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SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three distinct, although conceptually related, papers that are
unified in their focus on data-driven, stochastic sequential decision-making environments,
but differentiated in their respective applications. In Chapter 2, we discuss a special class
of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) in which the sources of un-
certainty can be naturally separated into a hierarchy of effects — controllable, completely
observable effects and exogenous, partially observable effects. For this class of POMDPs,
we provide conditions under which value and policy function structural properties are in-
herited from an analogous class of MDPs, and discuss specialized solution procedures.
In Chapter 3, we discuss an inventory control problem in which actions are time-lagged,
and there are three explicit sources of demand uncertainty — the state of the macroecon-
omy, product-specific demand variability, and information quality. We prove that a base
stock policy — defined with respect to pipeline inventory and a Bayesian belief distribu-
tion over states of the macroeconomy — is optimal, and demonstrate how to compute these
base stock levels efficiently using support vector machines and Monte Carlo simulation.
Further, we show how to use these results to determine how best to strategically allocate
capital toward a better information infrastructure or a more agile supply chain.
Finally, in Chapter 4, we consider how to generate trust in so-called development pro-
cesses, such as supply chains, certain artificial intelligence systems, and maintenance pro-
cesses, in which there can be adversarial manipulation and we must hedge against the
risk of misapprehension of attacker objectives and resources. We show how to model dy-
namic agent interaction using a partially-observable Markov game (POMG) framework,
and present a heuristic solution procedure, based on self-training concepts, for determining




This dissertation is unified in its focus on partially observable sequential decision-making
environments under uncertainty. That is, this research is concerned with real-world envi-
ronments in which a decision-maker (DM) is tasked with making decisions sequentially
over time in such a way so as to optimize over some objective criterion, i.e. minimize the
costs or maximize the rewards, such as revenue or profit, accrued over the decision horizon.
Moreover, we consider decision-making environments that involve both uncertainty in their
dynamics — that each decision DM induces the state of the system to change according to
a random draw from a probability distribution — and partial observability in their infor-
mation structure — that the DM must make decisions on the basis of data that inform, but
do not completely reveal, the true state of certain aspects of the system. Since decisions are
made on the basis of data, rather than direct observation (of at least some aspects) of the
state of the system, these decision-making environments necessitate that the DM specify
a way to learn, or process, data over time into decisions, so as to optimize with respect to
their objective criterion. Solutions for the DM in such environments are, therefore, policies
— functions that specify at each decision epoch what action should be taken, given the data
available.
Decision-making environments such as these are manifest in much of human (and
computer-based) experience. A company must make operational decisions on the basis
of data about the micro- and macro-economic environment, so as to reach business ob-
jectives. A self-driving car must make decisions on the basis of sensor readings (data) of
the state of the road, in order to reach its destination safely and efficiently. We all make
decisions in our lives on the basis of what we know and observe, so as to increase our
health, our happiness, our pleasure, etc. The wide applicability of methods for modeling
1
such decision-making environments broadly motivates our study in this dissertation.
This body of this dissertation is composed of three distinct papers that consider different
partially observable sequential decision-making environments under uncertainty.
In Chapter 2, we consider a class of sequential decision-making problems under uncer-
tainty in which there is a natural hierarchy of effects: micro-level forces that the decision-
maker (DM) can control, and macro-level forces that the DM cannot. These problems have
a completely observed state process subject to control of the DM and a partially observed
modulation process exogenous to DM control that can affect the dynamics of the state pro-
cess. We model this broad class of problems as a specially structured partially observed
Markov decision process (POMDP) and call it the modulated POMDP or M-POMDP. The
M-POMDP has many application areas, from inventory control to healthcare systems to
dynamic pricing. By separating the belief update from actions taken, we show that the M-
POMDP inherits value function and optimal policy function structure from its completely
observed MDP analog. Further, we show that the M-POMDP allows for specialized ap-
proximate solution procedures based on solution procedures for the MDP.
In Chapter 3, we consider an inventory control problem that explicitly incorporates
three different types of uncertainty — the state of the macroeconomy, product-specific de-
mand variability, and information quality — in which ordering decisions are time-lagged
and made on the basis of historical demand and noise-corrupted observational data that are
Markov-modulated. We demonstrate how to efficiently compute an optimal ordering pol-
icy using grid-based approximation methods, simulated trajectories of future observational
uncertainties, and successive support vector machines. We then consider how our model
might address the following demand management question: should capital be allocated to-
wards (1) a better information infrastructure (data, forecasts, quantitative talent, etc.), or (2)
a more agile product architecture and supply chain design in order to more quickly respond
to changing demand? We show that better information quality and agility improves system
performance under optimal policies, and demonstrate how to numerically quantify these
2
effects using Monte Carlo simulation.
In Chapter 4, we consider how to increase trust in development processes in which
there is risk for adversarial manipulation and the adversary’s objectives, resources, and
level of rationality are either ill-specified, imprecisely specified, or unknown. In such prob-
lems, we must hedge against the risk of misapprehension of attacker objectives, resources,
and rationality, which is further complicated in the absence of adversarial training data.
We show how to model dynamic agent interaction, on the basis of partially observed or
noise corrupted data, using a partially-observable Markov game (POMG) framework. We
then propose a three-fold heuristic solution procedure that (1) uses the POMG to gener-
ate potential adversarial policies, (2) explicitly incorporates these adversarial policies in
the construction of a robust defender policy by solving a robust dynamic program, and (3)
employs a probability matching heuristic in partially observable environments.








Sequential decision-making environments often involve multiple tiers of effects — (1) the
micro-level forces that the decision-maker (DM) can influence or control through actions,
and (2) the macro-level forces that the DM cannot. This uncontrollable, macro-level tier
of effects includes forces such as the macro-economy, the stock market, or natural phe-
noma, (e.g. weather, water currents, airstreams, etc.). These tiers of effects often also
correspond to degrees of observability, leading to an information asymmetry. To reflect
this environment, we present a specially structured partially observed Markov decision
process (POMDP) having a completely observed state process (representing micro-level
effects) and a partially observed modulation process (representing macro-level effects),
where the modulation process affects the decision-making environment but is not affected
by actions of the DM. We call this specially structured POMDP the modulated POMDP, or
M-POMDP.
We remark that an important feature of the general POMDP is that it allows for the study
of the interplay between information and control. Although the M-POMDP separates the
belief update from the action and thus does not consider this interplay, the M-POMDP
models a broad, far from restrictive, class of real-world problem settings where the DM is
affected by forces that the DM cannot control but must take into account. Reality is such
that: airlines must consider the weather in planning routes; investors must consider macro-
economic conditions when making investment decisions; urgent, personalized healthcare
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therapy manufacturers must consider the patient’s health when making production deci-
sions; fish must consider currents in swimming across a river. Our separation assumption
is analogous to the fundamentally important principle of separation of estimation and con-
trol in optimal stochastic control, where an optimal observer for the state of the system
does not depend on the choice of control ([6], [55]). The objective of this paper is to study
the implications of this class of POMDPs.
Decision-making environments of this sort arise in numerous applications in the liter-
ature, without a unifying analytical framework, which justifies and inspires much of this
research. These applications include inventory control, healthcare, and dynamic pricing.
Inventory Control. [31] considered a completely observed inventory control problem
with reorder cost K ≥ 0, augmented with a partially observed exogenous modulation pro-
cess, assumed the demand process was dependent on the modulation process, and assumed
the modulation process was observed by both the demand process and a so-called “addi-
tional observation data” (AOD) process. For example, the modulation process can model
the underlying state of the economy; the AOD process can model various macro-economic
indicators, e.g., the number of housing starts, consumer spending, etc. This data-driven,
modulated demand model generalizes models considered in the Markov-modulated de-
mand and Bayesian updating literatures.
For this specially structured POMDP, (an M-POMDP, as we will show in Section 2.6)
[31] showed that a generalized attainability assumption implied the existence of an optimal
myopic base-stock policy if K = 0 and the existence of an optimal (s,S) policy if K > 0.
[31] showed that (1) when K = 0, the value of the optimal base-stock level is constant
within regions of the belief space and that these regions can be described by a finite set of
linear inequalities, and (2) when K > 0, the values of s and S and upper and lower bounds
on these values are constant within regions of the belief space and that these regions can
be described by a finite set of linear inequalities. Further, under certain conditions, the
base-stock levels are shown to be monotone with respect to a partial order on the belief
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space.
[54] present a similar inventory control problem in which inventory levels are com-
pletely observed and the demand process is nonstationary and partially observed. In their
formulation, replenishment time may be instantaneous or a fixed number of decision epochs.
The probability distribution of demand is determined by the state of a Markov chain (which
corresponds to a modulation process in our formulation). They derive that a base-stock pol-
icy, in which base-stock levels are parametrized by the belief distribution over the possible
demand distribution states, is optimal and analyze the performance of various sub-optimal
heuristics. As in [31], this model can also be cast as a M-POMDP.
Healthcare. [41] considered the problem of when patients with end-stage liver disease
should accept or reject liver transplant offers. They model this problem as a completely
observed Markov decision process (MDP), including two state processes, the liver trans-
plant offer and the patient’s rank on the transplant list, that are exogenous to control. The
quality of the liver offered is dependent upon the patient’s rank state. At each decision
epoch, the patient may choose to accept or reject an offered liver, so they control (to some
extent) their health state, which is dependent upon these exogenous liver offer and rank
state processes. The authors prove various structural properties of the value function and
optimal policy function, such as the monotonicity of the value function with respect to an
order on the health states and the existence of an optimal control limit policy with respect
to the liver offer quality. [42] is an extension of this model to the case in which the rank
state is partially observed and, under the same rank state conditioning assumptions as in
[41], is a M-POMDP. The partially observed model in [42] is shown to inherit structural
properties from the completely observed model in [41], and features monotone structure of
the value function and optimal policy function with respect to the belief space.
Dynamic Pricing. [2] introduced a dynamic pricing problem for highly seasonal prod-
ucts, in which demand is dependent upon pricing decisions and the underlying partially
observed “core states” of their model, which are exogenous to control and (as in [31]) are
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used to model product seasonality and demand correlations over time. Their initial formu-
lation of the model is a POMDP, which they note is intractable to solve due to the intricate
dependence of both the tasks of optimizing the objective function and learning the core
states on the pricing decision. However, they propose a heuristic solution procedure in
which they augment their information process with a hypothetical observation process in
order to develop an approximation of their POMDP in which the task of learning the un-
derlying core states is independent of action. This approximate model is a M-POMDP, and
they observe that this approximate model features a passive learning environment, in which
the task of learning the underlying core states of the model is independent of the actions
taken to optimize the objective. This makes the approximate model much more tractable
than the original POMDP model.
In this paper, we generalize the models presented in [31], [54], [41], [42], and [2] to
a problem having a completely observed state process, a partially observed modulation
process, an observation process, and an action process, where (i) the value of the state
process at the next decision epoch depends on the current action selected, the current state
process value, and the realization of the observation process at the next decision epoch, and
(ii) the realizations of the observation and modulation processes at the next decision epoch
are dependent on only the current value of the modulation process. Thus, the state process
is affected by the modulation process only through the observation process, the observation
process only observes the modulation process, and the modulation process is not affected
by actions selected by the decision-maker.
The objective of this paper is to provide a unifying analytical framework for this broad
class of models, by which we recover and generalize the salient features and structural
properties found in [31], [54], [41], [42], and [2], and determine the implications in devel-
oping efficient solution procedures. To this effect:
(1) We show that the M-POMDP inherits value function and optimal policy function
structure with respect to the completely observed state process from a set of closely
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related (completely observed) MDPs.
(2) We show that the M-POMDP inherits value function structure with respect to the
belief vector from the general POMDP, and discuss the value of information in M-
POMDPs.
(3) We determine solution procedures that are based on the special structure of the M-
POMDP.
2.1.2 Literature Review
The research towards (1) is inspired by [35] and [46], and by the commonalities of the
structural results in [31], [54], [41], and [42]. [35] considered a notion of structure (which
we adopt) as a restricted subspace of a function space in which every function in the sub-
space possesses some property of interest, and presented sufficient conditions by which a
dynamic program has a value function and/or optimal policy function that are structured in
this sense. We observe that structure has been useful for improved implementation and, as
noted by [46], in developing a qualitative understanding of the model and characterizing
how the results will vary with changes in model parameters. For example, the optimality of
a base-stock policy for a large class of inventory control models is easy to implement and
has significant impact computationally. Further, [46] showed that for a MDP, if the reward
function satisfies a property P and the transition probabilities satisfy a stochastic version
of property P , then the value function satisfies property P , where structural properties
that satisfy property P include monotonicity, convexity, supermodularity, combinations of
these, and other properties of interest. We remark that, whereas [46] only considers value
function structure, we consider optimal policy structure as well. Additionally, we inves-
tigate structure with respect to the belief function, the value of information, and solution
procedures that utilize special properties of the M-POMDP that are beyond the scope of
the results in [46].
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Further, we note that the results in [31], [54], [41], and [42] are such that the value
function and optimal policy function are structured with respect to the completely observed
state variable, and parametrized by the belief distribution over the partially observed state
variable. In [31], the value function is convex with respect to the inventory on hand and
has an optimal base-stock policy, in which the value function and base-stock level are
parametrized by the belief distribution over the state of the broader economy. In [42], the
value function is monotone with respect to the health of the patient and has an optimal
control-limit policy, in which the value function and control-limit are parametrized by the
belief distribution over the rank on the liver transplant list. The base-stock and control-limit
policy structures are inherited from simpler models that are agnostic to the broader state of
the economy and the rank on the liver transplant list, respectively.
The research towards (2) is inspired by various structural and monotonicity results in
the POMDP literature ([45], [48], [29], [1], [58], [59], [61], [60]). [31] shows that the
optimal base-stock levels are monotone in the belief vector under a first-order stochastic
dominance assumption on demand. [42] reports similar monotonicity results. Further,
we investigate the value of information accrued via observations. For POMDPs, more
accurate observations of the underlying state process will never degrade optimal systems
performance but may degrade sub-optimal systems performance [62]. We recover similar
results for the M-POMDP in this paper, which differ from the general POMDP results in
that we allow observations to impact state dynamics and cost.
Finally, the research towards (3) is motivated by the well-known problem with POMDPs
that the belief space is uncountably infinite, leading to computational complications. Var-
ious solution approaches from exact methods ([45], [48], [25]), to fixed grid approxima-
tions ([30], [22]), to simulation-based approximations ([34], [49]) have been proposed. We
present specialized approximate solution procedures for the M-POMDP:
• An a priori simulation-based grid approximation method that utilizes the structure of
M-POMDP dynamics to separate the learning and optimizing tasks, a salient feature
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of the solution approach in [2].
• A real-time heuristic procedure that exploits the relationship between the M-POMDP
and its MDP analog.
• Approximation procedures based on information relaxation of the modulation state,
as in [7].
We remark that the modulation and observation processes in our model may be equiva-
lently viewed as a hidden Markov process (HMP), also referred to as a hidden Markov
model (HMM). Thus, we may view our specialized class of POMDPs as MDPs with a
state process that is weakly coupled to a HMP through observations. There is a thorough
literature pertaining to the analytical and asymptotic properties, parameter estimation, and
applications of HMPs. The literature of HMPs is useful for estimating the M-POMDP
model parameters in real-world applications. For an introduction to this literature, we refer
the reader to the survey [16].
2.1.3 Outline
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present a POMDP with a completely
observed state process, a partially observed modulation process, an observation process,
and an action process. We present preliminary results for this POMDP in Section 2.3,
and begin by applying known results to the POMDP defined in Section 2.2 that lead to
the development of the optimality equation. We then make key conditioning assumptions,
which leads to the definition of the M-POMDP. These assumptions lead to a reformulation
of the optimality equation and the definition of a set of completely observed MDPs that
we call the MDP analog to the M-POMDP. We then extend three structural conditions due
to [35] to the M-POMDP, followed by an extension of the structural results of [46] to the
M-POMDP.
We present our main structural results in Section 2.4. In this section, we first charac-
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terize the inheritance property of M-POMDPs, giving sufficient conditions by which the
M-POMDP inherits structure in its value function and optimal policy, for a large class of
structural properties, from its MDP analog. We then address the structural properties of the
value function with respect to the belief vector over the modulation space. We show that
the M-POMDP inherits concavity of the value function from the general POMDP, and dis-
cuss the value of information in M-POMDPs. Additionally, we present analogous results
when state dynamics are described by a difference equation, as is common for inventory
problems, rather than by conditional probabilities.
Section 2.5 gives examples of how our results may be used to extend MDP structural
results to the M-POMDP. We show in Section 2.5.1 that the M-POMDP inherits monotone
optimal policy structure from its MDP analog. In Section 2.5.2, optimal myopic policy
structure is shown to be inherited by the M-POMDP by determining that separability is
a structure that satisfies results in Section 2.3. In the appendix, we additionally consider
L♮-convexity and multi-modularity as C3 properties, which are structures present in certain
inventory problem settings ([28], [64]).
Section 2.6 demonstrates an example of how the M-POMDP (albeit not under this
name) has been used in the literature. We consider the inventory control problem of [31] in
Section 2.6.1 and show that M-POMDPs inherit the optimality of a base-stock policy for
the case where there is no reordering cost and backlogging is allowed.
Section 2.7 presents two solution procedures for the M-POMDP that do not extend to
the more general POMDP. In Section 2.7.1, we present an a priori simulation-based ap-
proximation method based on the dynamics of the modulation process to transform the
M-POMDP into an MDP. In Section 2.7.2, we present a heuristic approach that transforms
the M-POMDP into an MDP at each decision epoch, each of which is more tractable than
the MDP derived in Section 2.7.1. We then discuss solution procedures using an informa-
tion relaxation lower bound in Section 2.7.3 and the tradeoffs between our approaches in
Section 2.7.4. Conclusions and directions for future research are presented in Section 2.8.
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2.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a POMDP that has an infinite horizon and discrete decision epochs t = 0,1, . . .,
and involves a completely observed state process {st, t ≥ 0} existing in a space S, a partially
observed modulation process {µt, t ≥ 0} in a space M , an observation process {zt, t ≥ 1}
in a space Z, and an action process {at, t ≥ 0} in a space A = ⋃s∈S A(s), where at ∈
A(st),∀t. Assume that S,M,Z,A are discrete spaces and that these processes are linked by
the conditional probability P [zt+1, st+1, µt+1∣st, µt, at]. It will be convenient for notational
purposes to let P [zt+1, st+1, µt+1∣st, µt, at] = P [z′, s′, µ′∣s, µ, a].
We assume that c ∶ S × Z × A ↦ R is the bounded single period cost function, where
c(st, zt+1, at) = c(s, z′, a) is the cost accrued during period [t, t + 1). We further assume
that the action at epoch t can be selected on the basis of the information received up to t,
It = {st, st−1, . . . , s0, zt, zt−1, . . . , z1, at−1, at−2, . . . , a0, x0}, where x0 = {x0(µ), µ ∈ M}
and x0(µ) = P [µ0 = µ] for all µ ∈M . A function mapping the set of all It into the set of all
actions for all t is a feasible policy. The problem criterion is the expected total discounted
cost over the infinite horizon, where we assume β, 0 ≤ β < 1 is the discount factor. The
problem is to determine a feasible policy that minimizes the criterion with respect to all
feasible policies.
2.3 Preliminary Results
Results in [45] and [48] imply that {(st, xt), t ≥ 0} is a sufficient statistic for this problem,
where xt = {xt(µ), µ ∈ M} and xt(µ) = P [µt = µ∣It]. We call xt the Bayesian belief
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function at epoch t and {xt, t ≥ 0} the belief function process. Let




x(µ)P [z′, s′, µ′∣s, µ, a]
λ(µ′∣z′, s′, s, x, a) = ∑µ
x(µ)P [z′, s′, µ′∣s′, µ, a]
θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a)
, θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a) ≠ 0
λ(z′, s′, s, x, a) = {λ(µ′∣z′, s′, s, x, a), µ′ ∈M} .
We can think of λ(z′, s′, s, x, a) as the posterior belief function xt+1, given xt = x, at =
a, st = s, st+1 = s′, and zt+1 = z′. Similarly, θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a) is the probability that zt+1 = z′
and st+1 = s′, given that st = s, xt = x, and at = a. Let V be the Banach space of bounded
value functions which map S ×X into R endowed with the sup-norm, and let H ∶ V ↦ V
be defined as
Hv(s, x) = min
a∈A(s)
{E [c(s, z′, a)∣x] + β ∑
z′,s′
θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a)v(s′, λ(z′, s′, s, x, a))} , (2.1)
where E [c(s, z′, a)∣x] = ∑z′,s′ θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a)c(s, z′, a). The optimality equation is v =
Hv. Results from [37] guarantee, by the contraction property of H , the existence of a
unique value function, v∗, such that v∗ =Hv∗, and that this fixed point is the expected total
discounted cost accrued by an optimal policy. Further, we can restrict search for an optimal
policy to t-invariant functions that select at on the basis of st and xt. Let Π to be the space
of such t-invariant functions from S ×X to A. The function, π ∈ Π such that π(st, xt) = at
causing the minimum in equation (2.1) to be attained is an optimal policy. The expected
total discounted cost accrued by this optimal policy can be attained by recursive application
of H , so that limn→∞ ∥v∗ − vn∥ = 0, where vn+1 = Hvn for all n, given v0 is any function in
V , and ∥⋅∥ is the sup-norm.
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2.3.1 Key Conditioning Assumptions.
By the definition of conditional probability,
P [z′, s′, µ′∣s, µ, a] = P [s′∣z′, µ′, s, µ, a]P [z′, µ′∣s, µ, a].
We assume that
P [s′∣z′, µ′, s, µ, a] = P [s′∣z′, s, a] (2.2)
P [z′, µ′∣s, µ, a] = P [z′, µ′∣µ]. (2.3)
We call the POMDP presented in Section 2.2 with these key conditioning assumptions the
modulated POMDP, or the M-POMDP.
We remark that the standard POMDP definition in the literature ([45], [48]) assumes
three processes, the partially observed state process, the observation process, and the ac-
tion process, all of which are linked by the given probability P [z′, s′∣s, a]. This standard
definition assumes P [z′, s′∣s, a] = P [z′∣s′, s, a]P [s′∣s, a], where P [z′∣s′, s, a] describes the
relationship between the state, observation, and action processes and P [s′∣s, a] describes
the controlled dynamics of the state process. We note that the conditioning for the POMDP
considered in this paper, P [z′, s′, µ′∣s, µ, a] = P [s′∣z′, s, a]P [z′, µ′∣µ], assumes that s′ is
dependent on z′, rather than vice versa.
Thus, for the M-POMDP we assume that the state process is affected by the modulation
process only through the observation process, the observation process only observes the
modulation process, and the modulation process is exogenous to control. Under these
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assumptions, we can rewrite θ,




p(s′∣z′, s, a)P [z′, µ′∣µ]
= p(s′∣z′, s, a)∑
µ,µ′
x(µ)P [z′, µ′∣µ]
= p(s′∣z′, s, a)σ(z′∣x),
where we let p(s′∣z′, s, a) = P [s′∣z′, s, a], and σ(z′∣x) = ∑µ,µ′ x(µ)P [z′, µ′∣µ]. We can
then rewrite λ, by plugging in for θ and assuming θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a) ≠ 0, as follows:
λ(µ′∣z′, s′, s, x, a) = ∑µ
x(µ)P [z′, s′, µ′∣s, µ, a]
θ(z′, s′∣s, x, a)
= ∑µ






Thus, λ(µ′∣z′, s′, s, x, a) is independent of s′, s, a, and we denote λ(µ′∣z′, s′, s, x, a) =
λ(µ′∣z′, x) for all µ′ ∈M and λ(z′, x) = {λ(µ′∣z′, x), µ′ ∈M}.
Note E[c(s, z′, a)∣x] = ∑z′,µ′∑µP [z′, µ′∣µ]x(µ)c(s, z′, a) = ∑z′ σ(z′∣x)c(s, z′, a), and
let
hz′(s, a, v̄) = c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)v̄(s′).
We then reformulate the operator H as follows:




σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x)))} .
We can now define the completely observed MDP analog to the M-POMDP. LetMDPz′
have single period cost function c(s, z′, a), transition structure {p(s′∣z′, s, a)}, and operator
H̄z′ v̄(s) = min
a∈A(s)
hz′(s, a, v̄). (2.4)
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We call the collection {MDPz′ ∶ z′ ∈ Z} the completely observed MDP analog of the
M-POMDP.
2.3.2 The Porteus Results Extended
Let Vx denote the halfspace of V induced by affixing x ∈ X (i.e. Vx = {f(⋅, x) ∶ f ∈ V },
∀x ∈ X) and Πx denote the halfspace of Π induced by affixing x ∈ X . Suppose Ṽ is
a space of structured value functions S ↦ R, and Π̃ is a space of structured Markovian
deterministic policy functions S ↦ A.
We now present the three structural conditions found in [35] extended to the M-POMDP
setting:
P(a) Structured space of functions contains its limit points
Ṽ is a closed subset of Vx,∀x ∈X .
P(b) Structured Value Preservation
v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ ,∀x ∈X ⇒Hv(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ ,∀x ∈X .
P(c) Structured Policy Attainment
v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ ,∀x ∈X ⇒ ∃π(⋅, x) ∈ Π̃,∀x ∈X s.t.
Hv(⋅, x) =∑
z′
σ(z′∣x)hz′(⋅, π(⋅, x), v(⋅, λ(z′, x))),∀x ∈X.
We refer to P(a), P(b), and P(c) as the extended Porteus conditions. Condition P(a)
insures that the limit point of a sequence of value functions obtained by the value iteration
algorithm will be in the space of structured value functions, condition P(b) insures that
the structure of the value function is preserved when applying the dynamic programming
operatorH , and condition P(c) insures that for all structured value functions on S, it suffices
to search the space of structured policies (smaller than the space of all policies) for a v-
improving policy.
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We present a proposition in which we establish that P(a), P(b), and P(c) are sufficient
conditions to guarantee that the value function and an optimal policy function are structured
on S. Subsequent results pertaining to structure on S demonstrate sufficient conditions for
P(a), P(b), and P(c) to hold, by investigating the M-POMDP model primitives and the
relationship to the MDP analog.
Proposition 1. Assume the extended Porteus conditions hold. Then there exists a π∗(⋅, x) ∈
Π̃ and a v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X such that
v∗(s, x) =Hv∗(s, x) =∑
z′
σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, π∗(s, x), v∗(⋅, λ(z′, x)))
for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X .
Proof of the above result is a straightforward extension of Theorem 6.11.1 in [37]. We
remark that the structured optimal value function and the structured optimal policy are both
modulated by the belief process {xt, t > 0}. The following corollary establishes that it is
sufficient for only P(a) and P(b) to hold to establish structure of the value function on S,
absent structure in the policy.
Corollary 1. If only P(a) and P(b) hold, then v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
2.3.3 Smith & McCardle Results Extended
We now seek properties that guarantee value function structure on S. Our approach, in
this subsection, is to extend properties due to [46] to the M-POMDP. Towards this aim, we
present four definitions due to [46] — the closed convex cone property (C3), the single point
property, the joint extension, and the stochastic dominance analog — and three related
results — Propositions 2, 3, and 4 — that work towards the structural results in Section
2.4. We begin with the definition of a C3 property.
Definition 1. (C3 property) P is a closed convex cone property (C3) if and only if the set
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of all real-valued functions on S satisfying P forms a closed convex cone in the topology
of pointwise convergence.
We assume for the remainder of this section that Ṽ is a space of structured value func-
tions possessing a C3 property, P . Proposition 1 in [46] gives us an equivalent definition
of C3 property in terms of an inequality “test of satisfaction”. A real-valued function f
on S satisfies a C3 property if and only if there exists a finite set of points {sj, j ∈ Jk},






where K is an index set.
For Proposition 2 below, we will need to consider a special sub-class of C3 properties,
defined in terms of the “test of satisfaction” definition of C3 properties.
Definition 2. (Single Point Property) A C3 property P is considered a single-point prop-





where {γi, i ∈ Ik} is a finite set of positive weights, and K is an index set.
Many of the structural properties that we care about are in fact single point properties:
isotonicity, antitonicity, convexity, subadditivity. The notion of single-point properties en-
capsulates the intuition that if the function, f ∶ S × A ↦ R to be minimized satisfies a
structural property on S for every a ∈ A, then the function, optimized over A should retain
the property on S. As [46] show, this intuition does not hold in general, but does hold for
this special class of single-point C3 properties.
Our next result is the first step towards extending MDP results to the M-POMDP. The
idea is if hz′(s, a, v) has a single-point C3 property on S, for all a ∈ A and z′ ∈ Z, then the
optimal value function v∗ will have structure on S, for each belief state x ∈X .
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Proposition 2. Assume for all v̄ ∈ Ṽ , −v̄ possesses a special single-point C3 property,
P . If v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X implies hz′ (⋅, a, v(⋅, x)) ∈ Ṽ , for all a ∈ A,x ∈ X , then
v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
Our next result provides another set of sufficient conditions on hz′ for which P(b) holds.
In fact, these sufficient conditions contain the prior conditions. Towards this effort, we
introduce the notion of a joint extension of a C3 property.
Definition 3. (Joint Extension) Given a C3 property P on S, a function f ∶ S × A ↦ R
satisfies a joint extension of P on S ×A, call it P∗, if and only if for any k ∈ K, actions
{aj, j ∈ Jk}, ∃{ai, i ∈ Ik} such that
∑
j∈Jk
γjf(sj, aj) ≤ ∑
i∈Ik
γif(si, ai)
where {γj, j ∈ Jk}, {γi, i ∈ Ik} are finite sets of positive weights associated with the test of
satisfaction for P .
This next proposition makes use of Proposition 4 in [46] and states that if for MDPz′ ,
when v̄ satisfies a C3 property and hz′(⋅, ⋅, v̄) satisfies a joint extension of that C3 property
for all z′ ∈ Z, then v∗ is structured on S.
Proposition 3. If v̄ ∈ Ṽ implies hz′(s, a, v̄) satisfies a joint extension of P in (s, a) on
S ×A, P∗, for all z′ ∈ Z, then v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
In our next result, we present conditions on the model primitives c, p, and v that guaran-
tee P(b) holds, thereby guaranteeing that v∗ is structured on S by Corollary 1. Towards this
aim, we introduce the notion of stochastic dominance relations, which will define stochas-
tic analogs for the C3 properties and their joint extensions that we have introduced thus far.
We frame the definition explicitly in terms of the random variable parameters of interest in
this paper. A more thorough and general treatment can be found in [46].
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Let st+1(s, z′, a) be the random variable for the state at time t+1, conditioned on st = s,
zt+1 = z′, and at = a. The transition probability function p(⋅∣z′, s, a) represents a probability
measure on S, for all s ∈ S, z′ ∈ Z,a ∈ A.
Definition 4. (Stochastic dominance analog) We say that st+1(z′, s, a) stochastically dom-
inates st+1(z′, s′, a′) on Ṽ , if
Ev (st+1(z′, s, a)) ≥ Ev (st+1(z′, s′, a′)) , ∀v ∈ Ṽ .
Additionally, [46] present an equivalent representation of these dominance relations
with respect to the probability measures p, using a binary relation ≾Ṽ , such that st+1(z′, s, a)
stochastically dominates st+1(z′′, s′, a′) on Ṽ if p(⋅∣z′, s′, a′) ≾Ṽ p(⋅∣z′, s, a). As in [46], we
say that st+1(z′, s′, a′) satisfies the stochastic analog of P (a property of functions on S×A)
on Ṽ , call it PṼ , if the inequality test of satisfaction for P is satisfied with respect to ≾Ṽ .
This brings us to our next result, which is an extension of Proposition 5 in [46], and
states that if the value, cost, and probability transition functions satisfy a C3 property, its
joint extension, and its stochastic joint extension, respectively, for each observation z′ and
belief distribution x, then v∗ is structured on S.
Proposition 4. Suppose Ṽ , C̃, P̃ are spaces of structured value, cost, and probability tran-
sition functions for which v̄ ∈ Ṽ has a C3 property, P , c̄ ∈ C̃ has a joint extension of P on
S ×A, and p̄ ∈ P̃ has a stochastic joint extension of P (a property of functions on S ×A)
on Ṽ , call it PṼ . If the following conditions hold:
(i) c(⋅, z′, ⋅) ∈ C̃ for all z′ ∈ Z
(ii) p(⋅∣z′, ⋅, ⋅) ∈ P̃ for all z′ ∈ Z.
Then, v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
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2.4 Main Structural Results
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 present sufficient conditions for guaranteeing value function struc-
ture on S by guaranteeing that P(b) holds under operator H . We now present our primary
structural results, which formalize the inheritance property of M-POMDPs — that value
function and optimal policy function structure of the MDP analog are inherited by the M-
POMDP. Oftentimes in modeling efforts we make stylized and unrealistic simplifying as-
sumptions for the sake of analytical tractability and gaining important qualitative intuition
about a system (e.g. demand is i.i.d. across decision epochs, a firm operates independent of
competitors). The thrust of the results in this section is that, for an important class of prop-
erties and models, we may analyze a simpler model and guarantee the structural properties
hold for a more robust model. Thus, analytical tractability need not be traded for modeling
realism. We use this inheritance property liberally in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 in order to give a
flavor of how the results in this section may be used in extending general MDP results and
in specific applications. In this section, we also demonstrate how many of the value func-
tion and optimal policy function structural results on X from the POMDP literature apply
to the M-POMDP. We then, finally, relate the definition of dynamics via conditional prob-
abilities to the functional description of dynamics, as is more natural in many application
settings, such as inventory control.
2.4.1 Structure on S
We begin by stating the Porteus conditions for MDPs, and recapitulating, for ease of refer-
ence, the structural implications for the MDP analog.
Pz′(b) Structured Value Preservation
ṽ ∈ Ṽ ⇒ H̄z′ ṽ ∈ Ṽ .
Pz′(c) Structured Policy Attainment
ṽ ∈ Ṽ ⇒ ∃π̃ ∈ Π̃ s.t. H̄z′ ṽ = hz′(⋅, π̃, ṽ).
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The following proposition is due to [35] and is stated in Theorem 6.11.1 in [37].
Proposition 5. Suppose P(a), Pz′(b), and Pz′(c) hold. Then there exists a π∗z′ ∈ Π̃ and a
v∗z′ ∈ Ṽ such that v∗z′(s) = H̄z′v∗z′(s) = hz′(s, π∗z′(s), v∗z′), for all s ∈ S.
Corollary 2. Suppose P(a) and Pz′(b) hold. Then v∗z′ ∈ Ṽ .
Suppose F̃ is a space of functions from S ×A to R that satisfy a joint C3 property, P∗.
Further, let ∆ be the space of feasible MDP analog policies from S to A (note that Π̃ ⊆ ∆).
We present conditions by which the M-POMDP inherits this MDP analog structure:
B(a) ṽ ∈ Ṽ ⇒ hz′(⋅, ⋅, ṽ) ∈ F̃
B(b) f ∈ F̃ ⇒min
δ∈∆
f δ ∈ Ṽ
B(c) f ∈ F̃ ⇒ ∃π̃ ∈ Π̃ s.t. min
δ∈∆
f δ = f π̃,
where f δ(s) = f(s, δ(s)) for all s ∈ S, and the minimum with respect to δ ∈ ∆ is taken
pointwise, i.e. [minδ∈∆ f δ] (s) = mina∈A(s) f(s, a) for all s ∈ S.
Condition B(a) guarantees that, for the MDP analog, the Bellman minimized function
hz′ is structured on S×A. We recognize that this structure must be preserved under expecta-
tion in order for the M-POMDP Bellman minimized function to inherit this structure, which
is guaranteed in that F̃ is a space of functions possessing a joint C3 property, P∗. Con-
dition B(b) insures that the minimization operation over feasible policies maps functions
from F̃ into Ṽ . Finally, condition B(c) supposes we know, or can show, that minimizing
functions of a certain structure on S × A yields a structured optimal policy. In fact, these
conditions are quite mild, and hold for every one of the applications in Sections 2.5 and 2.6.
There are various results in the literature in this vein, e.g. results pertaining to minimizing
submodular functions on a lattice ([53]) and minimizing L♮-convex functions ([64]).
Note that B(a) and B(b) straightforwardly imply that Pz′(b) holds for all z′ ∈ Z, and
B(a) and B(c) imply that Pz′(c) holds for all z′ ∈ Z. Thus, these are sufficient conditions for
guaranteeing that the MDP analog is structured in its value function and an optimal policy
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by Proposition 5. Our next proposition formalizes the inheritance property of M-POMDPs
by demonstrating that these sufficient conditions for guaranteeing structure for the MDP
analog are, in fact, also sufficient for guaranteeing the M-POMDP is structured on S in the
same way. The proof follows by demonstrating that B(a), B(b), and B(c) are sufficient for
guaranteeing that P(b) and P(c) hold, and then applying Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. Suppose P(a), B(a), B(b), and B(c) hold. Then there exists a π∗(⋅, x) ∈ Π̃
and a v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X such that
v∗(s, x) =Hv∗(s, x) =∑
z′
σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, π∗(s, x), v∗(⋅, λ(z′, x)))
for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X .
The following is a straightforward corollary that shows that P(a), B(a), and B(b) are
sufficient for guaranteeing value function structure, absent policy structure.
Corollary 3. Suppose P(a), B(a), and B(b) hold. Then v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
Of course, if the model primitives p = {p(s∣z′, s, a)} and c = {c(s′, z′, a)} guarantee
that B(a) and B(b) hold, then the M-POMDP is structured in its value function by the
Corollary 3.
Corollary 4. Suppose P(a) holds, and that p ∈ P̃ for all z′ ∈ Z and c ∈ C̃ for all z′ ∈ Z
imply that B(a) and B(b) hold. Then v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
2.4.2 Structure on X
In this subsection, we discuss some known structural properties related to POMDPs, as
they pertain to the M-POMDP. The following proposition is due to [45] and [48], in which
successive value approximations achieved by applying the Bellman operator, H , preserve
piecewise linearity and concavity of v with respect to x. Concavity is preserved in the limit.









Figure 2.1: A graphical depiction of Corollary 5, with a 3-dimensional belief simplex X ,
and where π∗(⋅, x) = δ∗j for all x in partition region Xj .
If v∗ can be shown to be piecewise linear in x on X as well (such as if the optimal
policy is finitely transient, as in [48]), then we have a corollary result. For the standard
POMDP model, the belief space X partitions into a finite number of convex, polyhedral
regions that specify an optimal control or action to take. We note that for the M-POMDP,
the belief space partitions into a finite number of convex, polyhedral regions that specify an
optimal control or action for each s ∈ S. Thus, these non-overlapping regions in X specify
a partial policy, i.e. functions from the state space S into the action space A. If Proposition
1 holds, then these regions specify structured partial policies.
Corollary 5. Suppose v∗ is piecewise linear in x on X . Then, there exists a partition of X
into a finite number of convex, polyhedral regions {Xj, j = 1, . . . , n} such that there exists
a set of functions from S into A, {δ∗j , j = 1, . . . , n}, such that π∗(⋅, x) = δ∗j for all x ∈ Xj ,
j = 1, . . . , n.
The various monotonicity results for the standard POMDP relate to the M-POMDP, and
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the following proposition is in the vein of results found in [29]. We will need the following
notions of stochastic partial order (in increasing strength).
• First-order stochastic dominance. x ⪰S if an only if ∑i≥q x(i) ≥ ∑i≥q x′(i).
• Monotone likelihood ratio (MLR). x ⪰LR x′ if and only if x(i)x′(i′) ≥ x(i′)x′(i), for
all i, i′ ∈M .
• Strong MLR. For any two functions f, g from Z ×M → R, f ⪰TP g if and only if
f(z ∨ z′, µ∨µ′)g(z ∧ z′, µ∧µ′) ≥ f(z, µ)g(z′, µ′), where z ∨ z′ indicates max{z, z′}
and z ∧ z′ indicates min{z, z′}.
We say that f is TP2 if f ⪰TP f .
Proposition 8. Suppose the following hold:
(a) c(s, z′, a) is nondecreasing in z′ on Z, for all (s, a) ∈ S ×A
(b) p(s′∣z′, s, a) is nondecreasing in z′ on Z, for all (s′, s, a) ∈ S × S ×A
(c) The M ×M matrix P [⋅, z′∣⋅] is TP2 for all z′ ∈ Z
(d) ∑µ′ P [z′, µ′∣µ] ≥ ∑µ′ P [z′, µ′∣µ̄] for all z′ ∈ Z, µ ≥ µ̄ ∈M
(e) P [z′, ⋅∣⋅] ⪯TP P [z̄, ⋅∣⋅] for all z ≥ z̄ ∈ Z.
Then, x̄ ⪯LR x implies v∗(s, x̄) ≤ v∗(s, x) for all s ∈ S.
2.4.3 Value of Information
For the general POMDP, improved observation quality will not degrade performance if an
optimal policy is applied, although this may not be true for sub-optimal policies ([45], [62]).
The analogous result for the M-POMDP is not as straightforward due to the non-standard
conditioning assumptions made in Section 2.3.1, as we now show.
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Consider two M-POMDPs, the first of which has cost structure {c̃(s, z̃, a)}, state tran-
sition structure {p̃(s′∣z̃, s, a)}, and observation structure {q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ)}, where q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ) =
P̃ [z̃∣µ′, µ]. The second of which has cost structure {c(s, z′, a)}, state transition structure
{p(s′∣z′, s, a)}, and observation structure {q(z′∣µ′, µ)}, where q(z′∣µ′, µ) = P [z′∣µ′, µ]. We
assume both M-POMDPs share the same modulation dynamics P [µ′∣µ].
We now present a definition of improved observation quality, as presented in [45], [62],
and elsewhere.
Definition 5. For any two probability distributions q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ), q(z′∣µ′, µ) over Z, we say
that q̃ has improved observation quality over q if there exists a Z × Z stochastic matrix, ξ,
such that q(z′∣µ′, µ) = ∑z̃ ξ(z′∣z̃)q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ).
We may view the stochastic matrix ξ as a Markov noisy channel, so that we consider
an observation distribution q̃ improved relative to q if q is equivalent to receiving a signal
from q̃ passed through a noisy channel. Let H̃ and H be the Bellman operators for the
first and second problems, respectively. Assume ṽ0 and v0 are given, ṽn+1 = H̃ṽn and
vn+1 = Hvn, and assume ṽ and v∗ are the fixed points of H̃ and H , respectively. In the
following proposition, we seek to use the concavity of the value function (Proposition 7)
in order to demonstrate the relationship between improved observation quality and system
performance under an optimal policy.
Proposition 9. Suppose q̃ has improved observation quality over q, so that there exists
a Markov noisy channel, ξ, such that q(z′∣µ′, µ) = ∑z̃ ξ(z′∣z̃)q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ) for all z′ ∈ Z,
µ,µ′ ∈M . Assume:
(a) c̃(s, z̃, a) = ∑z′ ξ(z′∣z̃)c(s, z′, a), for all (s, z̃, a) ∈ S ×Z ×A
(b) p̃(s′∣z̃, s, a) = ∑z′ ξ(z′∣z̃)p(s′∣z′, s, a), for all (s′, s, z̃, a) ∈ S × S ×Z ×A.
If ṽ0 ≤ v0, then ṽn ≤ vn for all n, and ṽ ≤ v∗.
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Thus, with cost and transition structures suitably weighted to take into consideration
the relationship between the quality of data provided by q and q̃, Proposition 9 is analogous
to the value of information results found in ([45], [62]) and elsewhere.
We remark that Proposition 9 can provide lower and upper bounds on the value func-
tions of any M-POMDP, in analogy to similar results found in [45] for the standard POMDP.
For lower bounds on v∗ and vn, set ξ(z′∣z̃) = q(z′∣µ′, µ) for z̃ = µ, if q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ) = 1 if and
only if z̃ = µ. Thus, if the first M-POMDP completely observes the modulation process,
then its value functions are lower bounds on the value functions of any M-POMDP.
For upper bounds on ṽ and ṽn, let q(z′∣µ′, µ) = q(z′) and set ξ(z′∣z̃) = q(z′) = ξ(z′).
Then, the second M-POMDP gains no information about the state of the modulation pro-
cess from the observation process (i.e., the modulation process is completely unobserved)
and hence its value functions are upper bounds on the value functions of any M-POMDP.
The lower bound described above is by modifying the M-POMDP so that each observa-
tion received is equal to the modulation state. We can, additionally, demonstrate that direct
knowledge of the underlying modulation process yields improved performance. Suppose
we want to minimize the expected total discounted cost, where at each decision epoch the
DM has available the information as in the M-POMDP, It, but also knowledge of the mod-
ulation states {µt, . . . , µ1}. Feasible policies map It ∪ {µt, . . . , µ1} into feasible actions at
all epochs t. The DM is faced with a MDP defined by the operator HM ∶ VM ↦ VM , where
VM is the space of bounded real-valued functions on S ×M ,




P [z′, µ′∣µ] [c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)v(s′, µ′)] .
We may view the lower bound generated in Proposition 10 as being generated by an infor-
mation relaxation, à la [7]. Proof of the proposition follows by straightforward observation
that all M-POMDP policies in Π are feasible for this MDP, but not all policies for this MDP
are feasible for the M-POMDP. We remark that this bound may be improved by applying a
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proper penalty term, akin to a Lagrangian relaxation, an idea developed in [7] and [38].
Proposition 10. ∑µ x(µ)vM(s, µ) ≤ v∗(s, x) for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X , where vM = HMvM
and v∗ =Hv∗.
2.4.4 Functional Description of Dynamics
In many applications, it is natural to describe the state dynamics on S via a function, f ∶
Z ×S×A↦ S rather than transition probabilities. For example, in inventory problems with
backlogging, f(z′, s, a) = s+ a− z′, where z′ is the demand over t to t+ 1. Note that this is
a special case for which the stochasticity of the transition probabilities is attributed solely
to the observation process. For these applications, our operator H is equivalently defined




σ(z′∣x)[c(s, z′, a) + βv(f(z′, s, a), λ(z′, x))].
We show in the next proposition that if the transition probabilities satisfy a stochastic joint
C3 property P∗
Ṽ
with respect to Ṽ , then under the equivalent functional dynamic equation
v composed with f exhibits the analogous joint C3 property, P∗ (e.g. if P∗
Ṽ
is jointly
increasing on S × A with respect to Ṽ , then v composed with f is jointly increasing on
S ×A).
Proposition 11. Suppose that f ∶ Z ×S ×A↦ S is an equivalent functional description of
state dynamics and v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X . Then, p(⋅∣z′, ⋅, ⋅) satisfies a stochastic joint C3
property P∗
Ṽ
on S ×A for all z′ ∈ Z so that for all k ∈K
∑
j∈Jk
γjp(⋅∣z′, sj, aj) ≾Ṽ ∑
i∈Ik
γip(⋅∣z′, si, ai)
if and only if v(f(z′, ⋅, ⋅), λ(z′, x)) satisfies the joint C3 property P∗ analogous to P∗
Ṽ
for
all (z′, x) ∈ Z ×X .
Now, we present sufficient conditions under which a structure on f is inherited by the
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composition of v and f .
Proposition 12. Suppose f(z′, ⋅, ⋅) satisfies a single point property P∗ for all z′ ∈ Z with
respect to some order on S, generated by the binary relation ≤S , defined by convex weights
{γj}, and Ṽ is the space of bounded, non-decreasing, and convex functions on S. Then, for
all v ∈ V such that v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X , v(f(z′, ⋅, ⋅), λ(z′, x)) has single point property
P∗ for all (z′, x) ∈ Z ×X .
2.4.5 Relative Optima & General State and Action Spaces
In all of the results included thus far, we have investigated structured policies which are
optimal across the entire state space, S. For many applications, such as in inventory prob-
lems (as we will investigate below), this assumption may be overly restrictive. In fact, it
may be the case that structured policies are only optimal with respect to some sequence of
sets of states {St, t ≥ 0}, for which structured actions are feasible. In such applications,
we need an additional attainability condition which guarantees that the structured policy is
always feasible (for an example in inventory applications, see Veinott’s attainability condi-
tion in [56] and [57], and extended in [31]). The results above hold when the proposition
conditions are appended with such an attainability condition.
Finally, while we present results here for the case where S andA are discrete, the results
can be extended to hold for more general spaces, with measure theoretic considerations.
2.5 Extending MDP Structural Results
We now apply the results in Section 2.4 to a couple of important classes of MDPs. For
each subsection we demonstrate that sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of an
optimal structured policy for the MDP are sufficient for guaranteeing the existence of an
optimal structured policy on S for the M-POMDP, modulated by the belief process {xt, t ≥
0}. In Section 2.5.1 we discuss monotone optimal policies by generalizing conditions in
[37]. We examine myopic policies in Section 2.5.2 and show that separability is a joint C3
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property, adding separability to the list of C3 properties given by [46]. Thus, conditions
from [47] which guarantee the existence of an optimal myopic policy for the MDP also
guarantee the existence of an optimal myopic policy for the M-POMDP.
2.5.1 Monotone Optimal Policies
We now turn our attention to a motivating and important application of our results in Sec-
tion 2.4 that will illustrate the manner in which our results may extend structural results in
the MDP literature to the more robust modeling framework of the M-POMDP. Due to their
appealing mathematical properties, various applications, and ease of implementation, there
has been much interest in optimal policies for MDPs that are monotone ([63], [37], [43]).
We now present sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal policy for the
M-POMDP that is monotone on S, parametrized by belief state x. The proof of this propo-
sition proceeds showing that B(a) - B(c) hold and applying Proposition 6. In the result
below, we will use the terminology that transition probability functions satisfy some prop-
erty “in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance”, by which we mean that they satisfy
the inequality test of satisfaction for that property with respect to ≾Ṽ (as in Proposition 11),
where Ṽ is the space of real-valued non-decreasing functions on S.
Proposition 13. Assume
(i) c(s, z′, a) non-increasing in s on S for all (z′, a) ∈ Z ×A
(ii) p(⋅∣z′, s, a) stochastically non-increasing in s on S, in the sense of first-order stochas-
tic dominance, for all (z′, a) ∈ Z ×A
(iii) c(s, z′, a) subadditive in (s, a) on S ×A, for all z′ ∈ Z
(iv) p(⋅∣z′, s, a) stochastically subadditive in (s, a) on S × A, in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance, for all z′ ∈ Z.
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Then, there exists an optimal value-policy function pair (v∗, π∗) such that v∗(s, x) is non-
increasing in s on S for all x ∈ X and π∗(s, x) is non-decreasing in s on S, for all x ∈ X .
2.5.2 Myopic Optimal Policies
We now consider myopic optimal policy structure, based on results in [47]. As in prior
sections, we use our framework to extend the sufficient conditions given in [47] to the
M-POMDP. We begin with a definition of separable functions.
Definition 6. (Separability) A function f ∶ S ×A↦ R is separable if there exists a function
K ∶ A↦ R and a function L ∶ S ↦ R such that f(s, a) = L(s) +K(a).
Proposition 14. Suppose a function f ∶ S × A ↦ R is separable, such that f(s, a) =
K(a) +L(s). Then, separability is a joint C3 property.
Now, we present conditions under which the M-POMDP yields myopic optimal poli-
cies. Let L be the set of bounded, real-valued functions that map S × Z to R, and let K
be the set of bounded, real-valued functions that map A to R.
Proposition 15. Assume
(i) ∃K(z′, ⋅) ∈ K , L(⋅, z′) ∈ L ∶ c(s, z′, a) =K(z′, a) +L(s, z′) for all z′ ∈ Z
(ii) p(⋅∣z′, s, a) is independent of s










(iv) a∗(xt) is feasible for all t




In this section, we consider the inventory control problem of [31]. The description of the
problem setting and formulation is abbreviated, and we refer the reader to the original
work for a more thorough and in-depth discussion. We include this brief description with
the intention to demonstrate that this is an M-POMDP, and how the structural results found
in this paper is consistent with the structural results from Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Namely,
in Section 2.6.1, we re-derive the results from [31] which present conditions for a partially
observed inventory control problem to have an optimal base-stock policy. The numerous
applications in the literature review may be re-cast as M-POMDPs and structural results
re-derived in a similar manner, justifying our claim that M-POMDPs model a broad class
of important problems.
2.6.1 Inventory Control
We now model the inventory control problem considered in [31] as a M-POMDP. In this
inventory problem, replenishment is assumed to be instantaneous and replenishment capac-
ity is assumed to be infinite. Let zt = (z1,t, z2,t), where {z1,t, t ≥ 1} is the demand process
and {z2,t, t ≥ 1} is the additional observation data (AOD) process. If the modulation pro-
cess represents the underlying state of the economy, then the AOD process might provide
macroeconomic data (e.g. consumer spending, housing starts), useful, together with de-
mand data, for more accurately forecasting the state of the economy and, hence, future
demand.
The single period cost accrued between epochs t and t+1 is ĉ(z1,t+1, yt), where yt = st+
at. The function ĉ(z1,t+1, yt) is assumed to be convex in yt with lim∣yt∣→∞ ĉ(z1,t+1, yt) = +∞.
The single period cost function extensively considered in [31] is ĉ(z′, y) = p(z′1−y)++h(y−
z′1)+, where (⋅)+ indicates the non-negative part, p is a shortage penalty per period for each
unit of stockout, and h is a holding cost per period for each unit of excess inventory after
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demand realization.
The dynamics of the inventory process are given by the functional equation st+1 =
f(z1,t+1, st, at), an example of which that is considered extensively in [31] is f(z1,t+1, st, at) =
f(z1,t+1, yt) = yt−z1,t+1. Thus, p(st+1∣st, z1,t+1, at) = P [st+1∣z1,t+1, yt] = P [st+1 = f(z1,t+1, yt)].
Proposition 16. Let y∗(x) = arg miny∑z′ σ(z′∣x)ĉ(z′, y) for all x ∈ X , and suppose
y∗(xt) is a feasible order-up-to level for all t. Then, the optimal value function, v∗(s, x), is
non-decreasing and convex in s for all x ∈X , and an optimal policy is π∗(s, x) = y∗(x)−s.
We note that the condition y∗(xt) is a feasible order-up-to level for all t is an attain-
ability condition. In [31], this feasibility condition would be replaced by an extension of
Veinott’s attainability condition in [56] and [57].
2.7 Computational Procedures
In this section, we detail ways in which the M-POMDP conditioning structure (equations
(2.2) and (2.3)) admits to approximate computational solution procedures that are special
to M-POMDPs.
POMDPs, fundamentally, are difficult to solve for large instances due to the fact that the
belief space X contains an uncountably infinite number of possible belief vectors. There
have been various approaches in the literature that seek to overcome this issue, which may
be broadly characterized as exact methods, fixed-grid approximation methods, and belief
trajectory simulation methods.
Exact methods are based upon the value iteration algorithm and seek to solve the
POMDP exactly by utilizing the piecewise linear and concave structure of the value func-
tion with respect to x to construct the defining facets of v. [48] and [45] were the first
to take this approach in their seminal papers. [25] improved upon the complexity of this
approach by utilizing linear programming to construct the facet vectors.
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The most well-known fixed grid method is due to [30], in which a Freudenthal trian-
gulation of the belief space generates point-based value function estimates at grid points
uniformly dispersed across X . Another similar approach is to generate a random grid on
X , which is shown to perform similarly to the Freudenthal triangulation method, as in [22].
Neither of these approaches utilize any of the information inherent to the dynamics of the
belief process.
Belief trajectory simulation methods are based upon the intuition that, for many prob-
lems, there are only a small subset of beliefs that are reachable under an optimal policy.
Various approaches in the literature successively build a grid on X by alternating at each
epoch between sampling new beliefs and performing value iteration operations on the new
belief states ([34], [49]).
We first present an a priori belief trajectory simulation method for constructing a dis-
crete grid approximation, X ′ ⊂ X , which utilizes the actual dynamics of the modulation
and observation processes, while alleviating the computational burden associated with past
approaches due to the fact that learning in M-POMDPs is passive and independent of con-
trol. This method turns solving the M-POMDP into solving a completely-observed MDP
with state space S × X ′. Then we present a real-time heuristic method that utilizes the
M-POMDP structure to find approximate solutions for each belief state, as they are en-
countered in real-time. Finally, we discuss an information relaxation approach based on
the lower bound in Proposition 10.
2.7.1 Simulation-based Approximation Method
Suppose we have a metric space (X, ∥⋅∥), where ∥⋅∥ is the sup-norm and X is the belief
space. Let Xd ≜ {x ∈X ∶ ∃x′ ∈X ∶ x = ⌊x
′⋅10d⌋
10d
}, the grid of points in X rounded to the d-th
digit. Note that Xd ⊂X . We detail the so-called X ′ solution procedure for M-POMDPs.
In step 0, we initialize the solution procedure. We note that d should be a positive
integer and controls the fineness of the grid. The cardinality parameter, K, determines how
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0. Initialization. Initialize belief distribution, modulation state, number of simulation
runs, mesh parameter, and cardinality parameter — x0, µ0, N , d, and K respectively.
1. Belief simulation. Generate, according to P [z′, µ∣µ] the sequences {zt, t = 1, . . . ,N}
and {µt, t = 0, . . . ,N}. Then compute recursively {xt, t = 1, . . . ,N} such that xt+1 =
λ(zt+1, xt) for t = 0, . . . ,N − 1.
2. X ′ definition. Let x̃t be xt rounded to the d-th digit and let X ′ ≜ ⋃Ki=1 x̃(i), the K-th
most frequently visited balls of radius 10−d in X .
3. Solving the MDP with state space S ×X ′. Solve the modified completely observed
MDP with optimality equation




σ(z′∣x)[c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)v̂(s′, x′(z′, x))],
where x′(z′, x) ≈ λ(z′, x) and x′(z′, x) ∈X ′.
Figure 2.2: The X ′ method.
many points will be included in the approximate grid.
In step 1, we simulate a trajectory of the beliefs by simulating the evolution of ob-
servations and modulation states according to the underlying Markov chain governing the
dynamics, and recursively performing the belief update operations according to these ob-
servations and modulation states. So long as the Markov chain for the modulation states
is ergodic, simulating one long trajectory should be sufficient for approximating a steady
state distribution of modulation states. We note that this step is simulating a passive learn-
ing environment since the belief updates are independent of control under the M-POMDP
conditioning assumptions, guaranteeing that the learning operation for M-POMDPs is com-
putationally tractable.
In step 2, we determine {x̃t, t = 0, . . . ,N}, the set of simulated belief states rounded to
the d-th digit, so that x̃t is the unique point in Xd such that xt is within a ball of radius 10−d
of x̃t. Let X̃ = ⋃Nt=1 x̃t. (Note that X̃ ⊂Xd.) There is a complete order on X̃ induced by the
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binary operator, ⪯, defined so that








1{∥xt − x̃(j)∥ ≤ 10−d} .
This order counts the number of simulated beliefs that are rounded to a particular x̃ and
ranks them. We then define X ′ to be the K-th most frequently visited rounded beliefs
(Note that X ′ ⊂ X̃ ⊂Xd ⊂X). Of course, X ′ has cardinality K, so it is finite in dimension.
Finally, in step 3 we are left with the M-POMDP optimality equation, below






p(s′∣z′, s, a)v(s′, λ(z′, x))], ∀(s, x) ∈ S×X ′.
Our remaining challenge is that λ(z′, x) may not be in X ′ for a given (z′, x). Sup-
pose x ∈ X ′. The hope is that ∃x′(z′, x) ∈ X ′ such that λ(z′, x) ≈ x′(z′, x), and that
v(⋅, λ(z′, x)) ≈ v(⋅, x′(z′, x)). These assumptions may not hold if either λ(z′, x) is not
near any point in X ′ (although intuitively, in most cases, it should be since we chose
X ′ on the basis of frequently visited belief vectors in our simulation), or if λ(z′, x) is
near a facet of the Sondik regions of X , so that v(⋅, x′(z′, x)) is not a good approxima-
tion to v(⋅, λ(z′, x)). There are many ways we could define x′(z′, x), such as x′(z′, x) ≜
arg minx′∈X′{∥x′ − λ(z′, x)∥}.
This creates a well-defined MDP, with state space S ×X ′, which serves as our approx-
imate model for the M-POMDP. The benefits of this method is that we reduce drastically
the number of possible belief states that we need to consider in the M-POMDP by using
the actual dynamics of the system, which makes it better-suited than uniform or random
grid methods for each particular problem instance ([30], [22]).
2.7.2 Heuristic Solution Procedure
We now present an alternative, heuristic solution procedure that must be implemented in an
online manner. The fundamental idea is to map the M-POMDP into a related completely
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observed MDP with a state space on S × Z rather than on S ×X . We may assume that Z
is finite in its cardinality, and thus this mapping is a state space dimensionality reduction
technique (as is the X ′ procedure, above). The tradeoff is that we must solve such an MDP
at each time epoch in order to capture the belief dynamics.
0. Initialization. Assume (s0, x0) is given. Set t = 0.
1. Solve the completely observed MDP for all (s, z′):
v′z′(s, xt) = min
a∈A(s)




σ(z′′∣λ(z′, xt))v′z′′(s′, xt)} .
Let δ∗z′(s, xt) be an optimal policy, mapping S ×Z into A.
2. Choose action at to equal δ∗z′(st, xt) with probability σ(z′∣xt).
3. Observe the observation zt+1 (which will equal z′ with probability σ(z′∣xt)). Set
xt+1 = λ(zt+1, xt).
4. Observe the state st+1 (which will equal s′ with probability p(s′∣zt+1, st, at)).
5. Increment t← t + 1; go to 1.
Figure 2.3: Real-time heuristic method.










h(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))).
By pulling the minimization inside the summation, the idea is to establish a lower bound on
v∗ by solving a related problem. We formalize this intuition in the subsequent proposition.
Let
H̃z′ ṽ(s, x) = min
a∈A(s)




σ(z′′∣λ(z′, x))ṽz′′(s′, λ(z′, x))} ,
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and let ṽz′ be the unique fixed point of H̃z′ .
Proposition 17. v∗(s, x) ≥ ∑z′ σ(z′∣x)ṽz′(s, x), for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X .
Solving for {ṽz′ ∶ z ∈ Z} is no more computationally tractable than solving for v∗ due
to the cardinality of X and the dependence of ṽz′ on λ(z′, x). In developing our heuris-
tic procedure, we seek an approximation to {ṽz′ ∶ z ∈ Z} for a fixed x. If we assume
maxz′ ∥x − λ(z′, x)∥ is small, then it is reasonable to assume that ṽz′′(s′, λ(z′, x)) is close
to ṽz′′(s′, x) in many cases. This is effectively a learning rate assumption (that learning is
incremental and gradual), and is one that has been made in the literature, e.g. [31]. We then
define a completely observed MDP with state space S ×Z:
v′z′(s, x) = min
a∈A(s)




σ(z′′∣λ(z′, x))v′z′′(s′, x)} (2.5)
This is the intuition behind step 2 in Figure 2.3. Since this approximation is for a fixed x, it
is amenable to an online implementation, where this completely observed MDP is solved
for each xt.




where v′z′ is the fixed point of Equation 2.5. We use Equation 2.5 to develop a heuristic that,
for a given (s, x), chooses action δ∗z′(s, x) (an optimal policy mapping S × Z into A, for
this approximate MDP) with probability σ(z′∣x). This randomized policy is a probability
matching heuristic.
2.7.3 Information Relaxation
In Proposition 10, we establish that there always exists an information relaxation lower
bound by solving the MDP generated by HM . Of course, if we have available a heuristic
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policy, πh, then the value of that heuristic vπh , which may be found by solving for the fixed
point of Hπh either exactly or by Monte Carlo simulation, is an upper bound on v∗. Thus,
if the difference vπh − vM is small, then the heuristic πh is approximately optimal.
This method of utilizing the information relaxation lower bound might be combined
with some of the other solution procedures in this section to generate πh. For example, if
πM (a function from S ×M to A) is optimal for the information relaxation MDP gener-
ated by HM , then we might consider πh to be the randomized policy such that πh(s, x) =
πM(s, µ) with probability x(µ). If πX′ is the optimal policy generated for the MDP in Step
3 of Figure 2 (a function from S ×X ′ to A), then one might consider πh(s, x) = πX′(s, x̄),
where x̄ = arg minx′∈X′ ∥x − x′∥.
2.7.4 Tradeoffs & Remarks
There are many ways in which we may craft approximate solution procedures that utilize
the M-POMDP model structure. The procedures presented here are not meant to be exhaus-
tive, but rather illustrative examples of how the M-POMDP model structure might admit to
solution procedures that are unique to the M-POMDP.
In comparing the two solution procedures in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2, there are tradeoffs
that may make one or the other more well-suited for particular problem instances. For the
simulation-based approach, it may be the case that even though the number of reachable
belief vectors is finite, it may be very large. Thus the cardinality parameter K would need
to be very large in order to guarantee that the MDP on S×X ′ is a good approximation to the
M-POMDP. In such cases, if the cardinality of Z is small and much less than the number of
reachable belief vectors, then the real-time heuristic procedure may be much more tractable
to implement, even though the MDP on S ×Z must be solved at each decision epoch.
We recall that the number of operations per successive approximations step of an MDP
is on the order of the cardinality of the state space squared times the cardinality of the action
space. The cardinality of the state space for the simulation-based approximation method is
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K times the number of permissible actions, whereas this cardinality is ∣Z ∣ times the number
of permissible actions for the heuristic solution procedure, where ∣Z ∣ is the cardinality of the
set Z. Thus, the simulation-based method requires no more than the number of operations
per successive approximations step than the heuristic solution procedure if and only if
K < ∣Z ∣. We recall, however, that that the heuristic solution procedure requires its MDP to
be solved at each decision epoch.
Finally, we note that the procedures we detail in this section are not straightforwardly
applicable to the general POMDP. The X ′ method in Section 2.7.1 utilizes the passive
learning property of M-POMDPs, which is not a characteristic of general POMDPs. If we
extend the real-time heuristic procedure in Section 2.7.2 to the general POMDP, it generates
the best possible myopic policy, which can be decidely sub-optimal in many situations.
Lastly, the information relaxation approach in Section 2.7.3 utilizes the MDP generated by
HM , which is not applicable as a dual problem to the general POMDP.
2.8 Conclusions
We have presented and analyzed the M-POMDP, a specially structured POMDP that explic-
itly considers factors that affect the decision-making environment, are not controllable by
the DM, and are partially observed by a data-driven observation process. We demonstrated
that there is a broad class of decision-making environments with these salient character-
istics, and examples of this class have been considered previously in the literature, but
without a unifying analytical framework. We demonstrated that the characteristics of these
decision-making environments lead to interesting properties for the M-POMDP; e.g.
1. They model a broad class of problems.
2. They inherit the structural characteristics of the value function and optimal policy
function from their MDP analogs.
3. They inherit concavity of the value function from general POMDPs. With cost and
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transition structures suitably weighted to take into consideration the relationship be-
tween the quality of data, better observation quality improves optimal system perfor-
mance.
4. They separate at each decision epoch the task of learning the underlying modulation
state and optimizing, leading to improved tractability of solution procedures that are
special to the M-POMDP.
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CHAPTER 3
THE VALUE OF INFORMATION AND SUPPLY CHAIN AGILITY IN
MANAGING DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN INVENTORY SYSTEMS
3.1 Introduction
Demand uncertainty can have detrimental and propagating effects in a supply chain if im-
properly managed. These effects include cost pressures due to a supply-demand imbalance,
either incurring undue inventory holding, production, and distribution costs due to overly
optimistic demand expectations, or the opportunity costs of stock-outs and customer attri-
tion due to supply shortages and poor operating policy.
The big data revolution in the modern economy provides firms with unprecedented
availability of data, and thus potential for addressing demand uncertainty through data-
driven market insights and demand forecasts. Firms feel pressure to invest in an information
infrastructure — data access and engineering, IT systems, and quantitative talent — in order
to compete. At the same time, as the speed of information transmittal increases, consumer
trends are putting pressure on supply chains to cut cost and be more agile — to deliver
products or services more quickly. Creating agility, whether through a redesign of the
supply chain network or product architecture, allows the firm to react and quickly respond
to changing demand, reducing the burden of projecting demand too far into the future.
In this paper, we consider the effects of capital investments in supply chain agility
and an improved information infrastructure on an inventory control problem that explicitly
incorporates three sources of demand uncertainty — competitive pressures and the state
of the macroeconomy, product-specific demand variability, and information quality. The
decision-maker (DM) must make inventory ordering decisions on the basis of multiple in-
formation sources — historically observed demand and noise-corrupted observations of an
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exogenous modulation process that models broad macroeconomic and competitive effects.
Further ordering decisions take time to manifest in the market, e.g. due to transportation,
distribution, and/or production time, so the DM must consider how ordering decisions will
realize in potential evolutions of the market, demand, and observational data.
We prove conditions under which, for a fixed lead time and information quality, an
optimal policy for the DM has a base stock structure, in which the base stock levels are
with respect to the inventory position, i.e. total pipeline inventory level, and parametrized
by the DM’s Bayesian belief distribution over the possible states of the macroeconomy.
Even with this base stock structure, this optimal policy can be difficult to compute due to
cardinality of the Bayesian belief simplex and the number of potential evolutions of the
market, demand, and observations over the lead time between when ordering decisions are
made and their realization. In this paper, we present a computationally efficient method
for generating these base stock levels. We show that the optimal base stock levels are con-
stant within regions of the belief simplex defined by two linear inequalities. We then show
how to approximate the optimal base stock levels by generating a linear partition of the
Bayesian belief simplex using a fixed grid approximation to the simplex, simulating trajec-
tories of future observational uncertainties, and constructing the partitioning hyperplanes
using successive support vector machines.
Finally, we investigate how changes in information quality and supply chain agility
impact optimal inventory policies and system performance. This investigation is motivated
by the following questions:
• What is the value of information and the value of agility in managing demand uncer-
tainty? What are the limitations?
• How can a manager quantify, or measure, the effects of their operating policies and
strategic decisions on business objectives?
• Should investment money be allocated towards better data access/quality and infor-
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mation processing, or to a more agile product/supply chain design?
In considering these questions, we prove that better information — e.g. in the form of
better forecasts, an improved IT infrastructure, expanded data access — defined in terms of
signals passed through Markov noisy channels, improves long run costs under an optimal
policy (but not necessarily under a sub-optimal policy). Further, we provide conditions
on the firm’s cost structure under which these effects hold for investments in a more agile
supply chain, thereby proving both the value of information and agility. Finally, we show
how to evaluate numerically, using Monte Carlo simulation and regression, the effects of
investments in better quality information and agility in terms of discounted costs, stock-
outs, and risk of high-cost scenarios. We further discuss how these evaluations may serve as
the basis of ROI calculations, or an optimization model for determining capital allocation.
3.1.1 Literature Review
This research brings together ideas from various strands of literature.
Inventory Control. In this paper, we consider a model that generalizes approaches in
the Markov-modulated demand and Bayesian updating inventory control literatures. [31]
consider a completely observed inventory control problem with instantaneous replenish-
ment and backlogging, augmented with a partially observed exogenous modulation pro-
cess that models the underlying state of the economy. This modulation process is observed
by demand realization and an “all other data” (AOD) process. This is, to the best of our
knowledge, the only inventory control model in the literature to explicitly incorporate a
generalized source of macroeconomic data, and is the modeling framework that most re-
sembles our own. They prove the optimality of base stock policies that are parametrized by
the Bayesian belief distribution over the modulation space, and that these base stock levels
are constant within regions of the belief space defined by a finite set of linear inequalities.
We recover similar results in this paper, but whereas [31] assume instantaneous replenish-
ment, we consider ordering decisions with delayed replenishment, a generalization that we
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also consider to be more realistic in practice. Further, we present a way to incorporate
support vector machines, a popular technique for classification and regression problems in
machine learning, in order to efficiently construct the belief space partition.
[54] consider a completely observed inventory control model with a Markov-modulated
demand environment, in which the modulation process is partially observed by demand re-
alizations. They determine the optimality of base stock policies that are parametrized by a
Bayesian belief distribution over the modulation space. However, due to the intractability
of solving for base stock levels at each belief vector they present and evaluate multiple
heuristics in order to determine the quality of each heuristic in various demand environ-
ments. We note that we consider additional sources of information explicitly in this paper
and utilize the problem structure to avoid computational intractabilities due to the cardinal-
ity of the belief simplex. [7] apply information relaxation duality to determine tight bounds
on the performance of the heuristics considered in [54].
POMDPs. [5] analyze specially structured POMDPs, so-called modulated POMDPs
or M-POMDPs, in which there are multiple levels of effects — a completely observed and
controllable state process weakly coupled through observations to a partially observed and
uncontrollable modulation process. For this class of models, value function and optimal
policy structure are inherited from analogous MDPs and feature a passive learning envi-
ronment. Our model satisfies assumptions on the dynamics as in the M-POMDP, and may
be properly reformulated into this framework. We prove the optimality of base stock poli-
cies, which is a structure inherited from a simpler completely observed inventory control
model. Additionally, our model considers time-lagged actions, the effects of which to our
knowledge have not been analyzed for general POMDPs. [3] investigate POMDPs with
time-lagged and noise corrupted observations, but not actions.
Value of Information. The focus of this paper is closely related to the value of infor-
mation, which is a loosely and variously defined concept in the literature. [62] show for
POMDPs that worse observation quality, defined in terms of information corrupted by a
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Markov noisy channel, degrades system performance under an optimal control policy, but
may not degrade performance under suboptimal policies. We adopt this notion of observa-
tion quality in our investigation of the value of AOD information. [19] and [27] consider
the value of information flow between a supplier and retailer under different contexts, de-
fined in terms of expected costs, that resemble in principle our focus in its application to
supply chains, but are significantly different in approach and results. We note that often the
value of information is defined in terms of expected costs, but we additionally analyze the
effects of managerial decisions on other operational metrics, such as variance in Section
3.5 and stock-outs in Appendix B.5.
Support Vector Machines. As we have mentioned previously, we show that the struc-
tural properties of our problem admit to an optimal policy dependent upon a partition of the
space of Bayesian belief distributions over the modulation states. We introduce a sequen-
tial procedure for constructing the partition utilizing support vector machines, a popular
machine learning technique introduced in [14] for classification problems.
Hidden Markov Models. The modulation, AOD, and demand processes in our model
may be viewed as a hidden Markov model (HMM). Thus, our inventory control model may
be considered a MDP weakly coupled to a HMM via the demand process. Methods for
determining the underlying HMM primitives in our model are outside the scope of this
paper, but for a survey of such techniques and HMM theory we refer the reader to [16].
Hierarchical/Multilevel Modeling & Separation. Our modeling approach in this paper
is analogous to developments in the statistical literature pertaining to hierarchical, or multi-
level, modeling ([20]). In statistics, this refers to nested or composed statistical models, in
which compositions represent dependencies. Every super-model is dependent upon effects
modeled in the sub-model, but the sub-model is not dependent upon effects in the super-
model. This is also similar to the separation principle in the control literature, in which
state estimation is separated and performed first, and then optimization follows given the
results of state estimation ([6], [55]). Thus, state estimation is the sub-model and optimiza-
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tion is the super-model. In our modeling framework (from the lowest level model to the
highest), the dynamics of the macroeconomy are modeled as a Markov chain and called
the modulation process. The demand and AOD information processes are modeled as a
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) in which the latent stochastic model is the modulation pro-
cess. The inventory control model is a M-POMDP, which takes as a constituent sub-model
the demand/information/modulation HMM. In other words, the M-POMDP is composed
of the HMM, which in turn is composed of the Markov chain. There is a natural hierarchy
to this problem, in which the highest level model corresponds to the most local effects to
the firm (inventory ordering decisions) and the lowest level model corresponds to the least
local effects to the firm (the macroeconomy). The M-POMDP regards the firm’s inven-
tory decisions and interaction with the economic environment; the HMM models how the
macroeconomy generates information; the Markov chain models how the macroeconomy
evolves.
3.1.2 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the initial model
formulation and discuss how the model primitives explicitly reflect three types of demand
uncertainty. In Section 3.3, we show how the initial model formulation can be alternatively
expressed into a form that is more conducive to structural analysis. Section 3.4 is dedicated
to proving the optimality of base stock policies and how to efficiently compute the order-
up-to levels using the structure of the base stock levels with respect to the Bayesian belief
simplex and support vector machines. In Section 3.5, we consider how/whether capital
should be allocated to manage demand uncertainty through better information or supply
chain agility. In subsections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, we prove how the value function is affected
by AOD information quality and lead time. In subsections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4, we perform a
Monte Carlo numerical analysis and regression sensitivity analysis on a numerical example
in order to demonstrate how to quantify the effects of operational performance with respect
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to information quality and agility. Then, we discuss how this numerical output might be
embedded in a capital allocation decision-making process. We conclude and discuss future
research directions in Section 3.6.
3.2 Problem Formulation
We consider a discrete-time stochastic dynamic program with the following constituent
processes:
• {st, t = 0,1, . . .} is defined to be the inventory level process, where st is the inventory
level at the decision epoch t prior to satisfying demand and being replenished.
• {dt, t = 0,1, . . .} is defined to be the demand process, where dt is the demand that
becomes known just before decision epoch t.
• {at, t = 0,1, . . .} is the replenishment process, where at is the replenishment decision
made at decision epoch t.
• {zt, t = 1,2, . . .} is the additional observation data (AOD) process, where zt rep-
resents data that becomes known just before epoch t from sources in addition to
demand that might be useful in more accurately forecasting demand. The set of all
possible observations is Z and is assumed to be finite.
• {µt, t = 0,1, . . .} is the modulation process, models the underlying and perhaps only
partially observed forces that affect demand but are not controllable. The set of all
modulation states is M = {µ1, . . . , µ∣M ∣} and is assumed to be finite.
Further, we assume that the inventory, demand, and replenishment processes are related
through the stochastic difference equation st+1 = st +at−τ −dt, which assumes backlogging
is allowed, where τ is the replenishment delay. This equation can be described as a condi-
tional probability P [st+1∣st, dt, at−τ ]. We remark that this definition of inventory dynamics
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differs from the usual definition in that we allow the decision maker to know demand at
epoch t, whereas the typical formulation assumes that dt represents the (random variable)
demand realized between epochs t and t + 1. We further remark that when τ = 0, the re-
plenishment decision is made knowing the current inventory level and the current number
of orders to be fulfilled, thus resembling a build-to-order (BTO) production environment.
Hence, this model considers both BTO when τ = 0 and more traditional production envi-
ronments when τ > 0.
The modulation process is assumed to be related to the demand and AOD processes by
the conditional probability P [zt+1, dt+1∣µt+1, µt] and has dynamics described by the tran-
sition probability P [µt+1∣µt]. We assume the dynamics are described via the following
conditional probabilities,
P [zt+1, st+1, dt+1, µt+1∣st, dt, µt, at−τ ] = P [st+1∣st, dt, at−τ ]⋅P [zt+1, dt+1∣µt+1, µt]⋅P [µt+1∣µt].
(3.1)
While it is not necessary for most of the results we present in this paper, we will often
assume for simplicity that the demand and AOD processes are conditionally independent,
i.e. P [zt+1, dt+1∣µt+1, µt] = P [zt+1∣µt+1, µt] ⋅ P [dt+1∣µt+1, µt]. We will also assume that the
support of the demand distribution P [dt+1∣µt+1, µt] is finite for all µt+1, µt.
We denote the single-period cost accrued at epoch t as Cτ(st, dt, at, at−τ) = cτat +
hτ(st +at−τ −dt)+ +pτ(dt − st −at−τ)+, where (x)+ = max(0, x). The per-unit holding cost
is hτ , the per-unit purchase cost is cτ , and pτ is the per-unit underage cost. For notational
simplicity, we’ll suppress the τ from p and c in the formulations below when it is clear to
which τ we are referring.
At decision epoch t, the decision-maker (DM) makes decisions on the basis of their in-
formation pattern, It = {st, . . . , s0, dt, . . . , d0, zt, . . . , z1, at−1, . . . a−τ}. A feasible policy, π,
maps It into a replenishment decision. Let Π be the space of feasible policies. The overall
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βtCτ(st, dt, at, at−τ)∣I0] ,
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and at = π(It) for all t.
The optimality equation is v =Hv, where
Hv(It) = min
at
{Cτ(st, dt, at, at−τ) + βE [v(It+1)∣It, at]} . (3.2)
By results in [37], H is a contraction operator and there exists a unique fixed point v∗ of H ,
such that v∗ =Hv∗, representing the total expected discounted costs accrued by an optimal
policy. This fixed point can be attained by value iteration — repeated application of H , so
that limn→∞ ∥Hvn − vn∥ = 0, where ∥⋅∥ is the sup-norm and vn+1 =Hvn.
We note, additionally, that there are many alternative problem formulations that one
might consider, for which the general modeling framework and line of reasoning in this pa-
per would hold. For instance, in this paper we generate policies with respect to discounted
costs, and later incorporate other metrics in the evaluation scheme. We may be interested in
explicitly considering risk measures into the problem formulation. Other alternative formu-
lations might consider pricing or promotions along with inventory management, or assume
lost-sales for stock-outs.
3.2.1 Types of Demand Uncertainty
In this subsection we relate the model primitives to their applied context. In our model,
there are three explicit sources of demand uncertainty: the state of the economy, product-
specific demand variability, and information quality. We investigate in this paper how to
make optimal (or near-optimal) replenishment decisions in the presence of these sources of
demand uncertainty, and two primary ways of mitigating these uncertainties — (1) reducing
lead times by making the supply chain more agile, and (2) better data or information pro-
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cessing. (In Appendix B.5, we additionally consider artificially adjusting the cost structure
in order to generate policies that are robust to specific uncertainties.)
The state of the economy. The first source of demand uncertainty is the state of the
economy. Every firm is impacted by forces that they cannot control, including competi-
tive pressures, macroeconomic trends, financial markets, consumer sentiment, etc. In our
model, these exogenous forces are modeled through the modulation process, {µt}. In the
Markov-modulated demand literature, the modulation process is variously described as the
“core” process ([2]), the “world” process ([64]), or the “state of the economy” ([31]). In our
context, each µt is supposed to capture a possible “state of the economy”, and the stochastic
process modeling the evolution of the state of the economy is assumed to be a stationary
Markov chain. Thus, the dynamics and inherent uncertainties as to these uncontrollable
forces are modeled through the conditional probabilities P [µt+1∣µt] and a stochastic matrix
M such thatM[i, j] = P [µt+1 = µj ∣µt = µi]. We assume that the definitions of each mod-
ulation state and the Markov transition probabilities may be constructed or estimated by
macroeconomists considering the confluence of myriad market effects. The nature of these
transition probabilities impact the DM’s objective through the dependence of the demand
process on the modulation process. Thus at time t, the uncertainty as to the next state of the
economy, µt+1, yields additional uncertainty as to the realization of future demand. This
matches our intuition that demand forecasting requires considering explicitly the changing
market.
Product-specific demand variability. A second source of demand uncertainty is product-
specific demand variability — that is, the uncertainty in demand due to the nature of the
product itself, with all other exogenous factors held constant. In our context, this type of
demand uncertainty is modeled by the conditional probabilities, P [dt∣µt+1, µt], so we might
view each modulation transition (µt, µt+1) as representing a particular demand model,
dt∣µt+1, µt.
Information quality. The AOD process may be considered in various ways. One way is
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considering each AOD observation, zt, to represent data that are collected and informs the
DM about the state of the economy, such as SEC filings, housing starts, etc. Additionally,
we might consider zt to be the output of some firm’s internal information processing mech-
anism. For instance, it might be that zt is a demand forecast, or an estimation of the state of
the economy, that is the end result of an analytical process. Thus, the quality of these AOD
observations may reflect the degree of access to good data, the level of quantitative talent
inside the firm, the quality of IT systems, or any combination of these factors.
3.3 Preliminary Results
The optimality equation (3.2) is not suitable for solving due to the fact that It grows
linearly in t, so we must reformulate the problem. For the case when τ = 0, results in
[45] and [48] guarantee that (st, dt, xt) is a sufficient statistic for optimal control, where
xt = {xt(µ) ∶ µ ∈M} is the belief vector such that xt(µ) = P [µt = µ∣It]. We denote by X
the space of possible probability mass functions over M , the belief simplex, where
X ≜
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩







[3] extend these results to POMDPs with delayed and noise-corrupted state observations.
The following proposition is similar to these results and establishes a sufficient statistic for
our problem setting in which ordering decisions are delayed τ decision epochs between
placement of the order and fulfillment.
Proposition 18. The vector (st, dt, at−1, . . . , at−τ , xt) is a sufficient statistic for optimal
control.
Thus, we may reformulate the problem around the sufficient statistic (st, dt, at−1, . . . ,
at−τ , xt). It will be convenient to use the notation (s, d, a−1, . . . , a−τ , x) to indicate the
sufficient statistic (st, dt, at−1, . . . , at−τ , xt) (suppressing the t for notational simplicity) and
(d′, z′, µ′, s′) to represent (dt+1, zt+1, µt+1, st+1). The optimality equation then becomes
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v = H(a)v (the (a) superscript is an index defining the first reformulation), where H(a) is
defined as
H(a)v(s, d, a−1, . . . , a−τ , x) = min
a
{Cτ(s, d, a, a−τ)+
β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)v(s − d + a−τ , d′, a, . . . , a−τ+1, λ(d′, z′, x))},
(3.3)
and where
σ(d′, z′∣x) = ∑
µ′,µ
P [d′, z′∣µ′, µ]P [µ′∣µ]x(µ)
λ(µ′∣d′, z′, x) = ∑µ
P [d′, z′∣µ′, µ]P [µ′∣µ]x(µ)
σ(d′, z′∣x)
,
provided σ(d′, z′∣x) > 0. The vector λ(d′, z′∣x) is the Bayesian posterior belief vector over
the modulation space M , given that the prior belief vector is xt = x, the DM observed
demand dt+1 = d′, and the AOD observation is zt+1 = z′. Similarly, σ(d′, z′∣x) represents
the probability of observing demand d′ and AOD observation z′ given the prior belief vec-
tor x. We note that the posterior belief update, λ, is independent of control and thus we
have a passive learning environment. From a technical perspective, the passive nature of
the learning environment is due to the independence of the modulation state dynamics of
control, as is discussed in [5]. In our applied setting, this reflects our assumption that the
modulation process models forces that the DM must consider but cannot control.
We may further refine the optimality equation by defining yt = st +∑τj=1 at−j + at − dt,
the total amount of inventory possessed through the interval [t, t + τ]. Note that st+τ =
yt − at −∑τ−1j=0 dt+j . If we let ut = yt − at be the inventory position through interval [t, t + τ]
before ordering, then we have that ut+1 = yt − dt+1, which is familiar as the inventory
difference equation under backlogging. Finally, if project out purchase costs the resulting
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optimality equation is v = H̃v, where H̃ is defined to be:
H̃v(u,x) = min
y≥u















σ(d′, z′∣x)v(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))},
(3.4)
where h̃τ = βτhτ +cτ and p̃τ = βτpτ −cτ . We detail this reformulation in Appendix B.3 and
B.4.
3.4 Policy Construction
3.4.1 Base Stock Policies
Base stock policies have much appeal in the inventory literature due to their nice, simple
structure that yields computational advantages, as well as easy practical implementation.
We note that Equation 3.4 is in a familiar form, with backlogging state dynamics ut+1 =
ut + at − dt around the τ -lookahead inventory position (the total inventory orders across τ
decision epochs into the future).
Define y∗τ (x) as the smallest (and hence unique) myopic minimizer such that
y∗τ (x) ∈ arg min
y













It will be convenient to define the inner function, gτ :













In the following result, we provide conditions under which the base stock policy that or-
ders max{y∗τ (x) − u,0} when the current inventory position and belief vector are u and x,
respectively, is optimal.
Proposition 19. Suppose y∗τ (x)−d′ ≤ y∗τ (λ(d′, z′, x)) for all d′, z′, x. Then the τ -lookahead
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policy, π(u,x) = max{y∗τ (x) − u,0} for all u,x is optimal.
We note that the base stock levels are parametrized by the belief vector, x, and so thus
far we still have considerable computational intractabilities, since the belief simplex X is
uncountably infinite in cardinality. The size of X is a classic limitation of the POMDP
framework. Additionally, we are left with the task of computing exactly the expectation
within Equation 3.5 for each of these x, which may get unwieldy depending on the problem
size. We discuss each of these issues and a method for addressing them, in turn.
The condition in Proposition 19 is an attainability condition. This condition guarantees
that once y∗τ (xt)−ut becomes non-negative, it will remain non-negative at all future epochs.
An attainability condition first appeared in [56] and [57], was extended to the τ = 1 case
in [31], and is implicitly described in [54] as guaranteeing that the probability of excess
inventory is zero.
Computing E[gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x]. Now, we give a closed form for computing the
expectation within Equation 3.5. Let D(d′∣µ′, µ) ≜ ∑z′ P [z′, d′∣µ′, µ]. and M(µ′∣µ) ≜
P [µ′∣µ]. We now compute P [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x]:
P [dτ , . . . , d1∣x] =∑
µ










D(dτ ∣µτ , µτ−1)M(µτ ∣µτ−1)D(dτ−1∣µτ−1, µτ−2)⋯
⋯M(µ2∣µ1)D(d1∣µ1, µ)M(µ1∣µ), (3.6)
where the last equality follows from repeated application of the Markov property. Note that
E[gτ(y, d, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] = ∑dτ ,...,d1 P [dτ , . . . , d1∣x]gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ). This expression is a
closed form representation of E[gτ(y, d, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] because the support of the demand
distributions, the cardinality of the modulation space, and the lead time τ are all finite.
Even though we have a closed form for computing E[gτ(y, d, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x], it may
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be difficult to compute depending on the problem size. We note that each probability
P [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x] requires ∣M ∣τ computations for every (d1, . . . , dτ , x). Suppose the support
of M[d∣µ′, µ] is ∆ for all µ′, µ. Then, for each x computing this expectation requires
O(∣M ∣τ ⋅ ∣∆∣τ) computations. Moreover, there are uncountably infinite belief vectors x.
These computational considerations motivate a structural analysis of X and approximation
methods for constructing a (nearly) optimal base stock policy.
Computing the base stock levels. As discussed earlier, one of the primary computa-
tional difficulties with any POMDP model is the size of the belief simplex, X . There are
various methods in the literature that seek to address this issue, which may be broadly
characterized as exact methods, fixed-grid approximation methods, and belief trajectory
simulation methods. We focus our attention in this paper on finite grid approximations to
X . The first, and most well-known, grid-based approximation procedure is found in [30],
which builds an evenly-spaced finite grid approximation using Freudenthal triangulation
controlled by a mesh parameter. In [22], a random finite grid approximation to X gener-
ated by points drawn from a uniform distribution on X is shown to perform comparably to
the Freudenthal triangulation scheme. [5] introduced a trajectory following method in the
context of passive learning in M-POMDPs that simulates the belief evolution of {xt} mul-
tiple times and constructs a finite grid based upon the most frequently simulated regions of
X . Each of these grid-based procedures is applicable in our problem setting in a procedure
as in Figure 3.1.
Direct application of these fixed grid procedures is independent of the structure of the
base stock levels with respect to the belief vector, x. However, knowing this structure can be
computationally useful. Generalizing results in [31] and assuming the demand distribution
M[d∣µ′, µ] has finite support for all µ′, µ, there is a finite partition of the belief space X
such that the base stock level is identical for all x in each element of this partition and that
each element is described by two linear equations in x, which we now show.
Let ∆τ ≜ {∑τj=1 δj ∶ δ1, . . . , δτ ∈ ∆}, the set of possible total demands over τ epochs.
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1. Generate a finite grid approximation, Xfinite ⊂ X via any of the finite grid methods
[30], [22], or [5].
2. For all points x ∈ Xfinite, compute the optimal base stock level y∗τ (x) by computing
P [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x] exactly or by estimating.
3. Define the base stock levels for the other points in X ∖Xfinite by comparing to the
computed nearest belief in Xfinite (in the sense of some norm ∥⋅∥), so that y∗τ (x) ≈
y∗τ (x′(x)), where x′(x) ≜ arg min
x′∈Xfinite
∥x − x′∥.
Figure 3.1: Direct grid-based approximate base stock policy.
With some abuse of notation, let ∆τ ≜ {δ1, . . . , δ∣∆τ ∣}, where the δi are in ascending order
(δ1 < δ2 < . . . < δ∣∆τ ∣). Additionally, let Dτ be the τ -fold Cartesian product of ∆, so
that elements of Dτ are possible demand sequences (d1, . . . , dτ). Let Dτ(δ) be the set of
possible τ demand realizations that sum to less than or equal to δ:




dj ≤ δ} , ∀δ ∈ ∆τ .
We may use these sets {Dτ(δ) ∶ δ ∈ ∆τ} as probabilistic events that allow us to generate a
partition of X into sets Xm that are defined by the Newsvendor critical fractile, p̃τp̃τ+h̃τ :
Xm ≜
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ∈X ∶ ∑
(d1,...,dτ )∈
Dτ (δm−1)






P [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x]
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭











dj ≤ δm∣x]} .
The following proposition demonstrates that these regions Xm define the base stock
levels, that is for every belief vector in Xm it is optimal to order-up-to δm.
Proposition 20. The optimal base stock levels are y∗τ (x) = δm for all x ∈Xm.
Note that the partition of X is defined by hyperplanes since it is linear in x. Thus, in
order to fully specify the base stock levels {y∗τ (x) ∶ x ∈X}, we need only construct at most
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∣∆τ ∣ − 1 defining hyperplanes of the partition {Xm}. Moreover, these hyperplanes only
need to be constructed once, and can be done a priori to any policy evaluation step.
These hyperplanes get more difficult to compute as τ gets larger. Thus, by the same rea-
soning as our earlier discussion about computing P [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x], we seek an approximate
method for generating the partition {Xm} that scales well with τ . Our proposed method in
Figure 3.2 is based upon finite grid approximations, Monte Carlo simulation, and solving
∣∆∣ − 1 support vector machines to determine the defining hyperplanes.
1. Generate a finite set of belief points, Xfinite ⊂X . Let Xfinite = {x1, . . . , xK}.
















dnj ≤ δm} .







dj ≤ δm∣x] > p̃τp̃τ+h̃τ
1, else.
4. For each m, generate a separating hyperplane via a linear, soft-margin SVM on the
set of tuples {(xi, l(xi,m)) ∶ i = 1, . . . ,K}. The SVM is formalized by solving the








s.t. l(xi,m)(w ⋅ xi + b) ≥ 1 − ξi, i = 1, . . . ,K
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,K
Figure 3.2: Partitioning the belief space, X .
In Step 1, we generate a finite grid approximationXfinite ⊂X by either the Freudenthal
triangulation of [30], the random grid of [22], or the trajectory following of [5]. In Step
2, we generate an estimate P̂ [∑τj=1 dj ≤ δm∣x] ≈ P [∑τj=1 dj ≤ δm∣x] by simulating demand
trajectories, for each point in Xfinite. Since we estimate these probabilities using Monte
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Carlo methods, the computational burden scales linearly in τ , rather than exponentially
when we compute the probabilities exactly.
We then label these points in Step 3, for eachm according to which side P̂ [∑τj=1 dj ≤ δm∣x]
is on with respect to the critical fractile p̃τ
p̃τ+h̃τ
. The regions are constructed in Step 4 using
support vector machines (SVMs). For each m, a soft margin (due to the simulation error
present in the estimates P̂ [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x]) linear SVM is computed, resulting in a hyperplane
wm ⋅ x + bm = 0 that is defined by (wm, bm).
This hyperplane serves as a classifier for determining on which side of the critical
fractile p̃τ
p̃τ+h̃τ
the probability P [∑τj=1 dj ≤ δm∣x] falls. If sgn(wm ⋅ x + bm) is positive,
then we predict that P [∑τj=1 dj ≤ δm∣x] <
p̃τ
p̃τ+h̃τ
. Likewise if sgn(wm ⋅ x + bm) is neg-
ative, we predict that P [∑τj=1 dj ≤ δm∣x] ≥
p̃τ
p̃τ+h̃τ
. By proceeding in this manner for all
m, we determine our approximate order-up-to level for any x to be y∗τ (x) ≈ δm such that
sgn(wm−1 ⋅ x + bm−1) ≠ sgn(wm ⋅ x + bm).
Moreover, we approximate the partition regions Xm to be
Xm ≈ {x ∈X ∶ sgn(wm−1 ⋅ x + bm−1) ≠ sgn(wm ⋅ x + bm)}
= {x ∈X ∶wm−1 ⋅ x + bm−1 > 0,wm ⋅ x + bm ≤ 0}
(3.7)
Thus, each region Xm is defined by two linear hyperplanes. We note that it is possible that
the set Xm = ∅, which would indicate that δm is not an optimal order-up-to level for any
x ∈X . Thus, we have at most ∣∆τ ∣ − 1 different non-empty regions of X .
3.4.2 Example Partition
In this subsection, we illustrate our method of generating the partition {Xm} by considering
a small example and analyzing the output. In this example, the modulation space has three
elements M = {µ1, µ2, µ3}, the observation space has three elements Z = {z1, z2, z3}, and
the demand space has five elements ∆ = {1,2,3,4,5}. The dynamics P [d′, z′, µ′∣µ] are
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whereM(i, j) = P [µ′ = µj ∣µ = µi],Q(i, k) = P [z′ = zk∣µ = µk],D(i, l) = P [d′ = l∣µ = µi],
and P [d′ = l, z′ = zk, µ′ = µj ∣µ = µi] =M(i, j)Q(i, k)D(i, l). The lead time is τ = 2, the
discount factor β = 0.9, p̃τ = 70, h̃τ = 10 (which we denote as p, h for the remainder of this
section).
Since τ = 2, the set of possible total demand across τ is ∆τ = {2,3, . . . ,10} and, as in
Section 3.4.1, the partitioning regions {Xm,m = 2,3, . . . ,10} (we assume the indices m
coincide with δm) are defined as:
Xm = {x ∈X ∶ P [d1 + d2 ≤ δm−1∣x] <
p
p + h
≤ P [d1 + d2 ≤ δm∣x]}
= {x ∈X ∶ Θm−1 ⋅ x <
p
p + h
≤ Θm ⋅ x} ,
where we define Θm = {Θm(µ1),Θm(µ2),Θm(µ3)} to be the vector such that Θm(µ) =
P [d1+d2 ≤ δm∣µ]. Thus, the true partitioning hyperplanes ofX are of the form Θm ⋅x− pp+h =
0.
We use the procedure from Figure 3.2 to generate estimates of the partitioning hyper-
planes of X using soft-margin, linear SVMs. The grid approximation of Xfinite ⊂ X is
generated by randomly sampling 100 points from a uniform distribution on X and the esti-
mates P̂ [d1+d2∣x] are generated byN = 1000 Monte Carlo simulations for each x ∈Xfinite.
We generated the approximate partitioning hyperplanes of the form wm ⋅ x + bm = 0 using
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SVMs with penalty parameter C = 10 and C = 50. The results that define these approxi-
mate partitioning hyperplanes, and the true partitioning hyperplanes, are presented in Table
3.1. The entries for δ = 2,3,4,5 in Table 3.1 represent that there were no belief vectors
x ∈ Xfinite such that P̂ [d1 + d2 ≤ δ∣x] > pp+h = 0.875. Thus, the labels of all the points in
Xfinite were the same (= 1). This is reasonable when we compare to the Θ vectors. We
see for δ = 2,3,4,5, no entry of Θ is greater than the critical fractile pp+h = 0.875; thus, the
concomitant set Xm is empty. The implication is that it is never optimal to ever order-up-to
a value less than or equal to 5.
Table 3.1: The SVM partitioning hyperplanes defined by {(w, b)} and the true partitioning
hyperplanes defined by Θ and the critical fractile pp+h = 0.875.
C = 10 C = 50
δ w b w b Θ
2 – – – – (0.43,0.01,0.01)
3 – – – – (0.56,0.02,0.02)
4 – – – – (0.70,0.16,0.03)
5 – – – – (0.79,0.27,0.06)
6 (−3.35,0.77,2.58) 3.21 (−7.56,−0.56,8.12) 6.23 (0.94,0.73,0.21)
7 (−5.48,−1.82,7.3) 3.40 (−9.58,−3.86,13.45) 5.82 (0.97,0.84,0.30)
8 (3.59,3.71,−7.30) −1.13 (4.94,6.70,−11.64) −2.02 (0.98,0.98,0.44)
9 (4.01,4.35,−8.35) −0.79 (6.26,6.46,−12.71) −1.23 (0.99,0.99,0.57)
10 – – – – (1,1,1)
The results of this partitioning method are depicted in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3b depicts
the SVM partition with C = 10, Figure 3.3c depicts the SVM partition with C = 50, and
Figure 3.3d depicts the true partition of X . We color the points (belief distributions in
Xfinite) based on the estimated optimal order-up-to point (i.e. the m such that P̂ [d1 + d2 ≤
m − 1∣x] < pp+h ≤ P̂ [d1 + d2 ≤ m∣x] holds). Note that a color disparity between a point and
the region to which it belongs is, in the case of the SVM partitions, either due to simulation
error in the estimate of P̂ [d1 + d2 ≤ δ∣x] or an approximation error due to the dispersion
and number of points in Xfinite. In the case of the true partition of X , we know that these
color mis-matches are due to simulation error in the probability estimates.





















































































(a) Points randomly generated uniformly on the























































































































































































































(d) The true partition of X .
Figure 3.3: Depicting the SVM partitions of X . The red regions correspond to δ = 6, the
orange regions correspond to δ = 7, the green regions correspond to δ = 8, the blue regions
correspond to δ = 9, and the violet regions correspond to δ = 10.
number of Monte Carlo simulation for estimating P̂ [d1, . . . , dτ ∣x] increases since the esti-
mate converges to the true probability almost surely for all (d1, . . . , dτ). As C gets larger,
the SVM discourages mis-classifications of the points x ∈ Xfinite. Moreover, the SVM
partition will improve as the number of grid points in Xfinite increases.
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Additionally, in this example we see that for a fixed x(µ2), as the probability shifts
from x(µ1) to x(µ3), the order-up-to level increases. This reflects two attributes of this
example: (1) the construction of the D matrix, for which D[3, ⋅] has most of its probability
mass on high demand levels and D[1, ⋅] has most of its probability mass on low demand
levels, and (2)M has high probability mass on the diagonal. The implications are that if
x(µ3) is high, the DM believes there is a high probability of persisting in a high demand
state into the future. Likewise if x(µ1) is high, the DM believes there is a high probability
of persisting in a low demand state into the future.
3.5 Application
In this section, we consider how the structural and algorithmic inventory policy results,
above, might be used to facilitate an investigation of the following motivating question:
should capital be allocated towards (1) a better information infrastructure (data, forecasts,
quantitative talent, etc.), or (2) a more agile product architecture and supply chain design
in order to more quickly respond to changing demand?
3.5.1 Value of Information.
It is intuitive that better information will improve supply chain performance. We seek to
formalize this intuition by analyzing the value of information — namely, the relationship
between the optimal value function and information quality. Before analyzing the value of
information, we must conceptualize how this information is generated.
In Figure 3.4, we depict a noisy channel representation of the information process. At
time t, the market — encompassing relevant macroeconomic factors pertaining to the firm
— generates a hypothetical signal about its true, underlying state. This true signal under-
goes a process of data generation that potentially corrupts the true market signal. Corrup-
tions from data generation may come in the form of imperfect knowledge of the market,
measurement errors, information loss due to data transmittal or summary, malevolent in-
63
terference, limited access, etc. This data then undergoes a data processing step — how the
data is synthesized into information upon which decisions are made. This step includes
forecasting, business intelligence insights, reporting, etc. We consider the composition of
data generation and processing to be a noisy channel by which the true signal of the mar-
ket is corrupted and AOD observations are generated. We call such an AOD observation
mechanism the information infrastructure.
Figure 3.4: Noisy channel representation of the information infrastructure. Dashed lines
represent distortions of the true signal.
In comparing two such information infrastructures (say q and q̃), we say that q̃ has
improved AOD observation quality if it is equivalent to q when the observation generated by
q is passed through an additional noisy channel. In other words, if AOD observations from
the past information infrastructure are equivalent to corrupted AOD observations from the
current information infrastructure, then the current infrastructure is an improvement over
the past. This is consistent with the notion of improved observation quality, as presented in
[45], [62], and elsewhere.
Definition 7. For any two probability distributions q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ), q(z′∣µ′, µ) over Z, we say
that q̃ has improved AOD observation quality over q if there exists a Z × Z stochastic
matrix, ξ, such that q(z′∣µ′, µ) = ∑z̃ ξ(z′∣z̃)q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ).
For the following proposition, suppose the demand and AOD processes are condi-
tionally independent, so that P [d′, z′∣µ′, µ] = P [d′∣µ′, µ] ⋅ P [z′∣µ′, µ]. Let q(z′∣µ′, µ) =
P [z′∣µ′, µ] and q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ) = P̃ [z̃∣µ′, µ] be two different AOD probability measures on Z.
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Additionally, let H̃q be the operator H̃ under q, H̃q̃ be the operator H̃ under q̃, and let v and
ṽ be the fixed points of H̃q and H̃q̃ respectively.
Proposition 21. Suppose q̃ has improved AOD observation quality over q such that there
exists a Markov noisy channel ξ (i.e. a stochastic matrix {ξ(z′∣z̃)}) such that q(z′∣µ′, µ) =
∑z̃ ξ(z′∣z̃)q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ). Then, ṽ ≤ v.
Proposition 21 shows that if operating under an optimal policy, better information qual-
ity improves supply chain performance in terms of total discounted costs. Likewise, degra-
dations of information quality increase costs. This effect also typically holds for near-
optimal policies, as we demonstrate in the numerical exemplar of this section, although
this is not necessarily true in all cases, as results in the literature show ([62]). For the man-
ager, this shows the importance of efficiency in operations. If we consider the policy to
be the mechanism by which information is turned into operational decisions, a bad policy
can take better information and generate worse performance. Thus, in order to leverage the
value of improved information the firm must adapt and adopt operations, accordingly.
3.5.2 Value of Agility
We now consider how system performance is dependent upon lead time, τ . Intuitively,
longer lead times allow demand uncertainty in the supply chain to propagate and should
thus generate worse system performance than shorter lead times, a phenomenon that we
call the value of agility. We say system A is more agile than system B if (and only if)
the lead time for system A is less than the lead time for system B. In our next result, we
formalize this intuition and prove conditions under which it holds.
Let v∗τ and v∗τ ′ be the optimal value functions of the τ - and τ ′-lagged problems re-
spectively. Additionally, for compactness of notation, let d[1∶τ ′−τ] ≜ (d1, . . . , dτ ′−τ) and
z[1∶τ ′−τ] ≜ (z1, . . . , zτ ′−τ).
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Proposition 22. Suppose τ < τ ′, h̃τ ≤ βτ−τ
′
h̃τ ′ , and p̃τ ≤ βτ−τ
′






τ ′−τ(d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x)) ≤ βτ−τ
′
v∗τ ′(u,x)
for all demand realizations d[1∶τ ′−τ] and observations z[1∶τ ′−τ], where λτ
′−τ is the posterior
belief distribution given x and τ ′ − τ Bayesian updates from observations d[1∶τ ′−τ] and
z[1∶τ ′−τ].
To understand this proposition, some accounting is required. Recall in our reformula-
tion around inventory position, u, (Equation 3.4) that costs are accounted for at the time
of the decision by projecting forward in time. Thus the costs accrued are scaled by the
cost of capital so that they are reflective of what the costs would be if they were accrued
on delivery. This is why the proposition includes the scaling factor βτ−τ ′ . In this way, the
proposition states that reducing lead time from τ ′ to τ decreases total costs under an opti-
mal policy, when properly scaling for costs at any time t so that they are accounted for as
if realized at time t + τ instead of t + τ ′.
The conditions on the per-unit costs in Proposition 22 are required due to the depen-
dence of the single-period cost function on τ and have a natural interpretation. If 1 − β
represents the cost of capital, then these conditions may be interpreted that cost restructur-
ing under shorter lead times must improve per-unit costs by more than just the time value
of money. Additionally, we note that, as with the value of information, this result holds
under optimal policies. We show that this result holds for a near-optimal policy, as well, in
our numerical example later in this section. For the manager, if investment is allocated to a
supply chain restructuring, but the operating policy does not adapt to the new supply chain
structure and the implications of the redesign on per-unit costs are not properly considered,
then the value of agility may not materialize.
Finally, since Proposition 22 is dependent upon realizations of the demand and AOD
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processes, it is natural to define the expected marginal value of agility, m(u,x, τ, τ ′):





τ ′−τ(d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x)) ∣x] − v∗τ ′(u,x).
Note by Proposition 22 that m(u,x, τ, τ ′) ≤ 0.
3.5.3 Numerical Exemplar
In our numerical example we consider a simple Markov chain model of the macroeconomy.
We assume that there are 3 different states of the economy, with each state of the economy
corresponding to a conditional demand distribution D[d′∣µ] that is characterized by its
distributional characteristics (more specifically, its first two moments) as “high mean, high
variance”, “medium mean, medium variance”, or “low mean, low variance”. We denote
these modulation states by µi where i ∈ {L,M,H} represents that the demand distribution
has low, medium, or high mean/variance, respectively. These modulation states might be
considered to be a representation of various stages in the business cycle, in which the
number of decision epochs for which the macroeconomy remains in a state µi is distributed
geometrically with parameterM(µi∣µi) for i ∈ {L,M,H}. We consider the following class

















The parameter θM , thus represents the probability of a state of the economy remaining
in that state in the subsequent epoch. In this model, the expected number of epochs that the
economy will stay in the same state is 11−θM for θM ∈ [0,1) and infinite if θM = 1. Thus, the
higher θM , the more stable we expect the economy to be.
In this numerical example, we consider dt+1∣µt to be distributed Poisson(3) if µt = µL,
Poisson(6) if µt = µM , and Poisson(9) if µt = µH , truncated and scaled so that the demand
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is less than 30 to ensure finiteness of the demand support.
The AOD observations are generated according to the conditional probabilitiesQ(µ′, z′) =
P [z′∣µ′], which we describe by a class of stochastic matrices {Qθq} parametrized by θq, that








We assumeQθq ≜ Qθq . The parameter θq is, thus, the number of right matrix multiplications
of the base AOD matrix, Q. When θq = 0, Qθq is the identity matrix. As θq gets large the










In light of the value of information results in Section 3.4.3, we may view Q as a Markov
noisy channel, where θq represents the number of times a perfect signal (i.e. zt+1 = µt+1)
is passed through the Markov noisy channel Q. As θq gets large, this signal becomes
uninformative as zt+1∣µt+1 becomes uniformly distributed. In this interpretation, Qθq is
monotone in θq in the sense that Qθq has improved AOD observation quality over Qθ′q for
all θq < θ′q.
When describing the quality of AOD information for this parametrized class of obser-
vations matrices, {Qθq}, we will use the language “ρ-perfect information quality”. By this
we mean the diagonal entry ofQθq , call it ζ , scaled by its proportion of the interval [ 1∣M ∣ ,1]
which reflects the extremes of completely uninformative AOD information, i.e. zt+1 is
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distributed uniformly over M (ζ = 1∣M ∣ ), and perfect AOD information (ζ = 1). Thus,
ρ = ∣M ∣




which gives a measure of the degree to which the AOD observations perfectly observe
the modulation process. For instance, if the diagonal entry of Qθq=1 is 0.9, then Qθq=1 is
ρ = 32(0.9 −
1
3) = 85%-perfect AOD information quality.
In this numerical example we assume β = 0.93, which is based upon a current esti-
mate of the weighted average cost of capital across all U.S. markets (approximately 7%,
according to [26]). The true per-unit penalty cost is p = 3 and the true per-unit holding
cost is assumed to be h = 1, yielding a critical fractile pp+h = 0.75. We assume, for sim-
plicity, that these per-unit costs are invariant with τ , so that p̃τ = p = 3 and h̃τ = h = 1.
For our sensitivity analysis, we evaluate various lead times τ ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}, parameters
θM ∈ {0.25,0.5,0.75,1} and θq ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5}. We generate policies based on possible
choices of per-unit stock-out penalty cost parameters θp ∈ {3,4,5,6}, and evaluate them
using Monte Carlo simulation based on the true stock-out penalty term, p = 3. The motiva-
tion and numerical results pertaining to θp and stock-outs are discussed in Appendix B.5.
Each policy is specified with respect to an SVM-generated partition of X , as in Sections
3.4.1 and 3.4.2 and detailed in Figure 3.2. The finite grid approximation Xfinite ⊂ X is a
1000 point grid randomly generated from a uniform distribution on X . The approximate
probabilities {Θm} are generated on the basis of 1000 simulated demand trajectories.
We note that since our problem setting has an infinite horizon, we cannot simulate
infinitely long trajectories to evaluate our policies. One potential method for evaluating
policies via Monte Carlo simulation is to reformulate the infinite horizon problem as with
a random geometrically-distributed time horizon, as in paper 5 of [37]. This would give a
problem formulation that has an equivalent optimal policy and total expected discounted
costs. However, we wish to analyze not only the estimated total costs, but also the variance
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of the distribution and other metrics such as stock-out rates and violations of the attain-
ability condition in Proposition 19. Reformulation around a random horizon would skew
such metrics. Thus, we seek to simply evaluate a sufficiently long finite horizon, T . The
error (in terms of total expected discounted costs) of such a finite horizon approximation is
O(βT ), so we choose T = 65 in our evaluations so that βT = (0.93)65 < 1%.
Finally, we evaluated via Monte Carlo simulation the various parameter choices for θp,
θq, θM , and τ , which amounts to 4 × 6 × 4 × 5 = 480 combinations. For each combination,
we simulate the SVM-generated policy as in Figure 3.5, beginning from our assumed ini-






on hand s0 = 0, the epoch 0 demand d0 = 0, and the history of actions a−1 = . . . = a−τ = 0.
3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Let θ ≜ (θp, θM , θq, τ) be a combination of the Monte Carlo evaluation parameters. For
each θ, we generate Nsim = 1000 samples {vnθ ∶ n = 1, . . . ,1000} for which vnθ is the
realized total discounted costs in simulation n, for the base stock policy generated by the
SVM-partitioning method of Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 under parameter vector θ. We detail
the method for generating the samples {vnθ ∶ n = 1, . . . ,1000} in Figure 3.5.
For each parameter vector θ, we collect the following metrics: mean value, standard
error, and attainability violations.
• The mean value, which we denote vθ, is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the








• The standard error, which we denote SEθ, is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the
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0. Initialize. Initialize with the parameter vector θ = (θp, θM , θq, τ).
1. Generate the SVM partition of X . The partition of X is dependent on θp, θM , and τ ,
and is generated using the SVM method of Figure 3.2. Let SVM(x) be the order-up-
to level of x according to the SVM partition.
2. Monte Carlo simulation. For each Monte Carlo simulation n, generate vnθ as follows.





], dn0 = 0, an−1 = . . . = an−τ = 0, and vnθ = 0. Sample
µ0 from the belief distribution x0.
(b) For t = 0, . . . , T :
• Determine ordering decision and cost.
ynt ← SVM(xnt )





ant ← (ynt − unt )
+
vnθ ← vnθ + βt[h̃τ (snt + ant−τ − dnt )
+ + p̃τ (dnt − snt − ant−τ)
+ ]
• Transition, costs, and belief update.
snt+1 ← snt + ant−τ − dnt
dnt+1 ∼ D[µnt , ⋅]
µnt+1 ∼MθM [µnt , ⋅]
znt+1 ∼ Qθq[µnt+1, ⋅]
xnt+1 ← λ(dnt+1, znt+1, xnt )
Figure 3.5: The SVM-Monte Carlo evaluation method.











• We denote by ATNθ the number of violations of the attainability condition (in Propo-
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1{ynt > unt } .
The first two metrics — mean value and standard error — are meant to describe different
aspects of a DM’s risk profile. A DM’s objectives may be multiple and may include min-
imizing costs (mean value) and minimizing tail risk (standard error). We seek to quantify
the effect of input parameters on these objectives. We measure attainability violations in or-
der to check the conditions necessary for a myopic base stock policy to be optimal that are
presented in Proposition 19. In Appendix B.5, we consider stock-outs as an additional as-
pect to the DM’s risk profile. There we also discuss how the DM might generate stock-out
robustness by hypothetically manipulating their cost structure in constructing a policy, and
the relationship between this approach and a Lagrangian relaxation of a chance-constrained
version of our inventory problem.
Since the number of combinations of input parameters θ is large, we use regression
analysis to describe how the parameters vθ, SEθ, and ATNθ are related and propose for our
initial regressions the following log-linear form (where SEθ and ATNθ may be substituted
for vθ):

















bθq=j1{θq = j} + ε,
(3.8)
where ε is the error term. In these regressions, the endogenous variable (our metrics vθ,
SEθ, SOθ, and ATNθ) is regressed against the categorical variables of our various input
parameters. This regression is useful for estimating non-constant elasticities of our metrics
with respect to the input parameters, θ. Note the following relationship between the regres-
sion estimated mean values under parameter vectors θ and θ′, with the estimated regression
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coefficients and metrics denoted with a hat (we drop the hat notation later when it is clear
from context that we are referencing the estimated regression coefficients):
v̂θ
v̂θ′
− 1 = exp (b̂τ − b̂τ ′ + b̂θM − b̂θ′M + b̂θp − b̂θ′p + b̂θq − b̂θq) − 1. (3.9)
Thus, the estimated percentage change in mean value (or other metrics) by changing from
θ′ to θ is an exponential function of the regression coefficients, so our regression model
isolates the effects of τ , θM , and θq on the metrics that compose the DM’s risk profile and
the attainability condition of Proposition 19. In order to avoid over-fitting our regression
model, we determine the subset of regressors for each metric using step-wise regression
with Akaike information criterion. Summary metrics of these step-wise regressions are
documented in Table B.1. The magnitude of the t-statistic indicates the level of statistical
significance. In this type of regression, for each component parameter in θ, one of the
categorical variables must be used as a reference variable, and thus may be interpreted to
have a regression coefficient equal to 0.
On Attainability Violations. We first seek to verify the degree to which the attainability
condition in Proposition 19 holds, which would add to the justification for analyzing base
stock policies. In our analysis, we found that the attainability violation rate was relatively
robust, with the vast majority of parameter combinations resulting in attainability viola-
tions that were less than 15%, as is shown in Figure 3.6. In our step-wise regression, the
only significant parameters for attainability were τ and θM . For this example, attainability
violations are shown to increase as τ increases and decrease as θM is closer to 0 or 1. Recall
that attainability violations are dependent upon the evolution of the belief vector and the
optimal base stock levels with respect to expected total discounted costs. Thus, our regres-
sion analysis shows that attainability violations increases with the uncertainty regarding the
future states of the economy, either by uncertainty propagation through time (τ ) or by the
nature of the macroeconomic transition structure (θM ). We note that attainability violations
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Figure 3.6: Histogram of attainability violations rates.
typically occur when the state of macroeconomy abruptly changes from a high mean de-
mand state to a low mean demand state, leading to an oversupply of stock. Thus, the less
an economic environment is subject to negative shocks, the better base stock policies will
tend to perform.
On Expected Total Discounted Costs. The first, and primary, metric that we consider
is the expected discounted costs. Recall that we discussed in Section 3.4.3 the relation-
ship between expected total discounted costs and the AOD observation parameter, θq, as
the value of information. We proved in Proposition 21 that improved AOD observation
quality leads to lower expected total discounted costs under an optimal policy. Figure B.2a
demonstrates the value of information. In this example, perfect AOD information — which
corresponds to perfect knowledge of the state of the economy — is worth 2.4% in long-run
cost savings over 85%-perfect AOD information quality (corresponding to θq = 1), 3.9%
in long-run cost savings over 72.25%-perfect AOD information quality (corresponding to
θq = 2), and 4.9% in long-run cost savings over 61.4%-perfect AOD information quality
(corresponding to θq = 3), and so on. Thus, better AOD information improves expected
total discounts costs, as anticipated by Proposition 21. Further, in Figure B.2a note that
vθ appears concave in θq for the values we tested. This indicates that, at least for this nu-
merical example, there is marginally increasing value in removing Markov noisy channels
in AOD observations. This relationship holds when we additionally consider the predicted
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value of AOD information with respect to our measure of ρ-perfect AOD information, as
shown in Figure B.2b.
In Section 3.4.4, we discussed the relationship between lead time and expected total
discounted costs as the value of agility. We prove that so long as the per-unit holding and
penalty costs change with τ so as to provide cost savings by more than the time value
of money, we expect long run costs to increase with τ . In Figure B.3b, this is exactly
the effect observed. The undiscounted case represents the simulated example in which
h̃τ = 1 and p̃τ = 3 for all τ . The discounted case represented these costs scaled by βτ−1
to represent an estimate of the costs under h̃τ = βτ−1 and p̃τ = 3βτ−1. The scale of long
run cost savings with regard to reducing lead times is much greater in this example than
improved information quality. For example, we estimate the value of reducing the lead
time from τ = 5 to τ = 4 to be worth at least 17% in long run cost savings and reducing
lead time from τ = 2 to τ = 1 is worth at least 36% in long run cost savings. We expect
in practice that the price of such a restructuring of the supply chain or product design also
scales similarly. Further, our estimated long run costs are convex in τ over the tested lead
times, which suggests that, in absolute dollars, small reductions in long lead times leads to
greater effects than small reductions in short lead times.
Finally, our numerical analysis demonstrates in Figure B.4 that, for this example, long
run costs are lower as θM either approaches 0 or 1. This analysis reflects the intuition that
the system should perform better in an economic environment that is more predictable. If
θM is very small, then the DM will be confident that the economy will change in the next
epoch. Likewise, as θM approaches 1, the DM will be confident in a stable, unchanging
economic environment.
On Variance. For the DM concerned with either mitigating the upper tail risk of ex-
treme scenarios that generate prohibitively high long run costs, we consider the sensitivity
of the variance in long run costs to our various input parameters.
In Figure B.1, we summarize the regression analysis of the marginal effects of AOD
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information quality on the standard error. Our regression analysis shows, for this numer-
ical example, that better AOD information quality is effective for mitigating variance in
long run costs. We quantify the magnitude of the marginal effects of AOD information
quality on standard error in Figure B.1. However, this may be more simply observed in the
histograms of sampled long run costs for various values of θq in Figure B.5. In comparing
the relative peak heights of these unimodal distributions, we clearly note that these heights
increase as θq gets smaller, which indicates that the variance of long run costs decreases
with better AOD information quality. Moreover, this effect is amplified as AOD informa-
tion quality improves, as depicted in the concavity of the normalized standard error curves
with respect to θq and ρ in Figures B.1a and B.1b. Thus, small improvements to poor AOD
information quality are less effective in mitigating tail risk than small improvements to
good AOD information quality. Perfect AOD information quality, corresponding to θq = 0
and ρ = 1, is estimated to reduce standard error of long run costs by 3.7% over 85%-perfect
AOD information quality (corresponding to θq = 1), by 5.0% over 72.25%-perfect AOD in-
formation quality (corresponding to θq = 2), by 5.5% over 61.4%-perfect AOD information
quality (corresponding to θq = 3), etc.
As intuition might indicate, the most significant and determinative input parameter on
variance is the lead time, τ . In Figure B.3, as we discussed in the relationship between τ and
expected total discounted costs, the undiscounted case represents the simulated example
in which h̃τ = 1 and p̃τ = 3 for all τ . The discounted case represented these standard
errors scaled by βτ−1 to represent an estimate of the standard error under h̃τ = βτ−1 and
p̃τ = 3βτ−1. Standard error is shown to decrease substantially as τ decreases. Moreover,
similar to the result we found in the relationship between τ and long run costs, the marginal
effect on standard error of increasing τ is amplified as τ increases. Reducing lead time from
τ = 5 to τ = 4 is estimated to reduce standard error 22.2%; reducing lead time from τ = 2
to τ = 1 is estimated to reduce standard error 45.6%.
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3.5.5 The Capital Allocation Process
In this subsection, we discuss how our numerical results may be used in a capital allocation
optimization process. Consider the following business scenario as an example of how our
results and methodology might be applied in a real-world context. Suppose a manager is
tasked with the following objective: “first minimize costs and variance, while service level
is above 1 − α, given a budget B”.
Let Θ be the set of scenarios θ = (θp, θq, τ) initially considered by the manager (some
of which may be infeasible a posteriori). For clarity, the parameters θp and τ are as defined
in the numerical example of Section 3.5, and the parameter θq defines a particular AOD
matrix Qθq that is not necessarily the same as any of the AOD matrices in Section 3.5. Ad-
ditionally, let ϕ(θ) be the price of implementing scenario θ, relative to the current scenario
θ0. There are various ways the the manager might interpret the statement of the objective
and use our methodology.
1. Scalarize the objective. The manager has access to a function h ∶ R2 ↦ R such that
h(vθ,SEθ) measures the relative value the manager places towards the two objectives
of long run costs and variance, subject to constraints on stock-outs and budget feasi-
bility. This method is often referred to in the multi-objective optimization literature




s.t. SOθ ≤ α
ϕ(θ) ≤ B
2. Prioritize one objective. The manager chooses one of the objectives to be primary,
say long run costs, and treats the second objective, say variance, as a constraint such
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s.t. SOθ ≤ α
ϕ(θ) ≤ B
SEθ ≤ SEθ0
3. Pareto optimality. In this interpretation, the manager does not have access to a scalar-
izing function h, so instead solves for a set of scenarios that are Pareto optimal. Thus
the problem is to solve for the Pareto optimal set, PO(Θ):
PO(Θ) ≜ {θ ∈ Θ ∶ SOθ ≤ α,ϕ(θ) ≤ B,{θ′ ∈ Θ ∖ θ ∶ vθ′ > vθ,SEθ′ > SEθ} = ∅}
There may be additional feasibility constraints to the system, which if known may be in-
cluded as explicit constraints. If unknown, but intuited by the manager, then the these
constraints may be treated as post hoc cuts. For example, in the first two optimization
approaches, the manager might proceed in an iterative manner, as in the familiar cutting
plane methods in mathematical programming. The manager might solve the optimization
problem, then determine whether the resulting solution is feasible, and if not add a cut,
re-solve, and proceed until a solution that is feasible to the manager emerges. A benefit of
the third approach is that the Pareto frontier, a set of solutions, is generated. The manager
can then simply determine the subset of these Pareto optimal scenarios that are feasible to
implement.
Each of these budget allocation optimization formulations has many different solution
approaches, and it is outside the scope of this paper to consider how to solve these opti-
mization problems. We formulate the budget allocation problem in different ways simply
to note that each of these requires as input (vθ,SEθ,SOθ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, the manager
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has at least two options for using our methodology:
1. Enumerative Evaluation, then Optimization. Evaluate (vθ,SEθ,SOθ), as described
in Figure 3.5, for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, solve an optimization problem that takes as input
these evaluations.
2. Representative Evaluation, Regression, then Optimization. Evaluate (vθ,SEθ,SOθ)
for some subset of possible parameters Θrep ⊂ Θ. Utilize a regression akin to
Equation 3.8 (or suitably modified) as a model for determining the estimates of
(vθ,SEθ,SOθ) for all θ ∈ Θ ∖ Θrep. Then, solve an optimization problem that takes
as input these evaluations and estimations.
The first method is a straightforward application of our evaluation methodology for all
scenarios θ ∈ Θ, which is computationally tractable for small scenario sets Θ or time-
insensitive application settings. For more time-sensitive applications or large scenario
considerations, the second method uses a representative subset of scenarios and a regres-
sion to formulate approximate evaluations of (vθ,SEθ,SOθ). This approach is related to
value function approximation methods in the approximate dynamic programming literature
([36]).
Finally, we note that since we have demonstrated a method for quantifying the monetary
effects of AOD information, lead times, and stock-out penalties, the manager may use our
methodology to compute the return on investment (ROI) of each scenario, ROI(θ):
ROI(θ) = vθ − vθ0
ϕ(θ)
.
3.6 Future Research Directions
There are a number of future research directions for this work. In this paper, we model
data as the end result of a noisy channel composed of data generation and processing. This
allows us to generalize the concept of data to include anything from economic indicators to
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demand forecasts and define explicitly a notion of the quality of this information in terms
of composed noisy channels. This generalization gave us rich mathematical structure as
well, which we used in Proposition 21 to establish the value of information. However,
our notion of quality in this paper is relative (comparing one information infrastructure to
another), and the concept of noisy channels as a measure of quality — though analytically
and conceptually appealing — is a bit unintuitive to consider in practice. It’s more natural
to consider instead an absolute measure of quality, say on [0,1], so the practitioner can
consider information to x% perfect. We introduce the ρ metric in Section 3.5 for our
numerical example for this reason. Incidentally, for our numerical example, the ρ metric
we introduced is (1) an eigenvalue of Qθq and (2) the absolute value of the correlation
between µt and zt. An interesting line of future research is to investigate how these or other
measures might be generalizable, so that we might measure the quality of information
absolutely.
Additionally, there are other operational problem settings for the data-driven stochastic
dynamic program that may be of interest to pursue, as we discussed in Section 3.2. Fi-
nally, we note that mean value, standard error, stock-outs, and attainability are a sample
of the possible metrics that might be considered in the Monte Carlo evaluation of Section
3.5. Depending on the business setting and the DM’s risk profile, it may be of interest to
consider alternative metrics in addition to, or in lieu of, the metrics we investigate.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERATING TRUST IN DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES USING ROBUST,
DATA-DRIVEN MARKOV GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO PRESTIGE
4.1 Introduction & Literature Review
4.1.1 Introduction
In many real-world applications, we are concerned with how raw goods, ideas, tasks, etc.,
progress from an initial state and develop towards an end goal. Supply chains take raw
materials — and through a network of steps including transportation, production and man-
ufacturing, warehousing, assembly, etc. — generate an end product. Development chains
take initial product concepts and materials and generate a new product design. Mainte-
nance systems perform routine maintenance and/or take faulty or outdated equipment and
undergo a restorative process of re-engineering, hardware/software updates, etc. to generate
updated, newly functioning equipment. Many artificial intelligence (AI) systems likewise
undergo a sequence of steps in order to learn and automate a given task. We call function-
ing systems such as these, in which a series of events must take place in order to reach an
end goal (i.e. a product design, a product in the market, a refurbished piece of equipment,
an AI system), development processes. In this paper, we are concerned with so-called trust
problems. That is, we answer the following motivating question: how much can we trust
the end result of a development process to function as it is properly intended?
The research in this paper is motivated by efforts to incorporate optimal or near-optimal
dynamic decision making capability based on inaccurate observations into the PRESTIGE
(PRactical Evaluation and Synthesis of Trust In Government systEms) decision support
system developed at Sandia National Laboratories. The modeler or user (or defender, the
term we use in our discussion of our game-based model formulation) of the PRESTIGE
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decision support system faces a development process — a logical sequence of steps nec-
essary to achieve an end goal — in which there is potential for adversarial manipulation,
and must make decisions on the basis of possibly noise-corrupted data. In such situations,
there is uncertainty or imprecision as to the objectives, resources, and level of rationality
of a potential adversary. Moreover, whereas in many adversarial learning problems there is
access to training samples, development processes may be one-off processes and the risk
of adversarial manipulation a previously unknown or scarcely observed occurrence. In the
presence of adversarial training samples, the risk of misapprehension of attacker objectives
and resources may be mitigated by learning the attacker’s policy through data. However, the
lack of adversarial training samples in many development process applications makes the
risk due to misapprehension of attacker objectives all the more acute, since the attacker’s
objectives will ultimately determine their policy. In such problems, we seek to generate a
single defender policy that specifies at each decision epoch, on the basis of the information
available, actions for achieving progress towards the end goal of the development process
while ensuring that the output of the development process is as trustworthy as possible.
Such a policy would be a trusted or trustworthy policy. More specifically, in defending
a development process from potential adversarial manipulation, we seek a policy that (1)
achieves progress towards the end goal of the development process, and (2) can deter at-
tacks and if necessary, detect, respond to, and recover from an attack so that the output of
the development process is as trustworthy as possible.
Thus, we recognize that generating trust in these development processes is inherently
a multi-faceted concept. It is inextricably tied to risk mitigation — risk due to adversarial
manipulation, misapprehension of adversarial objectives and resources, natural processes,
model misspecification, etc. A trustworthy policy, then, must be robust — that is, the policy
reliably accomplishes what it is intended to do, and is secure with respect to potential
adversarial manipulation. Moreover, since the policy specifies how the defender behaves
dynamically over time and is generated algorithmically, we seek a policy whose behavior
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is inherently explainable to interpreters of the model. That is, in constructing the policy,
does our algorithm confer information about why the policy proscribes certain actions?
These notions of robustness and explainability are important concepts in developing trust
in artificial intelligence systems ([21]), and we discuss the implications of our research on
artificial intelligence throughout.
In this paper, we first show that the general trust problem can be modeled using a
definition of state and state dynamics based on a development process graph and a gen-
eralized concept of an attack graph that we call a precedence graph. We then model the
dynamic decision-making problem in which two known, intelligent, and adaptive agents
— an attacker and a defender — interact for control of a development process using the
partially-observable Markov game (POMG) framework ([9], [8], [10]). This serves as a
model of how each agent would interact, if the attacker’s objectives, resources, and level of
rationality were known. Since this is not generally the case in trust problems, we propose
a three-fold heuristic solution procedure:
1. We use a relaxation of the POMG model as a generative mechanism for creating
hypothetical or potential attacker policies by considering differing attacker objectives
and orders of rationality.
2. We use a robust dynamic program that explicitly incorporates these potential attacker
policies in constructing a robust policy, under perfect defender information.
3. The defender plays a probability matching heuristic on the basis of the robust policy
and the defender’s belief about the state of the development process.
We then show how this robust heuristic policy may be evaluated using Monte Carlo simu-
lation, and evaluate its performance on a numerical exemplar. Finally, we note that as rein-
forcement learning-based AI systems are foundationally dependent upon Markov decision
processes ([4]), and seek to determine an optimal policy, we see potential for foundation-
ally important advancements in generating trust in artificial intelligence systems through
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explicit incorporation of robustness and explainability in policy generation, as we present
in this paper. We see extending the dynamic programming (DP) methods in this paper to
incorporate approximate DP and heuristic search methods as potentially fruitful research
toward these aims. We discuss these potential contributions in the concluding section.
4.1.2 Literature Review
This research draws from ideas in various strands of literature.
PRESTIGE. PRESTIGE is a discrete event and Monte Carlo simulation-based tool set
based on a model of attacker-defender interaction called GPLADD (Graph-based Proba-
bilistic Learning Attacker and Dynamics Defender) described in [15] and [33]. GPLADD
represents an attack via multiple stochastic games, called PLADD (Probabilistic Learning
Attacker and Dynamics Defender, [24] and allows analysis of attack success parameters,
the effects of the defender strategy, and defender strategy optimization. GPLADD has been
applied to the study of data injection attacks on the electric power grid in [11] and elements
of PLADD has been applied to the same problem in [12]. Effects of detection in GPLADD
games are discussed in [18]. GPLADD games are constructed from individual PLADD
games. In PLADD, both a single attacker and a single defender compete for a resource.
Defender actions include the ability to retake control of the resource from the attacker and
disrupt any knowledge acquisition accrued by the attacker. For both agents, all actions
accrue cost, and rewards result from the length of time the resource is under the control
of the agent. PRESTIGE models attacker actions with an attack graph. Attack graphs in-
clude actions to undermine access controls. In this paper, we consider the general problem
setting of PRESTIGE and incorporate dynamic decision-making and Bayesian inference
based upon noise-corrupted data.
POMG. In this research, we use the POMG as the fundamental model of dynamic, data-
driven, and interactive decision-making between a defender and an attacker. The POMG
was originally introduced in [8] and [9] as a generalization of the multi-period stochastic
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game to partially observed decision-making, analogous to the way the partially observed
Markov decision process (POMDP) is a generalization of the Markov decision process
(MDP). The POMG was further applied to security in food production processes in [10].
We give a formal introduction of the POMG framework in Section 4.2.
Robust Optimization. In this paper, we are concerned with developing defender policies
that are robust to a range potential attacker policies, in order to develop a singular defense
policy that generates trust in the development process, regardless of the type of adversary.
[51] introduced a generalization of the MDP, the multi-model MDP (MMDP), in which
there is a set of candidate models of transition probability or cost function structures that
may be based on multiple competing data sources. The decision-maker (DM) is tasked
with determining a single policy that optimizes the expected weighted performance over all
models. In this way, a solution to the MMDP is a policy that is robust to model uncertainty.
In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we show that each attacker policy induces a best response stochastic
dynamic program (DP) for the defender. In Section 4.5.2, we show how we may adapt
results in [51] to determine a defender policy that is robust to an array of attackers by
solving a best response MMDP.
Training and Genetic Algorithms. In Section 4.5.1, we introduce an iterative method
of training the agents in order to generate a set of plausible and adaptive attacker poli-
cies. At each iteration, a new generation of candidate attacker policies is generated by
pairing the attacker with a defender policy and solving a best response MDP. We discuss
how this method of training is similar to the selection and mutation mechanism of genetic
algorithms, introduced in [23]. Moreover, the concept of training adversarial agents us-
ing successive competition is similar to and inspired by recent work in [44] using neural
networks and competitive self-play to develop policies for playing Go, shogi, and chess.
Thompson Sampling. We develop a randomized heuristic policy for the defender with
partial observability into the state of the system that has ties to Thompson sampling, a pop-
ular machine learning technique for multi-armed bandit problems that was first introduced
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in [52] and has been adapted to many operations research applications ([39], [17]). In the
appendix, we elucidate the connection between our heuristic and a non-stationary variant
of Thompson sampling. For a more in-depth treatment of this topic we refer the reader to
[40].
4.2 An Overview of the POMG
The POMG is a model of multi-agent sequential decision making under uncertainty and
partial (inaccurate, noise corrupted) observations. In the context of the trust problems,
there are two agents — an attacker and a defender. Each agent selects an action at each
of a countable number of decision epochs, t = 0,1, . . . , T , where T = ∞ corresponds to
an infinite horizon POMG and T < ∞ corresponds to a finite horizon POMG. An agent’s
actions are chosen with the intent of minimizing the agent’s criterion and are based on the
agent’s current state of knowledge. An agent’s current state of knowledge can contain past
and present observations of the state of the system and these observations may be partial
(inaccurate, noise corrupted). The dynamics and criterion of each agent are assumed to be
affected by the actions of both agents. Thus, each agent must consider what actions the
other agent might select in order to minimize its criterion.
More precisely, the POMG includes the following stochastic processes for each agent
k (either the attacker A or the defender D):
• {Skt } represents the state of agent k at epoch t,
• {Zkt } represents the observations that agent k receives about the system at epoch t,
and
• {Akt } represents the actions taken by agent k at epoch t.
We assume that agent k selects Akt on the basis of I kt , the state of knowledge or in-
formation pattern of agent k at epoch t. This action is chosen from the set of admissible
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actions A k that may or may not depend on I kt . We assume I kt contains Zkτ , the obser-
vation agent k receives about the other agent just before epoch τ < t. The dynamics of the
system are described by the given probabilities P [Zt+1, St+1∣St,At], where St = (SAt , SDt ),
At = (AAt ,ADt ), and Zt = (ZAt , ZDt ). The state, action, and observation spaces for one
agent may be totally different from the state, action, and observation spaces for the other
agent; however, we assume all of these sets are finite.
For agent k, we assume the cost accrued between epochs t and t + 1 is Ck(St,At) and
the criterion is the expected total discounted cost over a finite or infinite horizon. A policy
πk for agent k is a mapping from the set of all I kt to the set of all Akt , i.e., Akt = πk(I kt ),
for all t. (We remark that a generalization of this definition is to let a policy be a mapping
from the set of all I kt to the set of all probability distributions over the set of all Akt , a
generalization that will prove useful when we develop heuristics in Section 4.5.) Thus, we
seek a policy — a rule that tells the agent what action to take, given the agent’s current state
of knowledge. Let Πk be the set of feasible policies for agent k. Given policy πj , j ≠ k and








βtCk(St, πk(I kt ), πj(I
j
t )) +CkT+1(ST+1)∣I0] ,




0 (I k0 ∣πj).
(4.1)
where β ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor. For the finite horizon setting when T <∞, we take
CkT+1 to be the terminal cost function for agent k. For the infinite horizon setting when
T =∞, then β must be strictly less than 1, and we let CkT+1 = 0.
We remark that the value of one agent’s criterion is dependent on the policies of both
agents. Thus, ideally a solution to this problem would be a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a policy
pair (πA, πD) such that V A0 (I A0 ∣πD) = V π
A
0 (I A0 ∣πD) and V D0 (I D0 ∣πA) = V π
D
0 (I D0 ∣πA).
A more detailed description and analysis of the POMG can be found in [9], [8], [10].
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4.3 Modeling Trust problems with the POMG
Graphs can be useful in the development of well-defined POMGs for many trust and trust-
related problems. For example, in modeling the food production security problem consid-
ered in [8] and [10], two distinctly different AND/OR graphs, one for the attacker and one
for the defender, were useful in representing important aspects of the problem, and these
graphs serve as an intermediate step in the development of a well-defined POMG.
For POMG model construction, many trust problems can be (at least partially) de-
scribed by one or more directed acyclic OR graphs. These problems are modeled with
a development process graph, which is associated with the defender, and a set of attack
graphs, which is associated with the attacker. An attack graph describes the actions the
attacker is to take and the order in which these actions are to be taken. In this paper, we
generalize the notion of an attack graph to a precedence graph, an acyclic OR graph that
describes all actions the attacker can take and the order in which these actions can be taken,
i.e. the union of the attack graphs. The development process graph and the precedence
graph share nodes, which we call the game nodes since they are the nodes in which at-
tacker and defender interact with each other. Game nodes consist of access control nodes
and artifact nodes. Artifact nodes correspond to objects that are contested, and access
controls correspond to gateways that protect or grant access to these objects. For example:
• In a cyber-network context, an artifact might be RTL files and an access control might
be an encrypted hard drive on which the RTL files are stored.
• In a bank, an artifact might be deposited currency and an access control might be a
vault door.
Interactions may take place between the attacker and defender at the perimeter level of
access controls, or at the level of artifacts themselves.
Let NA and ND be the nodes in the precedence and development process graphs, re-
spectively. The node nA ∈ NA is the start node for the attacker. Nodes with null successor
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sets are called terminal nodes. Let N ′ = NA ∩ND be the game nodes. The attacker’s start
node is neither a game node nor a terminal node. The intersection of the set of non-game
nodes for the attacker and the set of non-game nodes for the defender is null.
Let EA ⊂ NA ×NA and ED ⊂ ND ×ND be the directed edges in the precedence and de-
velopment process graphs, respectively. The meaning of an edge is domain dependent. For
example, an edge (n,n′) in the precedence or development process graph might indicate
the existence of a situation having a non-zero probability of an agent successfully taking
control of node n′, given the agent has control of node n.
We call the union of the precedence and development process graphs the unified graph.
The State of the Unified Graph. The state of a graph is represented by the state of the
nodes in the graph. We now describe the state of a game node and a non-game node.
A game node can be in one of three states:
• The access control or artifact does not yet exist (state 0)
• The access control or artifact exists and is under the control of the attacker (state A)
• The access control or artifact exists and is under the control of the defender (state D).
The access control or artifact is created when the defender first visits the game node, and
the defender is immediately in control of the node. Thus, once the defender successfully
reaches the game node for the first time, the node makes transition from state 0 to state A.
Once a game node’s state leaves state 0, it will never return to state 0 but thereafter will be
in one of the two states in the set {A,D}.
The state of the start node for the attacker is always A. A non-game node in the prece-
dence graph that has been visited by the attacker is in state A and otherwise is in state 0.
Similarly, a non-game node in the development process graph that has been visited by the
defender is in state D and otherwise is in state 0.
Let st(n) be the state of node n at epoch t. Then, the state of the unified graph at epoch
t is St = {st(n) ∶ n ∈ NA ∪ND}. Initially (at epoch 0), all non-start nodes are in state 0 for
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Figure 4.1: Modeling the existence phenomena using context. At initialization access con-
trol n and artifact n′ are in state 0, i.e. they do not exist. We define the context of the
attacker take move on n corresponding to the edge (A,n) to be simply that n is not in
state 0. The context of the attacker take move on n′ from A, i.e. a take move directly on
the artifact n′, corresponding to edge (A,n′) is that n is in state 0 and n′ is not. In other
words, the defender created the artifact n′ before creating the access control. Once n is not
in state 0, i.e. it has been created by the defender, the direct take move on n from A is not
permissible.
both graphs, which is an easily modified assumption.
Action Selection. A variety of actions can be available to each agent. We mention three
possible actions:
• Take. A successful Take move on a node n by agent k at epoch t results in node n
being under the control of agent k at epoch t + 1. Each agent can only attempt to
control nodes in its own node set. We remark that a Take move in this paper is a
slightly different notion than the Take move in GPLADD ([18]).
• Protect. Each agent can decide to reduce the probability of success of a Take move
on a game node by its adversary (corresponds to a delay under a memoryless assump-
tion) by the Protect action.
• Observe. Each agent may choose to observe the state of nodes in either node set.
These observations may be noise corrupted.
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Observations. We note that the Take and Protect actions affect the state transitions of
the development process and precedence graphs. The Observe action affects the informa-
tion available to the agents. Let Zt = {zt(n) ∶ n ∈ NA ∪ND}, where zt(n) is the possibly
noise corrupted observation of st(n). We assume that P [Zt+1∣St+1, St,At] is given, where
At is the collection of actions taken by the two agents at epoch t.
The Transition Structure of the State of the Unified Graph. Take actions on the part of
both agents can affect the state of both graphs in making state transitions, i.e., in changing
from SAt and SDt to SAt+1 and S
D
t+1. In order for an action to change the state of a specific
node n to be successful, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition is that the current states of
the ancestor nodes, of node n, which are defined to be all of the nodes n′ in the precedence
(development process) graph such that there exists a path from nA (nD) to n′ that does not
include n, are in permissible states, i.e. that the context of n is satisfied. The context of
all actions is thus state-based. If this necessary condition is satisfied, then the action is
said to be feasible. We note that in a partially observed environment, the agents might not
know for sure whether the context of any particular action is satisfied. If the agent chooses
an infeasible action, then we assume the agent accrues the cost of the action (which may
be higher if the action is chosen when the context is not satisfied than if the context were
satisfied), and the action does nothing to affect the state of the graphs.
For example, assume a node n in the precedence graph is in state 0 if it is a non-game
node or state D if it is a game node and the attacker would like to change the state of this
node to A. A necessary condition for success (or for an action to be feasible) might be
that at least one of the immediate ancestor nodes of n be in state A. Another example of
feasibility is that there is a path of ancestor nodes from the start node to node nwhere every
node on this path is currently in state A. This latter example would model the need for a
supply chain to be under complete control of the attacker before any further attacks are
allowed (or are prudent). We assume the attacker cannot successfully attack a game node
if the game node is in state 0.
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Thus, both agents take control of non-game nodes in their respective graphs in an iden-
tical fashion and without the interference of the other agent (an assumption that is easily
modified). However, taking control of game nodes is different for the two agents. The
defender must take control of a game node before the node can exist. Once a game node
exists, it is initially controlled by the defender, but then becomes a candidate for control by
either agent. Hence, the existing game nodes represent potential battlegrounds for the two
agents. We depict this existence phenomena in Figure 4.1.
Assume that existing game node n is under the control of one of the two agents. At
each epoch, the agent controlling node n can decide to protect node n from an attempt
by the other agent to assume its control or to leave node n unprotected. If node n is left
unprotected and the other agent attempts to take control, then there is a probability that the
other agent will be successful, assuming the attempt is feasible. If node n is protected and
the other agent attempts to take control of node n, we assume that the likelihood of success
by the other agent is reduced.
Finally, we depict how different types of actions may be employed by the defender to
impede attacker progress in Figure 4.2, and remark that this subsection describes one of
many possible transition structures for the state of the precedence graph. In Appendix C.1,
we show how the transition probabilities P [St+1∣St,ADt ,AAt ] may be computed under this
transition structure, including the three types of actions presented above. In the remainder
of the paper, however, we assume for the sake of simplicity of exposition, that Take moves
are the only type of actions available.
Information Patterns. An information pattern describes what an agent knows before
the agent selects an action, i.e., who knows what and when. We assume the information
pattern for both agents is node specific and can involve data about the state of any node in
either graph. We also assume that an agent can not only take action to obtain control of, or
continue to control, a node (at a cost) but can also decide to acquire data (at a cost) about
the state of individual nodes and that these data may be inaccurate (noise corrupted) and
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Figure 4.2: Types of defense moves. Suppose the attacker has control of n and n′. The
defender may seek to prevent the attacker from progressing in the precedence graph in
three different ways.
• Take on n from D. This corresponds to an attack on the context of the attacker. If the
access control is necessary for attacker take moves on n′ and n′′, then the defender
can make these moves infeasible by controlling n.
• Take on n′ from D. This is a direct attempt to wrest control of n′ from the attacker.
• Take on n′′ from D and protect. The defender takes the subsequent node n′′ and
employs “protect” actions on n′′ to limit the chance of the attacker ever taking control
of n′′.
can be in either graph. It seems intuitive that more accurate observation quality will result
in better expected performance, and this intuition, although not true in general ([62], [9]),
will be supported by examples presented later in the paper. Let I At and I Dt be the data
available to the attacker and defender, respectively, at epoch t on which to base their action
selections. Examples include:
• I At = SAt ; i.e., the attacker has complete visibility of the state of the precedence
graph without cost but only finite memory
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• I Dt = ZDt ; i.e., the defender has inaccurate observations of the state of the develop-
ment process graph without cost and only finite memory, where ZDt = {zt(n) ∶ n ∈
ND} and zt(n) is a noise corrupted observation of the state of node n just before
epoch t.
Detection. We remark that I Dt can be useful for attack detection. The probability
P [SDt ≠ SD0 ∣I Dt ] provides insight into whether or not an attack is underway, and the prob-
abilities P [SDt ∣I Dt ] for all SDt can be useful in determining a best response action.
Reward, Cost, Criterion Structure, Problem Objective, and Policies. We assume that
any action Akt taken by an agent k at epoch t accrues a cost, ck(Akt ). We assume that any
reward accrued is dependent on the current state of the agent’s graph, and denote this reward
by rk(Skt ). In other words, we assume that the cost function Ck(St,At) = ck(Akt )−rk(Skt ).
Thus, the dependence of the cost function for each agent is separable and is only dependent
on the actions of the other agent through the state of the agent’s respective graph, Skt .
As in the POMG, we assume that the criterion each agent is trying to minimize is the
expected value of the sum over all epochs of all costs minus the rewards accrued at each
epoch, as in Equation 4.1. Recall that each agent is trying to minimize its criterion over all
feasible policies, where a policy is a mapping at each epoch from the data set available to
the agent at that epoch into the set of actions available to the agent at that epoch. A policy
that achieves the minimized criterion is an optimal policy. Since each agent’s criterion is
dependent on the policy taken by the other agent, an agent’s optimal policy depends on
what policy is taken by the other agent.
We have several remarks at this point:
• A policy can be viewed as a set of IF-THEN rules, stating that if agent k knows I kt
at epoch t and has feasible action set A kt at epoch t, then the policy tells the agent
what action(s) in A kt to select. A policy answers the question: Given I know I kt and
I can select an action from A kt , which action should I select? For example, given
I’m in my car at the intersection of Peachtree Road and North Avenue headed North,
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there is congestion on I-75, and my destination is Lenox Mall, should I go left, right,
or straight?
• A policy can contain stochastic rules; e.g, if I kt is the current data set for agent k,
and if a, a′ ∈ A kt , then a stochastic IF-THEN rule might be: select action a with
probability p; otherwise, select action a′.
• If an agent has multiple objectives, then instead of seeking an optimal policy, the
agent may seek a Pareto optimal frontier with its associated Pareto optimal policies.
4.4 Preliminary Results
Now, we formally specify the POMG model that we consider for the remainder of this pa-
per. Recall that the motivating PRESTIGE problem setting is inherently defender-centric.
Namely, the risk analysis that we perform is from the defender’s point of view. It is natu-
ral, then, that in this practical setting we understand the information pattern more clearly
for the defender than the attacker. For instance, it may be difficult to ascertain the quality
of the observations received by the attacker, even though we are able to specify this for
the defender. Moreover, it is intuitively reasonable (but perhaps not always the case – a
topic for future investigation) that if a defender policy is ‘good’ against an attacker with
complete observability of the system, then it will be ‘good’ against an attacker with partial
observability of the system. Since this is the problem setting, we consider there to be an
asymmetric information structure between the defender D and the attacker A. Namely, we
assume:
I Dt = {Zt, . . . , Z1,ADt−1, . . . ,AD0 , πA}
I At = {St, . . . , S0,AAt−1, . . . ,AA0 , πD} .
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We assume that each agent knows the structure of the respective graphs (ND,ED) and
(NA,EA).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the attacker presumes that the defender has
complete observability of the system, i.e. has a symmetric information pattern. In this case,
results in [37] guarantee that it is sufficient for the attacker to consider only Markovian
deterministic policies, such that I At = {St, πD} and πA is a mapping from all possible
graph states St into feasible actions A At for all t. The attacker assumes that the defender’s
policy is likewise Markovian, and thus the attacker can determine the best response policy
by solving a Markov decision process (MDP):
V At (St∣πD) = min
AAt ∈A At
{CA(St,AAt , πD(St)) + ∑
St+1
P [St+1∣St,AAt , πD(St)]V At+1(St+1∣πD)} .
(4.2)
Well-known results in [37] guarantee that we may solve this MDP by backward recursion.
Due to the information asymmetry, computing the defender’s best response policy is
more complicated. Given the attacker policy, the defender may theoretically determine the
best response policy by solving the following stochastic dynamic program (DP):
V Dt (It+1∣πA) = min
ADt ∈A At
E [CDt (St,ADt , πA(St)) + V Dt+1(I Dt+1∣πA)∣I Dt ,ADt , πA] . (4.3)
The state space of this formulation grows with t, which makes this formulation unreal-
istic for computation. Note that this best response DP is a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP). Results in [45] guarantee that the Bayesian belief distribu-
tion over the state space (the union of the development process and precedence graphs)
XDt = {P [St∣I Dt ]} is a sufficient statistic for control and that the defender may determine
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the best response policy by solving:




XDt (St)CDt (St,ADt , πA(St))
+ ∑
St+1,Zt+1
σ(Zt+1∣XDt ,ADt , πA(St))V Dt+1 (Λ(Zt+1,ADt ,XDt )∣πA)},
(4.4)
where
σ(Zt+1∣XDt ,ADt , πAt (St)) = P [Zt∣I Dt ,ADt , πA(St)]
Λ(St+1∣Zt+1,ADt ,XDt ) = P [St+1∣Zt+1,ADt ,XDt ].
Thus, XDt+1 = Λ(Zt+1,ADt ,XDt ) is the defender’s Bayesian posterior belief distribution over
the state space, given that the observation was Zt+1, the defender chose action ADt , and the
prior belief was XDt . We show how to compute Λ using Bayes’ rule in the next section.
4.5 Heuristic Solution Procedure
A candidate solution to the POMG of Section 4.4 is a tuple of policies (πA, πD). In a
standard POMG, ideally these policies would form a Nash equilibrium, in which neither
agent has incentive to deviate from their policy. Due to the size and complexity of our
problem, determining a Nash equilibrium is computationally and analytically intractable
for all but the smallest of problem instances. Moreover, in our application setting the
defender policy generated by such a Nash equilibrium may not even be the most desirable
to implement in practice. Recall that in our application, we assume that the modeler (the
defender) is trying to analyze risk in the system against potential or hypothetical attackers.
The objectives of the attacker are assumed or posited by the defender in order to capture
different potential attacker priorities (e.g. budget-constrained, win-at-all-costs). A Nash
equilibrium solution would assume that the objectives of such a potential attacker are well-
known and, thus, the attacker has no reason to deviate from the equilibrium if both agents
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are behaving completely rationally (an assumption that itself might not hold). Moreover, it
is unknown whether the equilibrium is stable or not, so it is unclear whether the defender’s
equilibrium policy is effective against a range of attacker policies.
For these reasons, we use the POMG as a generative mechanism. The modeler/defender
might posit different objective functions for the attacker in order to generate different kinds
of attacker behavior. Moreover, as we showed in Section 4.4, it provides a mechanism for
determining best response policies using dynamic programming methods. The focus for
the defender is then to determine a “good” policy, i.e. a policy that is:
• robust to a range of attacker policies,
• adaptive to the changing state of the system, and
• intelligent in the way that it processes (possibly noise-corrupted) information.
We foreshadowed our approach to policy determination in Section 4.4, where we showed
how determining the attacker’s best response policy, given a Markovian defender policy, re-
duces to solving a MDP. Likewise, determining the defender’s best response policy, given
an attacker policy, reduces to solving a POMDP. Although solving the POMDP defined by
Equation 4.4 is a reduction in computational complexity relative to the POMG, it may still
be computationally difficult to solve itself. This motivates the following three-fold method
for generating a good (randomized) heuristic defender policy:
1. Train the Agents. First, we relax the partial observability assumption of the defender
and generate intelligent, plausible attacker and defender policies by solving succes-
sive best response MDPs.
2. Generate a Robust Defender Policy. After training, and again relaxing the partial
observability assumption, we solve for a single defender policy by solving a robust
MDP that considers all of the trained attacker policies.
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3. Probability Matching Heuristic. The defender then uses a probability matching
heuristic policy based on Thompson sampling.
We detail our heuristic solution procedure in Figure 4.3 and discuss each step in the re-
mainder of this section.
4.5.1 Training the Agents
The first step in our heuristic solution procedure is to “train” the agents. This training
step is our mechanism for generating hypothetical attacker policies that exemplify different
attacker behaviors. The goal is to generate plausible, intelligent, and adaptive attacker poli-
cies that the defender should consider in constructing its own policy. In this step, we relax
the partial observability condition for the attacker both because of potential computational
intractability — recall the defender’s best response problem is a POMDP, which may be
difficult to solve — and because it matches the attacker’s presumption about the defender’s
information pattern. Thus, given an attacker policy πA, we assume that the defender may
generate a Markovian deterministic best response policy, πD, (a function from St to A Dt
for all t) by solving the following MDP:
V Dt (St) = min
ADt ∈A Dt
{CD(St,ADt , πA(St)) + ∑
St+1
P [St+1∣St,ADt , πA(St)]V Dt+1(St+1)} .
We say a policy πk for agent k is trained against a policy πj for agent j, where j ≠ k and
k, j ∈ {A,D}, if (and only if) πk is a best response policy to πj .
The training procedure begins with an initial finite set of defender policies, GD0 , which
we call “generation-0” defender policies. These policies are initialized by the defender and
can contain a wide range of easily determined policies, e.g. a naive policy such as “take
action A at every epoch and every state”, a myopic policy that is greedy with respect to the
single-period cost function CD, or the historical operating policies.
Next, we determine the generation-1 attacker policies, GA1 , by training the attacker
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0. Initialization. Defender has an initial finite set of defender policies GD0 (i.e. the
generation-0 defender policies).
1. Train the Agents. For each generation g = 1, . . . ,m:
(a) For each πD ∈ GDg−1 (or any subset of GDg−1), determine the attacker best response
by solving via backward recursion as in [37] for t = T + 1, . . . ,0:
V At (St) = min
AAt ∈A At
{CA(St,AAt , πD(St)) + ∑
St+1
P [St+1∣St,AAt , πD(St)]V At+1(St+1)} .
Add the best response policy, πA, to the set of generation-g attacker policies,
GAg :
GAg ← GAg ∪ πA.
(b) For each πA ∈ GAg (or any subset of GAg ), determine the defender best response
by solving via backward recursion as in [37] for t = T + 1, . . . ,0:
V Dt (St) = min
ADt ∈A Dt
{CD(St,ADt , πA(St)) + ∑
St+1
P [St+1∣St,ADt , πA(St)]V Dt+1(St+1)} .
Add the best response policy, πD to the set of generation-g defender policies,
GDg :
GDg ← GDg ∪ πD.
2. Generate a Robust Defender Policy. Solve the MMDP with weight distribution λ =
[λ1, . . . , λn] over the set of attacker policies {πA1 , . . . , πAn } determined by training.
Generate the robust policy πDrob using WSU, adapted from [51]. Initialize V̂
i
T+1 = CDT+1
for each policy πAi , i = 1, . . . , n.
For t = T, . . . ,0:






λi{CD(St,ADt , πAi (St))+∑
St+1
P [St+1∣St,ADt , πAi (St)]V̂ it+1(St+1)}.
(b) For every state St and i = 1, . . . , n:
V̂ it (St)← min
ADt ∈A Dt
{CD(St,ADt , πAi (St)) + ∑
St+1
P [St+1∣St,ADt , πAi (St)]V̂ it+1(St+1)} .
3. Probability Matching Heuristic. The defender plays the randomized policy such that
at epoch t, πDrob(St) is chosen with probability XDt (St).
Figure 4.3: Heuristic solution procedure.
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against the generation-0 defender policies, GD0 . That is, we begin with GA1 = ∅. Then
for each policy πD ∈ GD0 , we determine a best response policy πA by solving the attacker
MDP induced by πD (Equation 4.2), and add it to the set GA1 . The set of generation-1 de-
fender policies, GD1 , are likewise determined by training against the generation-1 attacker
policies, GA1 .
For generation-g policies, GAg is the set of attacker policies trained against GDg−1, and
GDg is the set of defender policies trained against GAg . In this way, the generation number g
may be interpreted as the order of rationality, i.e. the number of times each agent considers
the other agent’s best response in determining their policy. This is alternatively referred
to in the game theoretic literature as level-g reasoning or depth of reasoning ([50]) and is
closely related to the concept of cognitive hierarchy in games ([13]). Thus, given the initial
defender policies GD0 , we generate the sets of level-g reasoned policies for the attacker and
the defender, up to some pre-specified maximal level of reasoning, m.
There are other implementations that we might consider that give the generation number
g alternative interpretations. For instance, we might implement the training procedure as a
genetic algorithm that mimics the natural selection and reproduction process in biological
evolution. In this case, we assume we have access to some fitness function, F , that gives
each policy a real-numbered “fitness score” (a natural fitness score might be the evaluation
of the policy given the opponent policy at the initial state of the system, e.g. V πD0 (S0∣πA)).
At generation g, we assume that we have the set of “surviving” defender policies, GDg−1, and
attacker policies, GAg−1 the fitness score for each of the generation-(g − 1) policies satisfied
some “survivability” criterion. We might then consider GAg to be the set of best response
policies to the surviving defender policies GDg−1 that satisfy the survivability criterion, and
likewise, GDg to be the defender best response policies to GAg . In this context, the process
of solving the best response MDP for each agent acts as the “genetic operator” for gener-
ating the next generation of candidate policies. This process continues for a pre-specified
maximal number of generations, m.
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4.5.2 Generating a Robust Defender Policy
At the end of the training step, we have a finite number of attacker policies, {πA1 , . . . , πAn }.
In this step, we want to generate a single defender policy that is robust against this set of
attacker policies, and thus robust against an array of attacker types. In order to do so, we
use the multi-model MDP (MMDP) of [51], that was originally developed for imprecisely
specified MDPs in which there are multiple candidate models of the cost function and
transition probabilities. In our setting, we recognize that each attacker policy πAi induces
a different transition probability structure for the defender {P [St+1∣St,ADt , πAi (St)]}, and
thus represents a candidate model of the transition probabilities. In the MMDP, we suppose
that we have access to a set of weights λ = {λ1, . . . , λn} such that λi represents the a priori
probability that the defender believes the attacker will use policy πAi . A robust defender
policy, πDrob, is then a policy that minimizes the expected costs, given λ:










CD(St, πD(St), πAi (St)) +CDT+1(ST+1)] .
Standard solution methods in [37] like backward recursion are not applicable for this
MMDP. [51] suggest an algorithm called “Weight-Select-Update” (WSU) that we adapt
to our setting here in Figure 4.3.
4.5.3 Probability Matching Heuristic
In training and determining πDrob we relaxed the partial observability condition on the de-
fender, so that πDrob is a function that maps states into feasible defender actions. In imple-
mentation, or policy evaluation, the defender must make decisions at epoch t on the basis
of the information available:
I Dt = {Zt, . . . , Z1,ADt−1, . . . ,AD0 , πA} ,
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rather than knowledge of the true state St. Recall that XDt = {P [St∣I Dt ]} is a sufficient
statistic for the defender. In implementation, we assume the defender’s action at epoch t
is selected randomly, based only on knowledge of I Dt , such that at epoch t, the defender
chooses the robust policy action for state St with the probability that the defender believes
the system to be in state St. More precisely, in order to differentiate between the true state of
the system St and the random variable upon which the defender makes a decision, suppose
that Rt is a random variable with the same support as St, probability mass function XDt ,
and is independent of St. The defender chooses its action as follows: Rt is drawn from
XDt , then the defender plays πD(Rt). Thus, the defender chooses action πDrob(St) with
probability XDt (St).
Note that this is a probability matching heuristic. Denote by πDheu this policy, such that
πDheu(XDt ) = πDrob(St) with probability XDt (St). This heuristic policy, πDheu, is conceptually
connected to Thompson sampling — a popular technique in machine learning for balancing
the well-known exploration-exploitation tradeoff in online optimization problems, which
we detail in Appendix C.3.
4.5.4 Step-by-step explanation of an example transition from t to t + 1.
In this subsection, we consider a hypothetical unified graph in order to elucidate the infor-
mation flow and transition dynamics from t to t + 1. In this unified graph, we assume that
each node is initially controlled by the defender (that they already exist) and each node is a
game node. For simplicity, we assume that the only actions available to the attacker and de-
fender are Take moves, which we refer to as “attacks” for the attacker and “counter-attacks”
for the defender.
We assume that the attacker’s policy, πA, has been determined and that the defender
knows the attacker’s policy and has constructed a policy, πD, to counteract it in order to
best achieve the defender’s objectives (protect node 10). The attacker’s policy (constructed
to compromise node 10) directs the attack from node 1 to node 6 through nodes 4 and 5.
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1. Information patterns: who knows what at epoch t.
(a) The attacker knows the state of the precedence and development process graph,
i.e. I At = St.
(b) The defender keeps track of the belief distribution XDt = P [St∣I Dt ].
2. The attacker’s action: given the attacker’s policy πA, the attacker’s action is πA(St).
3. The defender’s action:
(a) Based on XDt , a random process generates the realization Rt, which is revealed
to the defender.
(b) Given the defender’s policy πD, the defender’s action is πD(Rt).
4. Update the precedence graph: Given πA(St) and πD(Rt), the state of the
precedence graph is updated to St+1 according to the transition probability
P [St+1∣St, πA(St), πD(Rt)].
5. Update the belief distribution. The defender receives observation Zt+1 and has infor-
mation pattern I Dt+1 = {Zt+1,Rt,I Dt }. The defender then updates the belief distri-
bution:
XDt+1 ← Λ (Zt+1, πD(Rt),XDt ) = {P [St+1∣I Dt+1]}.
6. Update t← t + 1; GO TO 1.
Figure 4.4: How the process proceeds, from one decision epoch to the next, given attacker
policy πA and the defender policy πD.
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Since the defender knows the attacker’s policy, the defender is aware that this will be the
line of attack.
Figure 4.5: Configuration at epoch t.
Figure 4.5. Figure 4.5 summarizes what the agents know at decision epoch t. The actual
state of the precedence graph is that nodes 4 and 5 have been compromised (i.e., the state of
the precedence graph is (A,D,D,A,A,D,D,D,D,D)), which the attacker knows. Based
on possibly inaccurate observations of the state of the nodes, the defender does not know
whether only node 4 has been compromised (state (A,D,D,A,D,D,D,D,D,D)), both
nodes 4 and 5 have been compromised (state (A,D,D,A,A,D,D,D,D,D)), or nodes 4,
5, and 6 have been compromised (state (A,D,D,A,A,A,D,D,D,D)). However, the de-
fender has inferred from past and current observations and the attacker’s and defender’s
policies that the probabilities of these three possible states are 0.25, 0.45, and 0.30, respec-
tively.
Figure 4.6. We assume that the defender’s policy selects the defender’s action on the
basis of the current state of the precedence graph. We determine what state to use randomly,
selecting state (A,D,D,A,D,D,D,D,D,D) with probability 0.25, state (A,D,D,A,A,
D,D,D,D,D) with probability 0.45, and state (A,D,D,A,A,A,D,D,D,D) with prob-
ability 0.30. Figure 4.6 indicates that the realization of the random variable making this
selection, Rt, selected state (A,D,D,A,A,D,D,D,D,D), which coincidently is the ac-
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Figure 4.6: A “guess” state, Rt, is randomly chosen by the defender (in green) according
to the inference distribution, {P [St∣I Dt ]}.
tual current state of the precedence graph.
Figure 4.7: This “guess” state, Rt, determines the defender’s action to be taken, πD(Rt).
Figure 4.7. Given state Rt = (A,D,D,A,A,D,D,D,D,D), the defender’s policy se-
lects the action: counter-attack node 5, which corresponds to πD(Rt).
Figure 4.8. Given the actual state of the precedence graph, St, the attacker’s policy
selects the action: attack node 6 from (compromised) node 5, which corresponds to πA(St).
Figure 4.9. Figure 4.9 indicates that the counter-attack was successful. Since we have
assumed that the outcome of the defender’s action take precedence over the outcome of
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Figure 4.8: On the basis of the attacker policy, πA, and the actual state, St, the at-
tacker chooses action πA(St). On the basis of the defender policy, πD, and the infer-
ence distribution, {P [St∣I Dt ]}, the defender chooses randomized action πD(Rt), where
Rt ∼ {P [St∣I Dt ]}.
the attacker’s action, the attacker’s action fails. Thus, the state of the precedence graph at
epoch t + 1 becomes (A,D,D,A,D,D,D,D,D,D), indicating that the attacker has lost
ground.
Figure 4.10. The defender now receives new observations of the state of the nodes in
the precedence graph. We note two observations are incorrect. The defender is informed
that nodes 5 and 6 are compromised when they both are not. These incorrect data are used
to update the probabilities on the states of the precedence graph for the defender.
Figure 4.11. Figure 4.11 summarizes what the agents know at decision epoch t+1. The
actual state is St+1 = (A,D,D,A,D,D,D,D,D,D), which is known by the attacker, and
the defender has inferred that the state is (A,D,D,A,D,D,D,D,D,D) with probability
0.20, (A,D,D,A,A,D,D,D,D,D) with probability 0.30, (A,D,D,A,A,A,D,D,D,D)
with probability 0.40, and (A,D,D,A,A,A,A,D,D,D) with probability 0.10.
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Figure 4.9: State transition occurs on the basis of the actions taken. This transition is fully
observed by attacker, but not by defender.
Figure 4.10: Defender gets a noisy observation of the new state, Zt+1, and updates his belief
distribution to {P [St+1∣I Dt+1]} (recall that I Dt+1 = {Zt+1,Rt,I Dt }).
4.6 Numerical Exemplar
4.6.1 Set Up
We now present a numerical exemplar to demonstrate the types of insights that our POMG
model and solution procedure can generate.
State and Actions. The state of our numerical exemplar is defined by the precedence
graph in Figure 4.12a. We assume that the defender has knowledge of the entirety of the
precedence graph, such that the development process graph consists of a dummy node
with a directed edge emanating to each node 2 through 8. Thus, the attacker and defender
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Figure 4.11: Configuration at epoch t + 1.
(a) Precedence graph for the nu-
merical exemplar.
(b) The success probabilities
for defender take moves.
(c) The success probabilities
for attacker take moves.
Figure 4.12: Model inputs for the numerical exemplar.
interact on a common set of nodes. For simplicity we assume that the attacker and the
defender only have access to “take” moves. Further, the attacker is permitted to perform a
take move on one node at each decision epoch, while the defender can perform any number
of take moves.
Transition probabilities. The transition probabilities are defined as in Section 4.3, with
the probability of success for each node-specific take move defined by Figures 4.12b and
4.12c. In order to generate an additional strategic consideration for the agents, we assume
that the probability of success for a take move by the attacker is scaled by the proportion
of nodes that the attacker controls in the precedence graph. This makes the probability of
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success state-dependent and incentivizes the attacker to consider tradeoffs between short-
term progress and the added benefit of long-term increased probability of success. The
transition probabilities may be computed as in Appendix C.1, with each term PA(τAt (n))
multiplied by 1∣NA∣ ∑
n∈NA
1{SAt (n) = A}.
Observations. Zt∣St is assumed to be distributed such that P [Zt = s∣St = s] = p and
P [Zt = s′∣St = s] = 1−p# of states−1 for s ≠ s′ ∈ S . That is, the parameter p indicates the
probability that the defender gets an observation that corresponds to the true state of the
system, and an observation corresponding to an incorrect state is uniformly distributed.
Note that p = 1 corresponds to complete observability and p = 1# of states corresponds to
complete unobservability of the system.
Cost functions. The cost function for the defender is specified such that each take move,
τD(n) costs 10 ⋅ PD(τD(n)). The terminal cost function for the defender is CDT+1(SDt ) =
1000 ⋅ 1{SDt (n = 8) = A}. Further, if the state of node 8 is A, then the defender accrues
an additional cost of 1000. We consider four different “types of attackers” — each with
different cost functions.
1. Win only. This attacker only cares about “winning” at the end of the time horizon,
i.e. controlling node 8 at epoch T + 1. That is, the attacker accrues a cost of -1000 if
SAT+1(n = 8) = A. Otherwise, the attacker accrues no cost.
2. Win early. This attacker only cares about controlling node 8 for as long as possible.
That is, the attacker accrues a cost of -1000 if SAt (n = 8) = A for any epoch t.
Otherwise, the attacker accrues no cost.
3. Progressive. This attacker cares about controlling node 8 and other nodes for as long
as possible. That is, the attacker accrues a cost of -1000 if SAt (n = 8) = A for any
epoch t, and additionally accrues a cost of -100 if SAt (n) = A for any epoch t and
node n ∈ {1,2, . . . ,7}.
4. Detection skittish. This attacker is sensitive to “losing ground”. That is, the attacker
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Figure 4.13: Value of Robustness. For each parameter p, the relative objective value (av-





g-generation policy trained against the g-generation attacker policy of type i. For example,
the average objective value across all attacker policies of πDrob is 35% better than π
D
1,1.
Figure 4.14: Value of Information. Relative change in objective value under the robust
policy, πDrob across observation parameters, p, against the generated attacker policies.
is penalized with a cost of 100 for each node that switches from A to D from epoch t
to t+ 1, and accrues a cost of -100 for each node that switches from D to A. We note
that the cost accrued for the detection skittish attacker depends on the state transition,
and so we consider the cost function for each decision epoch to be the expected cost
over possible state transitions.
Evaluation. We generate policy pairs as in Section 4.5, beginning with the defender
policy, πDACA, in which the defender “always counter-attacks”, i.e. the defender performs
a take move on every node {2, . . . ,8} at each epoch. We consider policies of one and two
orders of rationality, and depict the policies by πDi,g to represent a defender trained against
attacker type i and order of rationality g. The attacker policies are likewise defined as πAi,g
for the attacker of type i, trained against πDi,g−1. If g − 1 = 0, then this corresponds to the
attacker of type i trained against πDACA. We evaluate all policy pairs, under the defender
heuristic defined in Section 4.5, with 2500 Monte Carlo simulations and a horizon T = 19.
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Figure 4.15: Average of Monte Carlo simulated defender objective values for each policy
pairing and p = 1.
4.6.2 Results
The numerical output of the Monte Carlo evaluations of each of the generated attacker-
defender policy pairs is summarized in Figures 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15. Our numerical results
highlight two phenomena, in particular — the value of robustness and the value of infor-
mation.
Recall that our motivation for developing a defender heuristic on the basis of πDrob was
based upon the conjecture that a policy trained against a specific attacker policy may be
subject to vulnerabilities when the attacker chooses a different policy. We use a Monte
Carlo simulation of the robust policy against the generated attacker policies (as in Section
4.4) and compare this to the performance of the variously generated defender policies in
order to investigate this conjecture. The average costs accrued for each attacker-defender
policy pairing are depicted in Figure 4.15 for the completely observed case (p = 1). On the
whole, we see that the robust policy tends to perform nearly as well as the best defender
policy for each attacker policy. In Figure 4.13, we depict the average simulated cost across
all attacker policies for each defender policy, relative to the robust policy, at differing levels
of observation quality. This shows that mismatched policies can lead to poor performance,
e.g. for the completely observed case (p = 1), πDrob accrued an average of 70% less cost than
πD1,1 across the different generated policies. We call this phenomenon, in which the robust
policy hedges against the risk of policy mismatch, the value of robustness.
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Figure 4.16: Opener. Actions under πA1,1 are depicted in red, actions under π
D
1,1 are depicted
in blue, and actions under πDrob are depicted in green.
It is intuitive that the better the information quality available to the defender (p → 1),
the better the defender will perform — a phenomenon we call the value of information.
(Although this intuition is correct when the policy used is optimal and is often the case for
good sub-optimal policies, see [62] for counterexamples.) For the exemplar and policies
that we consider here, costs decrease as p gets closer to 1, as summarized in Figure 4.14.
Further, we see that better information leverages the value of robustness. As p approaches
1, in Figure 4.13, the robust policy in general performs better relative to the other defender
policies. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this may be because the observational uncertainty
when p is low can act as a hedge against conservative tendencies for mismatched policies
(the defender choosing not to act due to poor assumptions about the attacker, say when πD1,1
is trained against a conservative attacker and matched with πA2,3, an aggressive attacker).
4.6.3 Closer Examination of Robustness
In this subsection, we compare a specifically trained policy and the robust policy to better
understand how the robust policy hedges against the risk of alternative attacker policies
in its decision-making. Consider the attacker policy πA1,1, the defender policy π
D
1,1, and
the robust policy πDrob. We depict in Figures 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18 the decisions of these
policies under different scenarios that correspond to the attack line — the actions taken by
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Figure 4.17: Middle game. Actions under πA1,1 are depicted in red, actions under π
D
1,1 are
depicted in blue, and actions under πDrob are depicted in green.
Figure 4.18: End game. Actions under πA1,1 are depicted in red, actions under π
D
1,1 are
depicted in blue, and actions under πDrob are depicted in green.
the attacker if each attack is successful — under policy πA1,1.
Recall that attacker type 1 is “win only”, so the attacker playing πA1,1 is only concerned
with controlling node 8 at the end of the horizon. The attack line for policy πA1,1 is 1 →
2 → 7 → 3 → 8. The game plays out roughly in three stages — the opener (roughly epochs
1 through 13), the mid game (roughly epochs 13-16), and the end game (roughly epochs
17-19). In the opener and mid game, the attacker seeks to build his or her position, to
set his- or herself up for a take from 7 on 8 in the end game. That is, the attacker under
πA1,1 chooses to build a position and then wait or secure the position until the end of the
horizon, at which point the attacker takes on 8. Under the assumption of this behavior, we
see that the defender under policy πD1,1 chooses to conserve resources in the opener, employ
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conservative take moves in the middle game, and play aggressively in the end game. On
the other hand, the robust policy plays like the πA1,1 in the end game, but for the entirety of
the horizon.
Herein lies the value of robustness in this exemplar, the robust policy spreads counter-
attacks across multiple nodes in order to cover for different attack lines (spatial robustness),
and also attacks early and consistently (temporal robustness). Because the defender under
πD1,1 does not contest the attacker early in the game, an aggressive attacker can exploit
this behavior. The robust policy hedges against this risk by playing aggressively across
each decision epoch. This also explains why the policies trained against more aggressive
attacker types, {πD1,2, πD1,3, πD2,2, πD2,3}, perform similarly to the robust policy in this exemplar,
as shown in Figure 4.15.
4.7 Conclusions & Future Directions
In this paper, we considered how to create dynamic, data-driven, and robust policies that
generate trust in development processes. We first presented a graph-based representation of
both the development process — necessary conditions for progress towards the defender’s
end goal — and paths the attacker could possibly take to compromise the defender’s end
goal (which we call the precedence graph). We then showed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 that
dynamic interactions between the two agents can be modeled using a POMG. In using the
POMG as a mechanism for generating varied attacker policies, we were able to construct
a defender policy that explicitly considers an array of attacker policies — thereby generat-
ing trustworthiness by increasing robustness to misapprehension of attacker objectives and
rationality.
We now point out several limitations in our approach that create future research direc-
tions. First of all, the graph-based representation of the development process and attacker
precedence structure leads to an exponentially increasing state space in the number of nodes
comprising the unified graph. This makes our method difficult to implement, as presented
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here, for graphs of moderate to large size. In Appendix C.4, we show that the probabil-
ity transition matrices that govern dynamics are sparse — a fact that we use to significant
computational advantage in our exemplar in Section 4.6. Even if exploiting sparsity, we
expect computational intractabilities for larger-sized graphs. This opens up substantial op-
portunity for adapting our robust policy procedure in Figure 4.3 to incorporate approximate
dynamic programming and heuristic search methods.
Secondly, in our solution procedure in Section 4.5, we use the POMG as a generative
mechanism, using orders of rationality in response to an initial set of defender policies and
different posited attacker objectives. Thus, we can trust that the robust defender policy will
perform better than a singularly-trained policy against an array of attacker types. However,
we recognize that this robustness is contingent upon (1) the degree to which our genera-
tive mechanism determines good attacker policies, and (2) the degree to which we have
determined plausible attacker objectives. Thus, there is substantial opportunity to improve
upon our self-learning approach by improving the generative mechanism. We mention the
passing similarity of our method to genetic algorithms (GAs) in Section 5, and note that
the evolutionary approach of GAs represents a potentially fruitful research direction.
Finally, we note that we assume that the robust weight parameters, λ = [λ1, . . . , λn],
are chosen a priori and are fixed. Instead, we might allow for dynamic tuning of the
weight parameters over decision epochs. This would add additional complexity, but will
allow for improvement in the robust policy. Further, this would take a step towards making
robustness — especially in a reinforcement learning context — explainable. For large
problems, the analysis we did of robustness in Section 4.6.3 would be difficult due to the
size of the problem. If we allow for dynamic adjustment of λ, we can explain robustness
by analyzing how the weights considered in the robust policy evolved. Highly weighted
attacker policies would indicate significance in forming the robust defender policy.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH
There are many potentially fruitful research directions that emanate from each chapter of
this dissertation. We detail some of these, below.
5.1 Sequential Decision-Making Affected by Partially Observable Exogenous Forces
In Chapter 2, we consider sequential decision-making environments in which there is a
natural hierarchy of effects — micro-level forces that the DM can control, and macro-level
forces that the DM cannot. The specially-structured partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP) that we present, the modulated POMDP (M-POMDP), had three main
properties that make constructing optimal policies tractable:
1. The M-POMDP inherits structure from its MDP analog.
2. The M-POMDP inherits structure with respect to the belief distribution from the
general POMDP.
3. The M-POMDP yields specialized, tractable solution procedures due to its passive
learning environment.
These properties were facilitated by a separability assumption on the transition dynamics,
akin to the separation principle in stochastic optimal control. One particularly interesting
line of research is to consider how M-POMDPs might be used as tractable approximations
to more general POMDPs in which the separability assumption does not hold. That is,
how good is an optimal policy generated from an M-POMDP, for an analogous POMDP in
which the separability assumption almost holds?
Future research might additionally consider applications of the M-POMDP. One partic-
ularly interesting potential application area is healthcare operations under real-time patient
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health data. In such applications, a healthcare operator must make decisions (e.g. order-
ing, production, distribution decisions) while simultaneously considering real-time patient
health data. This setting would be particularly important for critically ill patients, and per-
sonalized gene therapies, in which the patient’s health evolves independently of operating
decisions, but affects the operator’s objectives to both minimize costs and maximize patient
well-being.
5.2 The Value of Information and Supply Chain Agility in Managing Uncertainty in
Inventory Systems
In Chapter 3, we consider the strategic demand management question: should capital be
allocated towards (1) a better information infrastructure (data, forecasts, quantitative talent,
etc.), or (2) a more agile product architecture and supply chain design in order to more
quickly respond to changing demand? We recognize that answering this question requires
considering how to analyze and quantify the effects of changes in agility and information
quality on optimal decision-making within an operational context. We show how to address
this question in a specific inventory control context, but future research might alternatively
consider different and/or more complex contexts.
Additionally, we present a notion of information quality in terms of Markov noisy
channels, and show that, in this sense, better information quality results in better system
performance under an optimal policy. Although mathematically appealing, this notion of
information quality is difficult to interpret in practice because it is a relative notion of in-
formation quality. We can only determine a partial order on the quality of information
mechanisms through this notion. However, for a specific numerical example, we were
able to present results with respect to an absolute measure of information quality. Future
research might seek to generalize these results.
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5.3 Generating Trust in Development Processes Using Robust, Data-driven Markov
Games: An Application to PRESTIGE
In Chapter 4, we consider a two-agent decision-making environment in which a defender
must make decisions in a development process, in which there is potential for adversar-
ial manipulation. In this context, we model agent dynamics using a partially observable
Markov game (POMG), and we show how to generate a policy that the defender can trust
— in the sense that the defender policy is robust to an array of attacker policies (potentially
due to misapprehension of adversarial objectives, level of rationality, etc.) — by combin-
ing a generative mechanism for constructing plausible attacker policies and then solving a
robust dynamic program that optimizes over the expected objectives with respect to an a
priori weight distribution, λ.
Traditional reinforcement learning has its mathematical foundations in Markov decision
processes (MDPs), and has been applied successfully (and famously) to zero-sum games,
such as chess and Go ([44]). However, multi-agent reinforcement learning settings in which
one agent does not know the other agent’s objectives have not been well-considered, to the
knowledge of this author, despite there being many applications (as we discuss in Chapter
4). A future research direction would be to consider how our approach might be adapted to
a reinforcement learning setting.
Moreover, there is a development in the artificial intelligence (AI) community towards
explainable AI. As we discuss in the conclusions of Chapter 4, the weight distribution λ
in our robust dynamic program might act as a way to explain the defender’s policy be-
havior in terms of the weights that are placed upon potential adversarial policies. Future
research methods might allow the DM to adjust these weights over time, as a foundation
for constructing policies that are both robust and explainable.
Finally, another future research direction might focus on improving the generative
mechanism that we present, using, for example, heuristic or evolutionary search mecha-
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SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING AFFECTED BY PARTIALLY OBSERVED
EXOGENOUS FORCES
A.1 L♮-convexity
We now examine a structure from discrete convex analysis, L♮-convexity, which can be
useful in many operations research applications. [64] proved the existence of a monotone
optimal policy and a L♮-convex value function for a completely non-perishable inventory
problem which is modeled as a MDP. In this subsection, we show how the results in Section
2.4 can be used to demonstrate that the M-POMDP inherits this optimal policy structure.
We provide a brief introduction to this topic, and refer the reader to [32] for a thorough
treatment. Let F = R or Z and e be the ones vector. We begin with a definition of L♮-
convexity and a proposition that demonstrates that L♮-convexity is a C3 property.
Definition 8. (L♮-convexity) A real-valued function g(y) defined on an L♮-convex set Y ⊆
Fn, i.e.
∀y, y′ ∈ Y,∀α ∈ F+, y ∨ (y − αe) ∈ Y and (y + αe) ∧ y′ ∈ Y
is an L♮-convex function if the function ψ(y, ξ) = g(y − ξe), ξ ≤ 0 is subadditive on Y ×F−.
Proposition 23. L♮-convexity is a C3 property.
The following proposition demonstrates the inheritance of the L♮-convex value function
and an optimal monotone policy function for the M-POMDP, given that the MDP has these
properties.
Proposition 24. Suppose B(b) holds for F̃ the space of real-valued functions on S ×A that
areL♮-convex on S. Then there exists an optimal value-policy function pair (v∗, π∗) ∈ V ×Π
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such that v∗(s, x) is L♮-convex in s on S for all x ∈X , and π∗(s, x) is non-decreasing in s
on S for all x ∈X .
In [64] this structure is derived for a completely-observed lost sales inventory problem,
in which the author notes that the monotone optimal policy structure extends under a com-
pletely observed Markov-modulated demand process. We note that this is simply a special
case of a M-POMDP in which the modulation process (corresponding to the “world” pro-
cess in [64]) is completely observed.
We note, additionally, that the closely related concept of multi-modularity is also a C3
property since it is mathematically equivalent to L♮-convexity via a coordinate transforma-
tion. As with L♮-convexity, multi-modularity is useful in certain inventory control problem
settings, as in [28].
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X implies that v(⋅, λ(z′, x)) ∈ Ṽ
for all (z′, x) ∈ Z ×X . Recall that




σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))).
We know from [46] that single-point properties are preserved under maximization. Let
G ′ be the set of all real-valued functions on S that possess a C3 property, P ′, and let
G = {−v ∶ v ∈ G ′}. Then G also possesses a C3 property, P (not necessarily P ′).
Now, observe that∑z′ σ(z′∣x)hz′(⋅, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))) ∈ Ṽ since C3 properties are closed
under convex combinations. Further, single-point properties are preserved under maxi-
mization, so since




σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x)))}
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we conclude that Hv(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X . The result follows by applying Corollary
1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X implies that v(⋅, λ(z′, x)) ∈ Ṽ
for all (z′, x) ∈ Z ×X . Recall that




σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))).
Since v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X , hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))) satisfies a joint extension of P
on S × A, P∗, by the proposition assumption, for all (z′, x) ∈ Z × X . This implies
∑z′ σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))) has property P∗ on S ×A, as well. The result follows
from Proposition 4 in [46].
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose v̄ ∈ Ṽ . The proof proceeds by first showing hz′(s, a, v̄)
satisfies P∗ and then applying Proposition 3. Recall
hz′(s, a, v̄) = c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)v̄(s′).
Note that c satisfies P∗, for all z′ ∈ Z due to (i). Then Proposition 2 of [46] and (ii)
guarantee that ∑s′ p(s′∣z′, s, a)v̄(s′) has property P∗ for all z′ ∈ Z. Since P∗ is a convex
cone, hz′(s, a, v̄) has property P∗ in (s, a) on S ×A, for all z′ ∈ Z. The result follows by
applying Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 6. We proceed by demonstrating that P(b) and P(c) hold and then
applying Proposition 1. Suppose v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X . Recall, we have




σ(z′∣x)hz′(s, a, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))).
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By B(a), we have that hz′(⋅, ⋅, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))) ∈ F̃ for all (z′, x) ∈ Z ×X . Further,
∑
z′
σ(z′∣x)hz′(⋅, ⋅, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))) ∈ F̃
as well, since F̃ is a space of functions possessing a joint C3 property, P∗. By B(b),
minimizing over feasible policies from S to A maps functions in F̃ into Ṽ . We conclude
that Hv(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X and P(b) holds.
By the same logic, since ∑z′ σ(z′∣x)hz′(⋅, ⋅, v(⋅, λ(z′, x))) ∈ F̃ , B(c) guarantees that
P(c) holds as well. The conclusion follows by Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose vn(s, ⋅) is piecewise linear and concave in x. It suffices to
show vn+1(s, ⋅) =Hvn(s, ⋅) is piecewise linear and concave in x.
If vn(s, ⋅) is piecewise linear and concave, then that implies there exists a vector on µ,
α⃗(s), such that vn(s, ⋅) can be expressed as follows.
vn(s, λ(⋅∣z′, x)) = vn (s,














Now, we plug into the value iteration equation, vn+1 =Hvn.
vn+1(s, x) = min
a∈A(s)




















{xT c(s, ⋅, a) + β ∑
z′,s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)[P (z′)x]α⃗(z′,x)(s)}
= xT [c(s, ⋅, a∗) + β ∑
z′,s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a∗)P (z′)α⃗(z′,x)(s)]
= xT α⃗′(s)
So successive approximations preserve piecewise linearity and concavity of the value func-
tions. Concavity is preserved in the limit as n → ∞. Piecewise linearity is not in general
preserved in the limit, but may be under some specialized conditions, such as the finite
transience condition in [48].
Proof of Proposition 8. Proof follows along the lines of Proposition 1 in [29], by induction
on the value iteration iterates. Suppose v0 = 0 and that vn(s, x) is nondecreasing in x on
X , in the sense of monotone likelihood ratio, for all s ∈ S. Suppose x ⪰LR x̄.
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We first show that σ preserves MLR-order and that Ec is non-decreasing in z′ on Z.





x̄(µ)f(µ), ∀q ∈M,f nondecreasing









P [z′, µ′∣µ], ∀q ∈M,z′ ∈ Z
by (d)
Ô⇒ σ(z′∣x) ≥ σ(z′∣x̄), ∀z′ ∈ Z
Ô⇒ σ(⋅∣x) ⪰S σ(⋅∣x̄)
Ô⇒ ∑
z′
σ(z′∣x)c(s, z′, a) ≥∑
z′
σ(z′∣x̄)c(s, z′, a), ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A,
by condition (a) and Lemma 1.1 in [29].
Next, we show that λ preserves MLR-order.
condition (c) and x ⪰LR x̄Ô⇒ ∑
µ
x(µ)P [z′, ⋅∣µ] ⪰LR∑
µ
x̄(µ)P [z′, ⋅∣µ], ∀z′ ∈ Z
by Lemma 1.3.1 in [29]
Ô⇒ λ(z′, x) ⪰LR λ(z′, x̄), ∀z′ ∈ Z
by Lemma 1.2.2 in [29].





x(µ)P [z′, µ′∣µ] ⋅∑
µ
x(µ)P [z̄, µ̄∣µ] ≥∑
µ
x(µ)P [z′, µ̄∣µ] ⋅∑
µ
x(µ)P [z̄, µ′∣µ]
by Lemma 1.3.2 in [29]
⇐⇒ λ(µ′∣z′, x) ⋅ λ(µ̄∣z̄, x) ≥ λ(µ̄∣z′, x) ⋅ λ(µ′∣z̄, x)
⇐⇒ λ(z′, x) ⪰LR λ(z̄, x).
Altogether, we show that vn+1(s, x) ≥ vn+1(s, x̄).
hz′(s, a, vn(⋅, λ(z′, x))) = c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)vn(s′, λ(z′, x))
≥ c(s, z̄, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z̄, s, a)vn(s′, λ(z̄, x))
by induction hypothesis, condition (b), and λ(z′, x) ⪰LR λ(z̄, x)
≥ c(s, z̄, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z̄, s, a)vn(s′, λ(z̄, x̄))
by induction hypothesis and λ(z̄, x) ⪰LR λ(z̄, x̄)
= hz̄(s, a, vn(⋅, λ(z̄, x̄))).
Since this holds for all a, and σ(⋅∣x) ⪰S σ(⋅∣x̄), we conclude by Lemma 1.1 in [29] that
vn+1(s, x) ≥ vn+1(s, x̄). Monotonicity is preserved in the limit as n → ∞, so v∗(s, x) ≥
v∗(s, x̄) for all s ∈ S.




λ(µ′∣z′, x) = Λ(z′∣z̃, x)λ̃(µ′∣z̃, x),
where Λ(z′∣z̃, x) = ξ(z
′∣z̃)σ̃(z̃∣x)
σ(z′∣x) , which are convex multipliers since ∑z̃ Λ(z′∣z̃, x) = 1.
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Note that Proposition 7 and Jensen’s inequality imply
∑
z̃
Λ(z′∣z̃, x)ṽ(s′, λ̃(z̃, x)) ≤ ṽ(s′, λ(z̃, x)). (A.1)
Proof is by induction on the value iteration iterates. The base case ṽ0 ≤ v0 is satisfied by
assumption. Suppose, for induction, that ṽn ≤ vn, and that vn+1 =Hvn and ṽn+1 = H̃ṽn.




σ(z′∣x) [c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′





σ(z′∣x) [c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)ṽn(s′, λ(z′, x))]

















ξ(z′∣z̃)σ̃(z̃∣x) [c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, s, a)ṽn(s′, λ̃(z̃, x))]
















σ̃(z̃∣x) [c̃(s, z̃, a) + β∑
s′
p̃(s′∣z̃, s, a)ṽn(s′, λ̃(z̃, x))]
by proposition conditions (a) and (b).
= ṽn+1(s, x)
The result follows by taking the limit as n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 11. An equivalent representation of P∗
Ṽ
for all v ∈ V such that v(⋅, x) ∈
Ṽ for all x ∈X , is
∑
s′
v(s′, λ(z′, x)) ∑
j∈Jk




γip(s′∣z′, si, ai), ∀k ∈K.
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Since state dynamics can be described functionally, we may rewrite the above inequality
by applying f and interchanging summations.
∑
j∈Jk
γjv(f(z′, sj, aj), λ(z′, x)) ≤ ∑
i∈Ik
γiv(f(z′, si, ai), λ(z′, x)), ∀k ∈K
Note that this is the inequality test of satisfaction description of P∗.
Proof of Proposition 12. By the inequality test of satisfaction, monotonicity, and Jensen’s
inequality, for all k ∈K and (z′, x) ∈ Z ×X ,
f(z′, sk, ak) ≤S ∑
j∈Jk
γjf(z′, sj, aj)
v(f(z′, sk, ak), λ(z′, x)) ≤ v (∑
j∈Jk
γjf(z′, sj, aj), λ(z′, x))
≤ ∑
j∈Jk
γjv(f(z′, sj, aj), λ(z′, x)).
The following two lemmas will be useful in our proof of Proposition 13 and is based
upon Lemmas 4.7.2 and 4.7.1 in [37], respectively, adapted to our setting here.





y′(s), for all k ∈ S,
and ∑s∈S y(s) = ∑s∈S y′(s). Suppose Ṽ is the space of all non-increasing real-valued







Lemma 2. If f ∶ S ×A↦ R is subadditive, then π ∈ Π such that
π(s) = min{a′ ∶ a′ ∈ arg min
a∈A
f(s, a)}
is non-increasing in s on S.
Proof of Proposition 13. We begin by naturally defining our structured spaces. Let
Ṽ ≜ {v̄ ∶ v̄ non-increasing in s on S}
Π̃ ≜ {π̄ ∶ π̄ non-decreasing in s on S}
P̃ ≜ {p̄ ∶ p̄ non-increasing in s on S for all a ∈ A and
subadditive on S ×A in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance}
C̃ ≜ {c̄ ∶ c̄ non-increasing in s on S for all a ∈ A, subadditive on S ×A}
F̃ ≜ {f ∶ f is subadditive on S ×A and non-increasing in s on S for all a ∈ A.}
We want to prove that (i) - (iv) imply P(a) and B(a) - B(c), at which point we will ap-
ply Proposition 6 to get the desired result. First, P(a) holds because Ṽ is the set of non-
increasing value functions on S, a closed space.
We aim to show B(a) holds. Suppose ṽ ∈ Ṽ . By (iv), we have for s+, s− ∈ S and
a+, a− ∈ A(s+) such that s+ ≥ s− and a+ ≥ a−,
∑
s′≥k
[p(s′∣z′, s+, a+)+p(s′∣z′, s−, a−)] ≤ ∑
s′≥k
[p(s′∣z′, s+, a−)+p(s′∣z′, s−, a+)],∀k ∈ S, z′ ∈ Z.
By Lemma 1, ṽ ∈ Ṽ implies
∑
s′≥k
[p(s′∣z′, s+, a+) + p(s′∣z′, s−, a−)]ṽ(s′) ≤ ∑
s′≥k
[p(s′∣z′, s+, a−) + p(s′∣z′, s−, a+)]ṽ(s′),
for all k ∈ S, z′ ∈ Z. We conclude the E[ṽ∣z′, s, a] is subadditive in (s, a) on S ×A for all
z′ ∈ Z. It follows from (iii) and the fact that subadditivity is a C3 property that hz′(s, a, ṽ)
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is subadditive in (s, a) on S ×A for all z′ ∈ Z. It remains to show that hz′ is non-increasing
in s on S, which follows from (i), (ii), and Lemma 1. So B(a) holds.
Now consider B(b). Suppose f ∈ F̃ . B(b) holds by the following simple argument:
min
a∈A(s)
f(s, a) = f(s, a∗s)




B(c) holds by Lemma 2. The conclusion follows from Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 23. We show first that L♮-convexity is a convex cone and then show
that it is closed under the topology of pointwise convergence.
Suppose g, h are L♮-convex functions defined on an L♮-convex set, X, with correspond-
ing functions ψg(x, ξ) = g(x − ξe) and ψh(x, ξ) = h(x − ξe), and α,β ≥ 0.
Since g, h are L♮-convex functions, we know that ψg and ψh are subadditive on X ×F−,
which gives us the following inequalities, where x1 ≤ x2 and ξ1 ≤ ξ2,
ψg(x1, ξ1) + ψg(x2, ξ2) ≤ ψg(x1, ξ2) + ψg(x2, ξ1)
ψh(x1, ξ1) + ψh(x2, ξ2) ≤ ψh(x1, ξ2) + ψh(x2, ξ1).
Taking the conic combination of these inequalities with weights α,β, and defining ψf =
αψg + βψh and f = αg + βh, we get
ψf(x1, ξ1) + ψf(x2, ξ2) ≤ ψf(x1, ξ2) + ψf(x2, ξ1).
We conclude that ψf is subadditive on X ×F−, f = αg +βh is L♮-convex, and L♮-convexity
is a convex cone. It remains to show that L♮-convexity is closed under the topology of
pointwise convergence, which follows from the fact that subadditive is closed under the
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topology of pointwise convergence.
Proof of Proposition 24. Let Ṽ = {v̄ ∈ V̄ ∶ v̄ is L♮-convex on S}. We show that B(a) -
B(c) hold, and then apply Proposition 6. First, P(a) holds from Proposition 23, since L♮-
convexity is a C3 property. B(a) holds by the proposition assumption. B(b) and B(c) hold
by Lemmas 2 and 3, respectively, in [64].
Proof of Proposition 14. We first show that separability is a convex cone. Suppose we
have two separable functions, f and g, which map S ×A to R, and conic weights α,β ≥ 0.
Clearly,
αf(s, a) + βg(s, a) = αKf(a) + βKg(a) + αLf(s) + βLg(s)
so that αf + βg is a separable function and hence that separability is a convex cone. It
remains to show that f is closed under the topology of pointwise convergence.
Suppose we have a sequence of separable functions {fn} such that fn converges point-
wise to f = limn→∞ fn. Note that f(s, a) = limn→∞ fn(s, a) = limn→∞ [Ln(s) +Kn(a)].
We conclude, by linearity of limits, that fn(s, a) = Ln(s)+Kn(a)→ L(s)+K(a) = f(s, a)
as n→∞, where L(s) = limn→∞Ln(s) and K(a) = limn→∞Kn(a).
Proof of Proposition 15. Suppose v(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X . We begin by defining our
structured spaces:
Π̃ ≜ {π̃ ∶ ∃a ∈ A ∶ π̄(s) = a,∀s ∈ S}
Ṽ ≜ {ṽ ∶ ∃L ∈ L ∶ v̄(s) = L(s)}
C̃ ≜ {c̃ ∶ ∃K ∈ K , L ∈ L ∶ c̄(s, a) =K(a) +L(s)}
P̃ ≜ {p̃ ∶ p̄(⋅∣s, a) = p̄(⋅∣a)}
F̃ ≜ {f ∶ ∃K ∈ K , L ∈ L ∶ f̄(s, a) =K(a) +L(s)}.
We want to show that there exists a set {a(x), x ∈ X} such that π∗(s, x) = a(x) for all
(s, x) ∈ S ×X is stationary optimal by showing that P(a), B(a), B(b), and B(c) hold.
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P(a) holds trivially. We aim to show B(a) holds. Suppose ṽ ∈ Ṽ . Observe that (i) and
(ii) are equivalent to p(⋅∣z′, ⋅, ⋅) ∈ P̃ for all z′ ∈ Z and c(⋅, z′, ⋅) ∈ C̃ for all z′ ∈ Z, which
imply that
hz′(s, a, ṽ) = c(s, z′, a) + β ∑
s′∈S
p(s′∣z′, s, a)ṽ(s′)
=K(z′, a) +L(s, z′) + β ∑
s′∈S
p(s′∣z′, a)L(s′) ∈ F̃ , for all z′ ∈ Z.
B(b) trivially holds. Further, separable functions when maximized yield state-invariant
optimal policies (maximizing L(s)+K(a) over a is equivalent to maximizingK(a) over a
for all s). So B(c) holds. By Proposition 6 we conclude that there exists a set {a(x), x ∈X}
such that π∗(s, x) = a(x) for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X is stationary optimal.
It remains to show that π∗(s, x) = a∗(x) for all s ∈ S, the myopic minimizer of the
function G(x, a). An inductive argument, which follows along the lines of the proof given
in [47] proves this result.
Let L(s, x) = E[L(s, z′)∣x] and K(x, a) = E[K(z′, a)∣x]. The value function of the
M-POMDP, under any policy π is defined as follows, where xt+1 = λ(zt+1, xt) and at =
π(st, xt):









βt [K(xt, at) +L(st, xt)] ∣s0, x0], (A.3)
and where (3) follows from application of assumption (a). From assumption (b), st+1 ∼
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γ(at, zt+1), where γ is a random variable depending only on at and zt+1. Then,




βt [K(xt, at) +L(st, xt)] ∣s0, x0]




βt[K(xt, at) +L(γ(at−1, zt), xt)]∣s0, x0]




βt[K(xt, at) + βL(γ(at, zt+1), xt+1)]∣s0, x0]




βt[K(xt, at) + βL(γ(at, zt+1), λ(zt+1, xt))]∣s0, x0]









p(s′∣zt+1, at)L(s′, z′′)]∣s0, x0]










We conclude that the policy π∗(s, x) = a∗(x) for all s ∈ S is stationary and optimal.
Proof of Proposition 16. We prove the optimal policy result by demonstrating that this in-
ventory problem satisfies the sufficient conditions for a myopic optimal policy presented in
Proposition 15. Note, first that the problem can be equivalently transformed to consider the
action space to be A = Z≥0 the amount of replacement inventory ordered, or as Y (s) = Z≥s,
the order-up-to level, where any order up to level y can be expressed as y = s+a. Then, the
operator H can be rewritten as
Hv(s, x) = min
y≥s ∑
z′
σ(z′∣x) [ĉ(z′, y) + β∑
s′
p(s′∣z′, y)v (s′, λ(z′, x))] .
We note that by replacing the role of a with y in the Proposition 15 insures that c is sep-
arable and p is dependent on only z′ and y. If we define y∗(x) to be the minimizer of
∑z′ σ(z′∣x)ĉ(y, z′), then by applying Proposition 15, we infer that the policy (under action
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space A) π∗(s, x) = y∗(x) − s for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X is stationary optimal.
Finally, we prove that v∗(s, x) is non-decreasing and convex in s for all x ∈ X . Define
Ṽ to be {v ∈ V ∶ v non-decreasing and convex }. We have a functional description of
dynamics, so H may be rewritten as
Hv(s, x) = min
y≥s ∑
z′
σ(z′∣x) [ĉ(z′, y) + βv(f(z′, y), λ(z′, x))] .
Note that f is non-decreasing and convex in s for all a ∈ A (through y) and z′ ∈ Z, with
respect to the usual order on S, a single-point property. Suppose v(⋅, x) is non-decreasing
and convex on S for all x ∈X . By Proposition 8 we conclude that v(f(z′, ⋅), λ(z′, x)) ∈ Ṽ
for all a ∈ A. Due to the separability of ĉ, we know that ĉ(z′, y) + βv(f(z′, y), λ(z′, x)) is
convex in s for all a ∈ A, and conclude that Hv(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈ X . Thus P(a) and P(b)
hold, so v∗(⋅, x) ∈ Ṽ for all x ∈X .
Proof of Proposition 17. By induction on the value iteration iterates. Let ṽz′,0 = 0 for all
z′ ∈ Z and v0 = 0. Suppose vn(s, x) ≥ ∑z′ σ(z′∣x)ṽz′,n(s, x) for all (s, x) ∈ S ×X , where
vn+1 =Hvn and ṽz′,n+1 = H̃z′ ṽz′,n for all z′ ∈ Z, n.




σ(z′∣x) [c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′





{c(s, z′, a) + β∑
s′










σ(z′′∣λ(z′, x))ṽz′′,n(s′, λ(z′, x))}




The result follows by taking the limit as n→∞.
136
APPENDIX B
THE VALUE OF INFORMATION AND AGILITY IN MANAGING DEMAND
UNCERTAINTY
B.1 Figures





















(a) Estimated relative marginal standard error of
AOD information, by varying θq. Standard errors
are normalized to θq = 0.





















(b) Estimated relative marginal standard error of
AOD information, by varying ρ-perfect informa-
tion quality. Standard errors are normalized to
ρ = 1.
Figure B.1: Marginal effects of AOD information on standard error.
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(a) Estimated relative marginal value of AOD in-
formation, by varying θq. Value means are nor-
malized to θq = 0.




















(b) Estimated relative marginal value of AOD in-
formation, in the ρ-perfect representation. Value
means are normalized to θq = 0.
Figure B.2: Marginal value of AOD information and stock-out robustness.




















(a) Normalized value mean for various lead
times, τ . Discounted standard errors are multi-
plied by βτ−1.




















(b) Normalized value mean for various lead
times, τ . Discounted value means are multiplied
by βτ−1.
Figure B.3: Marginal effects of τ .
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(a) Normalized standard error for various modu-
lation parameters, θM .



















(b) Normalized value mean for various modula-
tion parameters, θM .
Figure B.4: Marginal effects of θM .
Figure B.5: Histogram of simulated values by θq, for fixed θM = 0.5, p = 3, τ = 2. The
dashed lines represent the sample means.
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Table B.1: The regression output for the log-linear regressions for value mean, standard
error, stock-outs, and attainability violations.
log(SEθ) log(vθ) log(SOθ) log(ATNθ)
Regressor t-statistic b t-statistic b t-statistic b t-statistic b
Intercept 174.26 1.900 634.55 4.058 361.21 8.432 244.87 7.713
τ = 1 – 0 – 0 – 0 – 0
τ = 2 79.00 0.681 102.64 0.519 18.79 0.354 1.77 0.062
τ = 3 143.11 1.233 179.06 0.905 16.93 0.319 4.05 0.143
τ = 4 192.05 1.655 240.28 1.215 14.73 0.278 5.82 0.205
τ = 5 229.65 1.979 291.39 1.473 11.61 0.219 6.61 0.233
θM = 0.25 – 0 – 0 – 0 – 0
θM = 0.50 9.39 0.072 8.51 0.038 4.31 0.073 23.62 0.744
θM = 0.75 16.02 0.124 15.64 0.071 3.78 0.064 41.09 1.294
θM = 1 2.72 0.021 -9.58 -0.043 -21.38 -0.361 -5.82 -0.183
θp = 3 – 0 – 0 – – – –
θp = 4 -3.85 -0.030 12.21 0.055 – – – –
θp = 5 -3.80 -0.029 21.76 0.098 – – – –
θp = 6 -3.80 -0.029 30.11 0.136 – – – –
θp (numeric) – – – – -3.22 -0.037 – –
θq = 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 – –
θq = 1 4.04 0.038 4.36 0.024 -4.64 -0.096 – –
θq = 2 5.43 0.051 7.14 0.040 -9.42 -0.194 – –
θq = 3 6.01 0.057 9.04 0.050 -21.13 -0.436 – –
θq = 4 6.36 0.060 10.58 0.059 -24.65 -0.509 – –
θq = 5 6.54 0.062 11.42 0.063 -26.85 -0.555 – –
Adjusted R2 99.3% 99.6% 84.4% 85.7%
B.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 18. We use the notation s[t+1∶t+τ] ≜ {st+1, . . . , st+τ}, and likewise de-
fined for the other processes {zt}, {dt}, {µt}, and {at}. It is sufficient to show that the
following relationship holds:
P [s[t+1∶t+τ],z[t+1∶t+τ], d[t+1∶t+τ], µ[t+1∶t+τ]∣It]
= P [s[t+1∶t+τ], z[t+1∶t+τ], d[t+1∶t+τ], µ[t+1∶t+τ]∣st, dt, a[t−τ ∶t−1], xt] ,
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where It = {s[0∶t], z[1∶t], d[0∶t], a[−τ ∶t−1], x0}. Consider the following:
P [s[t+1∶t+τ+1], z[t+1∶t+τ+1], d[t+1∶t+τ+1], µ[t+1∶t+τ]∣It]
= P [st+τ , zt+τ , dt+τ , µt+τ ∣s[t+1∶t+τ−1], z[t+1∶t+τ−1], d[t+1∶t+τ−1], µ[t+1∶t+τ−1],It]⋯
⋯P [s[t+1∶t+τ−1], z[t+1∶t+τ−1], d[t+1∶t+τ−1], µ[t+1∶t+τ−1]∣It]
= P [st+τ , zt+τ , dt+τ , µt+τ ∣st+τ−1, dt+τ−1, µt+τ−1, at−1]⋯





P [st+j+1, zt+j+1, dt+j+1, µt+j+1∣st+j, dt+j, µt+j, at−τ+j] ⋅ P [st+1, zt+1, dt+1, µt+1∣It]
The result follows by noting
P [st+1, zt+1, dt+1, µt+1∣It] =∑
µt
P [st+1, zt+1, dt+1, µt+1∣st, dt, µt, at−τ ] ⋅ P [µt∣It],
and recalling the definition that xt = {P [µt∣It]}.


































dj = δk∣x] .
Lemma 3. E [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] is piecewise linear and convex in y, and has the form:
E [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A0(x)y +B0(x), y ≤ δ1
Am(x)y +Bm(x), δm ≤ y ≤ δm+1
A∣∆τ ∣(x)y +B∣∆τ ∣(x), y ≥ δ∣∆τ ∣.
Proof of Lemma 3. The inner function gτ is convex and piecewise linear by canonical in-
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ventory results. Convexity is preserved by expectation.
Piecewise linearity and the form above follow straightforwardly after noting:
E [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] = ∑
d1,...,dτ



















dj = δ∣x] ⋅ [h̃τ(y − δ)+ + p̃τ(δ − y)+] .
The proof of Proposition 19 follows along the lines of [31] Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 19. The proof is by induction on the value iterates in order to show
that vn(u ∨ y∗τ (x), x) is convex and non-decreasing, where a ∨ b ≜ max{a, b} and vn =
H(d)vn−1. Let v0 = 0, so the induction hypothesis trivially holds. Suppose, for induction,
that vn(u ∨ y∗τ (x), x) is convex and non-decreasing in u, for all x ∈X .




βτE [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
≤ βτE [gτ(y∗τ (x), d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(y∗τ (x) − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))
= βτE [gτ(y∗τ (x), d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(y∗τ (λ(d′, z′, x)), λ(d′, z′, x))
The last equality follows by applying the attainability condition. Note that the induc-
tion hypothesis implies that vn(ũ, λ(d′, z′, x)) = vn(y∗τ (λ(d′, z′, x), λ(d′, z′, x)) for all






βτE [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′








vn(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))
= βτE [gτ(y∗τ (x), d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(y∗τ (λ(d′, z′, x)), λ(d′, z′, x))
= βτE [gτ(y∗τ (x), d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(y∗τ (x) − d′, λ(d′, z′, x)).
Second case: u > y∗τ (x). An upper bound on vn+1 follows straightforwardly by noting





βτE [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′








vn(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))
= βτE [gτ(u, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(u − d′, λ(d′, z′, x)).
The last equality follows by convexity of E [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] (Lemma 3) and the induc-
tion hypothesis on vn. Thus, we conclude:
vn+1(u,x) = βτE [gτ(u ∨ y∗τ (x), d1, . . . , dτ)∣x]
+ β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)vn(u ∨ y∗τ (x) − d′, λ(d′, z′, x)).
The result follows by taking the limit n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 20. Suppose y∗τ (x) = δm. By the convexity of the definition of y∗τ (x)
as the smallest minimizer of E [gτ(y, d1, . . . , dτ)∣x] and convexity, ordering up to δm−1 and
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δm+1 yield the following set of inequalities:
Am−1(x)δm−1(x)δm−1 +Bm−1(x) > Am(x)δm +Bm(x)
Am+1(x)δm+1 +Bm+1(x) ≥ Am(x)δm +Bm(x).
The result follows by plugging in for the respective A and B functions and rearranging
terms.




λ(µ′∣d′, z′, x) = Λ(d′, z′, z̃, x)λ̃(µ′∣d′, z̃, x),
where
σ(d′, z′∣x) = ∑
µ′,µ
q(z′∣µ′, µ)P [d′∣µ′, µ]P [µ′∣µ]x(µ)
σ̃(d′, z̃∣x) = ∑
µ′,µ
q̃(z̃∣µ′, µ)P [d′∣µ′, µ]P [µ′∣µ]x(µ)




and {Λ(d′, z′, z̃, x)} convex multipliers since ∑z̃ Λ(d′, z′, z̃, x) = 1.
Note that the concavity of v with respect to x ([48]) and Jensen’s inequality imply
∑
z̃
Λ(d′, z′, z̃, x)ṽ(u′, λ̃(d′, z̃, x)) ≤ ṽ(u′, λ(d′, z̃, x)). (B.1)
Proof is by induction on the value iteration iterates. The base case ṽ0 ≤ v0 is satisfied by
assumption. Suppose, for induction, that ṽn ≤ vn, and that vn+1 =Hvn and ṽn+1 = H̃ṽn. For
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E[gτ(y, d[1∶τ])∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′





E[gτ(y, d[1∶τ])∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)ṽn(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
by the induction hypothesis
≥ min
y≥u
{E[gτ(y, d[1∶τ])∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′,z̃




{E[gτ(y, d[1∶τ])∣x] + β ∑
d′,z′,z̃
ξ(z′∣z̃)σ̃(d′, z̃∣x)ṽn(y − d′, λ̃(d′, z̃, x))}




E[gτ(y, d[1∶τ])∣x] + β∑
d′,z̃
σ̃(d′, z̃∣x)ṽn(y − d′, λ̃(d′, z̃, x))
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
= ṽn+1(u,x)
The result follows by taking the limit as n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 22. We’ve shown that for the τ ′-lagged problem, it is sufficient for
the DM to make decisions at epoch t on the basis of (ut, xt). Suppose that the DM is a
clairvoyant for τ ′ − τ epochs into the future, so that the DM makes decisions at epoch t on
the basis of (ut, xt, dt+1, . . . , dt+τ ′−τ , zt+1, . . . , zt+τ ′−τ), i.e. the DM knows the realizations
of the demand and AOD observations for τ ′ − τ epochs into the future.
Consider the single period cost function for this new clairvoyant DM for the τ ′-lagged
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problem. Let d[1∶τ ′−τ] = (d1, . . . , dτ ′−τ) and z[1∶τ ′−τ] be defined likewise.
E
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣




























∣d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦







































∣λτ ′−τ(d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The first equality follows by noting that the clairvoyant demand information allows us
to reformulate the cost function around the remaining random variables (dτ ′−τ , . . . , dτ ′)
and a new stocking decision ȳ. The second equality follows by noting than an equivalent
sufficient statistic for the τ ′-lagged clairvoyant is (u−∑τ
′−τ
j=1 dj, λ
τ ′−τ(d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x)),
where λτ ′−τ is the (τ ′ − τ)-fold Bayesian update on the basis of the clairvoyant demand
realizations d[1∶τ ′−τ] and AOD observations z[1∶τ ′−τ].
Let v∗τ ′,c to be the fixed point of Hτ
′
c the Bellman operator of the τ ′-lagged clairvoyant
problem (defined below), and
Hτ
′






















σ(dτ ′−τ+1, zτ ′−τ+1∣λτ
′−τ(d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x)) ×⋯
× v (ȳ − d1, λ(d1, z1, x), d[2∶τ ′−τ+1], z[2∶τ ′−τ+1])}.
Note that this is the τ -lagged Bellman operator, except with the holding cost and penalty
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cost per unit dependent on τ ′ instead of τ . By using the relationships βτ ′−τ h̃τ ≤ h̃τ ′ and
βτ






τ ′−τ(d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ], x)) ≤ βτ−τ
′
v∗τ ′,c (u,x, d[1∶τ ′−τ], z[1∶τ ′−τ]) .
However, since the clairvoyance assumption is an information relaxation, by weak duality










There are some atypical characteristics to the optimality equation in (3.3) — namely, the
dependence of C(s, d, a, a−τ) on the τ -lagged action a−τ . We seek to reformulate the prob-
lem in a more familiar way by shifting the perspective of the DM at each decision epoch.
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βtcτat + βt+τ [hτ(st+τ + at − dt+τ)+ + pτ(dt+τ − st+τ − at)+]∣I0] ,
(B.6)
where D is the term in line (B.4).
Minimizing the expectation in (B.6) is equivalent to minimizing the total discounted
costs, due to the independence of the cost in the first τ epochs with respect to control.
This corresponds to the Bellman optimality equation v = H(b)v, where H(b) is defined as
follows, and we let a[−1∶−τ] = (a−1, . . . , a−τ):
H(b)v(s, d, a[−1∶−τ], x) = min
a
{cτa + βτE[hτ(sτ + a − dτ)+ + pτ(dτ − sτ − a)+∣s, d, a[−1∶−τ], x]
+ β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)v(s + a−τ − d, d′, a, a−1, . . . , a−τ+1, λ(d′, z′, x))}.
(B.7)
At first, this reformulation may not appear to give much computational advantage using
traditional solution procedures such as value iteration or policy iteration, since computing
the expectation in the single period cost may itself be computationally expensive. However,
we will show that there are analytical advantages to the reformulation that can be used to
148
develop specialized solution procedures.
Note that the inner function gτ(sτ , a, dτ) = h(sτ + a− dτ)+ + p(dτ − sτ − a)+ is familiar
from canonical inventory problems. The function gτ is piecewise linear and convex, and
these structural properties are preserved under expectation. Further, gτ is dependent on the
action of the current decision epoch, rather than on the past action, which elucidates the
dependence on action in the optimization within Equation B.7.
There may be interpretative advantages to different, equivalent formulations. In the
original formulation, costs are accounted for on delivery. In this new reformulation, costs
are accounted for at the time of decision by projecting forward τ decision epochs.
We may further modify the formulation by defining yt = st + ∑τj=1 at−j + at − dt, the
total amount of inventory possessed through the interval [t, t + τ], and noting that st+τ =
yt − at −∑τ−1j=0 dt+j . If we let ut = yt − at be the inventory position through interval [t, t + τ]
before ordering, then we have that ut+1 = yt − dt+1, which is familiar as the inventory
difference equation under backlogging. The resulting optimality equation is v = H(c)v,
where H(c) is defined to be:
H(c)v(u,x) = min
y≥u















σ(d′, z′∣x)v(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))}.
(B.8)
Then we note that the expectation of the single period cost with respect to d1, . . . , dτ only
depends on x. Thus, we have projected out the dependence on the inventory stock level in
the single period cost function. This step is a transformation analogous to the transforma-
tions used for determining (1) base stock optimal policies when τ = 1 in [31], and (2) the
optimality of myopic policies in [47] for MDPs and in [5] for M-POMDPs.
Finally, denote let the operator H̃ from Equation 3.4 be denotedH(d), as well, to denote
the sequence of the reformulation.
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B.4 Relationships Between the Fixed Points
In this appendix, we detail the relationship between the fixed points of the operators {H(i) ∶
i = a, b, c, d}, which we denote by v(i) the unique fixed point of H(i), that define alternative
dynamic programming formulations of the inventory control problem of Section 3.2.
For ease of reference, we provide the different operator definitions below, where we
suppress t from the notation for compactness:
H(a)v(a)(s, d, a[−1∶−τ], x) = min
a
{cτa−τ + hτ(s + a−τ − d)+ + pτ(d − s − a−τ)++
β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)v(a)(s − d + a−τ , d′, a, . . . , a−τ+1, λ(d′, z′, x))}
H(b)v(b)(s, d, a[−1∶−τ], x) = min
a
{cτa + βτE[hτ(sτ + a − dτ)+ + pτ(dτ − sτ − a)+∣s, d, a[−1∶−τ], x]
+ β ∑
d′,z′
σ(d′, z′∣x)v(b)(s + a−τ − d, d′, a, a−1, . . . , a−τ+1, λ(d′, z′, x))}
H(c)v(c)(u,x) = min
y≥u















σ(d′, z′∣x)v(c)(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))}
H(d)v(d)(u,x) = min
y≥u















σ(d′, z′∣x)v(d)(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))}.
The relationship between the (a) and (b) formulations is straightforward, as detailed in
Section 3.3.1: v(a) =D + v(b), where




βt+τ [hτ(st+τ + at − dt+τ)+ + pτ(dt+τ − st+τ − at)+]∣I0] .
150
The (b) and (c) formulations are equivalent when u = s − d +∑τj=1 a−j . Thus,





The relationship between the (c) and (d) formulations requires some work. Note that
since a = (a)+ − (−a)+ for any a ∈ R,

















Plugging into the equation v(c) =H(c)v(c):






















σ(d′, z′∣x)v(c)(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))}.
Let ṽ(u,x) = v(c)(u,x) + cu and plug into the fixed point equation v(c) =H(c)v(c):





















σ(d′, z′∣x)ṽ(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x)) − βcτ(y − d′)}.
Finally, if we substitute once more for y from Equation B.9, we get:




dj ∣x] + βcτE[d′∣x]
+min
y≥u















σ(d′, z′∣x)ṽ(y − d′, λ(d′, z′, x))}.
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Thus, we get that ṽ =K +H(d)ṽ, where K = cτ(1−β)E [∑τj=1 dj ∣x]+βcτE[d′∣x]. It is then
straightforward to show that v(d) = ṽ − K1−β .
Altogether, the relationship between v(a) and v(d) is as follows:




where u = s − d +∑τj=1 a−j and D, K are defined above.
B.5 On Stock-outs
B.5.1 Stock-out Robust Policies
In the rest of this paper, we have been concerned with policies that minimize expected total
discounted costs. However, the DM may have additional objectives that reflect the DM’s
risk profile, e.g. hedging against the upper tail of the total cost distribution or maintaining a
particular service level at all times. In this subsection, we develop policies that consider the
frequency with which orders are backlogged (and correspondingly, robust to dips in service
level). The true stock-out penalty term pτ should capture the per-unit cost of backlogging,
incorporating all risk tolerances to stock-outs. However, it is often difficult in practice to
determine a “true value” of pτ that incorporates all of these notions of risk, because it may
be unnatural for the DM to “price” their risk aversion to stock-outs on a per-unit basis. It
may be more natural to express risk aversion in terms of “maintaining a particular service
level” or “keeping the probability of stock-outs below a certain threshold”. Therefore, we
consider pτ to reflect all other per-unit costs pertaining backlogging and treat the DM’s risk
aversion in terms of a chance constraint. We seek to illuminate the relationship between
this chance constrained formulation and our original formulation by viewing the term pτ as
a way to control the stock-out level.
We consider base stock levels, yθp,τ(x), parametrized by hypothetical stock-out penalty
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values θp, that are the smallest (and hence unique) minimizer such that:
yθp,τ(x) ∈ arg min
y













Let πθp,τ(u,x) ≜ max{yθp,τ(x) − u,0} for all u,x, the base stock policy generated by θp.
The next proposition states that, given the same underlying uncertainty realization, the
empirical stock-out rate (for any finite horizon) will be smaller under a base stock policy
generated by a higher penalty term, θp.














where {st} are generated by πp and {s′t} are generated by πθ′p .
Proof of Proposition 25. Suppose, without loss of generality, that s0 = s′0. The dynam-
ics for {st} and {s′t} are described functionally in terms of the like realizations of de-
mand {dt(ω)} (the ω is included to denote that these are realizations of demand rather
than random variables). Further, the belief evolution {xt} and {x′t} are due to common
realizations of demand {dt(ω)} and AOD observations {zt(ω)}. Thus xt = x′t for all
t. The result follows by simply noting that yp(x) ≤ yp′(x) for all x ∈ X . Thus, if
s′t+1(ω) = yp′(xt)−dt(ω) < 0, then st+1(ω) < 0, but the converse is not necessarily true.
The finite horizon in Proposition 25 resembles our numerical analysis in Section 3.5,
in which we will approximate the infinite horizon value of policies using Monte Carlo
simulation over a sufficiently long finite horizon. Proposition 25 formalizes the intuition
that, given the same sample path, the realized stock-out rate will be less under a base stock
policy that penalizes stock-outs more will always generate a stock-out rate at most as high
as a base stock policy that penalizes stock-outs less.
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Increasing the parameter θp used to generate policy πθp,τ decreases the stock-out rate
path-wise, by Proposition 25, but it also generates policies are suboptimal due to the mis-
match between the true stock-out penalty and the penalty used to generate the policy
πθp,τ . We refer to the marginal difference in value, given some initialization (u0, x0), to
be v∗τ (u0, x0)− vπθp,τ (u0, x0) as the marginal value of stock-out robustness, which we note
will typically be ≤ 0.
Relationship to Chance Constraints. We seek to illuminate the intuition behind gen-
erating these stock-out robust policies by relating these policies to a chance constrained
version of the problem. Consider the following formulation of the problem, in which the
DM wants the a priori probability of a stock-out to be less than or equal to α (the service







βt(h̃τ(st + at−τ − dt)+ + p̃τ(dt − st − at−τ)+)∣I0]
s.t. P [st < 0∣I0] ≤ α, ∀t
The constraint P [st < 0∣I0] ≤ α for all t is a chance constraint, and under this formulation
of the problem it is a hard constraint (the service level must be above 1 − α). Note that
we can rewrite the constraint as E[1{st < 0}∣I0] ≤ α, and then consider the following
Lagrangian relaxation with penalties λ = {λt} ≥ 0 (an abuse of notation, not to be confused


















βt (h̃τ(st + at−τ − dt)+ + p̃τ(dt − st − at−τ)+ +
λt
βt







βt (h̃τ(st + at−τ − dt)+ + (p̃τ +
λt
βt(dt − st − at−τ)







βt (h̃τ(st + at−τ − dt)+ + p̄τ(dt − st − at−τ)+) ∣I0] , where p̄τ ≥ p̃τ .
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Hence, increasing the penalty term acts like including a Lagrangian multiplier in the La-
grangian relaxation of the chance constrained formulation of the problem. Thus, we may
approximate the optimal policies generated in the chance constrained problem by increas-
ing the penalty term and solving the original problem. Since base stock policies are optimal
in the unconstrained original formulation of the problem (under an attainability condition),
we generate base stock policies by varying the underage penalty as approximations to the
chance-constrained problem.
B.5.2 Numerical Analysis
Here we present the numerical results pertaining to θp and stock-outs for the numerical
example of Section 3.5. We denote by SOθ, the number of observed stock-outs in the









Effect of θp on discounted costs. Recall that we discussed the relationship between
expected total discounted costs (the mean value, vθ) and the per-unit underage penalty
parameter θp as the value of stock-out robustness. We showed in Proposition 19 that base
stock policies are optimal under an attainability condition that we found to be quite robust
in this numerical example. Thus, we expect the SVM-generated base stock policy with
parameter θp equal to the true per-unit underage penalty cost p = 3 to have the lowest
mean value, even though our policy generation method is approximate in nature and subject
to classification error (due to the SVM partitioning method) and simulation error (due to
the Monte Carlo policy evaluation). All other per-unit underage penalty parameters, θp =
4,5,6, generate suboptimal base stock policies due to the uniqueness of the optimal base
stock levels, and thus we expect higher mean values. Additionally, we discussed in Section
3.4.5 this trade-off between sub-optimality of policies generated by θp larger than p = 3
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under the term the value of stock-out robustness.
Following Equation 3.9, we estimate the average effects of varying θp and θq while
holding τ and θM constant, by normalizing to θp = 3 (the true penalty term) and θq = 0
(perfect AOD information) and computing e(bθp+bθq ). In Figure B.2 we can see that increas-
ing θp yields a significant and greater degree of sub-optimality in terms of long-run costs
for our example. Choosing the policy parametrized θp = 3, aligned with the true per-unit
underage cost p, is estimated to be worth 5.4% less in long run costs than θp = 4, 9.4% less
in long run costs than θp = 5, and 12.7% less in long run costs for θp = 6. Further, in Figure
B.2(c) we again see that for these parameter values the mean value is concave, which means
that there is increasing marginal effect on decreasing long run costs as θp approaches p = 3.
Effect of θp on variance. In this example, we see less drastic effects on standard error
in changing θp than in changing AOD information quality. These results are depicted in
Figures B.1c, B.1d, and B.1e. Increasing the stock-out penalty term has modest effects in
reducing variance of long run costs. However, for this example the effects are concentrated
to increasing θp over the true penalty, p = 3. This result may be due to the nature of this
particular example, in which increasing the penalty from θp = 3 to θp = 4 leads to a more
significant increase in base stock levels in general than increasing θp = 4 to θp = 5. These
effects also might alternatively be due to the narrow range of θp that were tested.
On Stock-outs. For the DM concerned with service level, the third metric that we
measure is stock-out rates.
Somewhat unexpectedly the step-wise log-linear regression with categorical regressors
(Equation 3.8) yielded some θp values with borderline statistically significant, so we ran the
same regression replacing the categorical θp regressors with the numeric log(θp) regressor,
the results of which are in Table B.1. This log-log regression amounts to an implicit as-
sumption of constant elasticity of stock-outs with respect to stock-out penalty parameter
θp.
The predicted effects on stock-outs are depicted in Figure B.6, and each graph is nor-
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(a) Predicted percentage of stock-outs for various
underage penalty parameters, θp, normalized to
the median stock-out rate at θp = 1.




















(b) Predicted percentage of stock-outs for vari-
ous AOD parameters, θq, normalized to the me-
dian stock-out rate at θq = 0.




















(c) Predicted percentage of stock-outs for various
lead times, τ , normalized to the median stock-out
rate at τ = 1.




















(d) Predicted percentage of stock-outs for vari-
ous modulation parameters, θM , normalized to
the median stock-out rate at θM = 0.25.
Figure B.6: Marginal effects on stock-outs.
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Figure B.7: Histogram of simulated values by θp, for fixed θM = 0.5, θq = 2, τ = 2. The
dashed lines represent the sample means.
malized to median stock-out rates. Our first observation is that the system is relatively
stable with respect to stock-outs. The majority of the sampled stock-out rates from our
Monte Carlo simulation were less than 10%, and the highest sampled stock-out rate was
11.2%.
As Figure B.6a shows, increasing θp has an effect of decreasing stock-outs as we dis-
cussed in Section 3.4.5. However, for this numerical example and over the range of θp
considered, this effect is relatively insignificant. Since the effect of increasing θp yielded
notable increases in discounted costs, as we discussed earlier, deviating from θp = 3 is inad-
visable in this particular example. We anticipate in other examples, the effect of increasing
θp on reducing stock-outs might be more pronounced.
Counter-intuitively, we see in Figure B.6b, that better AOD information yielded an
increase in stock-outs for this numerical example. There are different potential explanations
for why we observe this phenomenon. One potential explanation is that the presence of
uncertainty due to poor information quality may cause the order-up-to levels to increase,
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as the DM hedges against uncertainty by ordering more inventory — leading to a lower
stock-out rate. Essentially, in this interpretation, better AOD information allows the DM to
practice leaner inventory management, with lower inventory levels. This explanation seems
especially plausible when the DM is in a low-demand state of the economy, but believes
(due to information uncertainty) they might be in a high-demand state of the economy.
Counter to this explanation, if the DM is in a high-demand state state of the economy, but
believes they might be in a low-demand state, then the DM might order less. The aggregate
effect on stock-outs would thus depend on the balance between these two effects.
Similarly to what we have observed with our discounted costs and standard error, as
θM either approaches 0 or 1, stock-outs decrease. This reinforces the observation that more
stable and predictable macroeconomic environments yield better system performance, in
terms each of our metrics.
Finally, the effect of τ on stock-outs is non-monotone in our example. Thus, we cannot
make a plausible generalization that increasing or decreasing lead times will improve or ex-
acerbate stock-outs. Altogether, the effect of managerial decisions on stock-outs should be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis since simple rules-of-thumb pertaining to the relationship
between stock-outs and some of our input parameters remain elusive.
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APPENDIX C
GENERATING TRUST IN DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES USING ROBUST,
DATA-DRIVEN MARKOV GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO PRESTIGE
C.1 Determining the Transition Probabilities
In determining the transition probabilities in this section, we suppose that the actions are
feasible, namely that the context for the actions are satisfied. We first determine the transi-
tion probabilities for game nodes. Note
P [St+1∣St,ADt ,AAt ] = ∑
S′t∈{0,1}N
P [St+1, S′t∣St,ADt ,AAt ]
= ∑
S′t∈{0,1}N
P [St+1∣S′t,ADt ,AAt ]P [S′t∣St,ADt ,AAt ]
The terms on the right hand side decompose into the following
P [S′t∣St,ADt ,AAt ] = ∏
n∈N
P [s′t(n)∣St,ADt ,AAt ]
P [St+1∣S′t,ADt ,AAt ] = ∏
n∈N
P [st+1(n)∣S′t,ADt ,AAt ] .
We can compute these constituent probabilities for s′t(n) using the dynamics rules in Sec-
tion 4.3. Suppose agent k can take action akt (n) at epoch t and node n that has three com-
ponents: τ kt (n) corresponding to a Take move, ϕkt (n) corresponding to a Protect move, and
ωkt (n) corresponding to an Observe move. Take moves take values in {0,1}, Protect moves
take values in [0,1], and Observe moves take values in {0,1}. Take and Protect moves are
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the only actions that affect the transition dynamics here.
P [s′t(n) = st(n)∣τDt (n) = 0] = 1
P [s′t(n) = D∣st(n) = A, τDt (n) = 1, ϕAt (n)] = PD(τDt (n)) ⋅ (1 − ϕAt (n))
P [s′t(n) = A∣st(n) = A, τDt (n) = 1] = 1 − PD(τDt (n)) ⋅ (1 − ϕAt (n))
P [s′t(n) = D∣st(n) = 0, τDt (n) = 1] = PD(τDt (n))
P [s′t(n) = 0∣st(n) = 0, τDt (n) = 1] = 1 − PD(τDt (n))
P [s′t(n) = D∣st(n) = D, τDt (n) = 1] = 1.
We note that Protect moves are only feasible for the adversary if they already control the
contested node. In the same manner we can compute the constituent probabilities for
st+1(n). These constituent probabilities are then:
P [st+1(n) = s′t(n)∣aAt (n) = 0] = 1
P [st+1(n) = 0∣s′t+1(n) = 0, aAt (n)] = 1
P [st+1(n) = A∣s′t(n′) = D, τAt (n) = 1, ϕDt (n)] = PA(τAt (n)) ⋅ (1 − ϕDt (n))
P [st+1(n) = D∣s′t(n) = D, τAt (n) = 1, ϕDt (n)] = 1 − PA(τAt (n)) ⋅ (1 − ϕDt (n)).
The transition probabilities for non-game nodes are considerably simpler. The probabil-
ity of a take move by agent k on node n at epoch t, where n is a node that is accessible only
to agent k, is a Bernoulli random variable with probability of a successful take P k(τ kt (n)).
C.2 Updating the Belief Distribution
The defender selects action πDrob(Rt), where Rt is a random variable that is independent of
all other random variables, has a state space identical to that of the state of the precedence
and development process graph, has {P [Rt∣I Dt ]} =XDt as its probability mass vector, and
reveals its realization at epoch t. Note that when the detection system observes the state of
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the current precedence graph precisely (i.e., P [Zt∣St] = 1 if and only if zt(n) = st(n) for
all n), then the defender knows the state of the precedence graph exactly and this heuristic
selects action πD(St) with probability 1.
The array {P [St∣I Dt ]} is called the belief distribution. We note that
{Zt, Zt−1, . . . ,ADt−1,ADt−2, . . . , πA, πD}
can be deduced from
{Zt, Zt−1, . . . ,Rt−1,Rt−2, . . . , πA, πD},
but not vice versa, where Rt is the realization of the random variable having the same state
space as {St, t = 0,1, . . .} and probability mass function P [ ⋅ ∣I Dt ] such that ADt = πD(Rt)
with probability P [Rt∣I Dt ]. (With some potential for confusion, we are using the same
terms to represent random variables and their realizations.) We remark that given Rt, we
can determine ADt = πD(Rt); however, there may be several values of Rt such that ADt =
πD(Rt). Thus, going forward we will assume I Dt = {Zt, Zt−1, . . . ,Rt−1,Rt−2, . . . , πA, πD}.
Noting I Dt+1 = {ZDt+1,Rt,I Dt },
P [St+1∣I Dt+1] = P [St+1∣Zt+1,Rt,I Dt ]
=
P [St+1, Zt+1,Rt∣I Dt ]
∑
St+1
P [St+1, Zt+1,Rt∣I Dt ]
=





P [St+1, St, Zt+1,Rt∣I Dt ].
It is then straightforward to show that
P [St+1, St, Zt+1,Rt∣I Dt ] = P [Zt+1∣St+1]P [St+1∣St, πA(St), πD(Rt)]P [St,Rt∣I Dt ],
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where P [St,Rt∣I Dt ] = P [Rt∣St,I Dt ]P [St∣I Dt ]. By assumption,
P [Rt∣St,I Dt ] = P [Rt∣I Dt ],
and hence
P [St+1, St, Zt+1,Rt∣I Dt ] = P [Zt+1∣St+1]P [St+1∣St, πA(St), πD(Rt)]P [Rt∣I Dt ]P [St∣I Dt ].
C.3 Thompson Sampling
The general, non-stationary Thompson sampling algorithm progresses as follows. Suppose
the decision-maker (DM) has an action set At for t = 0, . . . , T . After the DM chooses
action at, the system generates an outcome yt according to a known probability distri-
bution qθt(⋅∣at), where θt is unknown but learned through successive Bayesian updates.
The system then generated a reward rt(yt) according to a known reward function rt. The
Thompson sampling policy at each epoch t then samples the estimated parameter θ̂t accord-
ing to the Bayesian belief distribution over possible θt, chooses the action that maximizes
Eqθt [r(yt)∣at], and updates the belief distribution according to the observation yt.
We see the connection between our heuristic and Thompson sampling by considering
θt = St, yt = Rt, and −rt(Rt) = V
πDrob
t (Rt∣πAt ) (the cost-to-go evaluation of πDrob).
C.4 Computational Tractability
For the sake of simplicity of exposition in this section, we assume that none of the nodes
in the graph “exist”, in the sense of Section 4.3 in which they are in either state A or D.
Further, we restrict our attention to “take” moves, and denote the take action simply by aA
for the attacker, and aD for the defender. Finally, we assume that the nodes states A and D
are encoded such that A > D.
Due to the nature of trust problem applications, we have demonstrated that the prece-
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dence graph structure is a natural model for the state of the system that facilitates con-
ceptual domain understanding. Further, the information primitives (attack/counter-attack
success probabilities) are provided at the level of nodes in the precedence graph. In order
to utilize the POMG framework, we demonstrated how to map these information primi-
tives into POMG model primitives in the form of conditional state transition probabilities,
{P [St+1∣St,AAt ,ADt ]}.
Since the information primitives, i.e. the attack/counter-attack success probabilities
{PA(aA(n))} and {PD(aD(n))}, differ in form to the POMG model primitives, i.e. the
conditional state transition probabilities, {P [St+1∣St,AAt ,ADt ]}, prior to any solution pro-
cedure we must go through a computationally taxing pre-processing step which takes these
information primitives and computes all of the relevant conditional state transition prob-
abilities. There are 2N possible states and 2N × 2N × NA × ND transition probabilities,
where NA is the number of possible node attacks available to the attacker, and ND is
likewise defined for the defender. Each conditional state transition probability requires
computation of the conditional node transition probabilities {P [st+1(n)∣S′t,AAt ,ADt ]} and
{P [s′t(n)∣St,AAt ,ADt ]}. For large N , these computations become intractable.
In the following proposition, we present a result that demonstrates that the matrix of
conditional state transition probabilities is sparse due to the nature of the rules governing
state dynamics. We use this fact to significantly reduce the computational burden of this
pre-processing step in our numerical results in Section 4.6.
Let f(s,AD) be the N -dimensional vector representing the best possible outcome for
the defender, in which all of the defender’s counter-attacks are successful. Likewise, let
g(s,AA) be the N -dimensional vector representing the worst possible outcome for the
defender in which all of the defender’s counter-attacks are unsuccessful and all of the at-
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tacker’s attacks are successful. These vectors have the following closed form expressions:
f(s,AD)[n] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
D, if PD(aD(n)) > 0, aD(n) > 0, s(n) = A
D, if s(n) = D
A, if s(n) = A, aD(n) = 0
g(s,AA)[n] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A, if PA(aA(n)) > 0, aA(n) > 0
A, if s(n) = A
D, if s(n) = D, aA(n) = 0.
Finally, let ⪯ be the binary operator, which induces a partial order on the state space, such
that s ⪯ s′ if and only if s[n] ≤ s′[n] for all n ∈ N .
Proposition 26. Given (πA, πD),
f(St, πD(St)) ⪯ St+1 ⪯ g(St, πA(St)).
Proof. This is a straightforward application of the state dynamics rules. The defender can-
not do better than all of his counter-attacks being successful, and cannot do worse than all
of his counter-attacks being unsuccessful and all of the attacker’s attacks being success-
ful.
Let s ∶ s′ ≜ {s′′ ∈ {D,A}N ∶ s ⪯ s′′ ⪯ s′}, the set of all state vectors “between” s and s′
in the sense of the partial ordering induced by ⪯. The following result is a straightforward
corollary to the prior proposition that demonstrates the sparsity of the matrix of conditional
state transition probabilities.
Corollary 6. P [St+1 = s∣St,AAt ,ADt ] = 0, for all s ∉ f(St,ADt ) ∶ g(St,AAt ).
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